As Egypt navigates one of the most difficult economic moments in its recent history, the grip of International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions continues to tighten. Within government and financial circles, a familiar refrain echoes: "There is no alternative to the Fund... Its conditions are non-negotiable... Compliance guarantees international market confidence." This mindset does not arise in isolation. It reflects a dominant institutional culture spanning ministries of finance and planning, central banks, financial regulators, major banks, investment funds, and policy advisers. Many within this system do not necessarily serve foreign agendas, but they operate on the belief that Egypt's economy should be managed externally — dictated by global markets rather than local priorities. IMF endorsement, a prerequisite for stability? As a result, a kind of "official economic doctrine" has taken root. It sees IMF endorsement as a prerequisite for stability — even at the cost of national sovereignty, social cohesion, and local industry. For this economic elite, nothing matters more than maintaining Egypt's credit rating, attracting dollar inflows, and retaining the confidence of foreign investors. In this worldview, the IMF acts as a guarantor of good behaviour. Its seal of approval is seen as essential — even when the social consequences are severe. Their thinking is shaped by a global financial order that rewards dependency and punishes deviation. Independency Yet this dependency carries enormous risks. Egypt's current economic structure is heavily reliant on external borrowing to cover fiscal deficits, on volatile short-term capital to ensure liquidity, and — most dangerously — on the US dollar to import most strategic goods. To those who subscribe to IMF orthodoxy, rejecting its advice invites immediate retaliation: higher global borrowing costs, capital flight, and ratings downgrades. State's only legitimate role is as regulator There is also a prevailing conviction among many in power that the state cannot manage the economy, that the market is inherently more efficient, and that subsidies are wasteful. Many believe the state's only legitimate role is as regulator — a view they claim reflects best practices in advanced economies. Personal benefits Some within this circle were trained within the IMF and similar institutions, while others see these organisations as the natural final stop in their careers. Beyond ideology, there are also direct benefits. The financial sector — both banking and non-banking — tends to profit in the environment created by IMF programmes, particularly through privatisation and borrowing. A way out of IMF dependency This raises a critical question: Is dependency on the IMF truly inevitable? The answer, from a national interest perspective, must be a resounding no. The cost of blind compliance is far greater than the risks of defiance. Building a national vision rooted in sovereignty and social justice is not just desirable — it is essential for Egypt's survival and long-term progress. The IMF model has failed in theory and practice. Dozens of countries have seen its policies deliver the opposite of their intended results. Egypt is no exception. The claim that "global markets know your interests better than you do" has yielded ballooning public debt, the collapse of the middle class, the erosion of domestic production, and growing inequality. Bold defiance of IMF orthodoxy Meanwhile, the global stage offers compelling counterexamples — countries that defied IMF orthodoxy and achieved real progress through sovereign economic strategies. Malaysia, under Mahathir Mohamad in 1998, refused IMF demands during the Asian financial crisis. It kept subsidies for food and fuel and imposed capital controls. Within two years, Malaysia had stabilised and returned to growth, emerging stronger, more independent, and economically diversified. Ecuador, under Rafael Correa, declared a portion of its national debt illegitimate and refused to pay. He expelled the IMF mission, redirected spending towards healthcare and education, and slashed poverty rates while achieving long-term economic stability. Argentina, under Néstor Kirchner, emerged from a catastrophic default by suspending debt repayments, renegotiating terms, raising wages, and expanding social support. Growth rates soared above 8 per cent for several years, unemployment fell, and purchasing power increased. These examples are not isolated miracles — they are the result of deliberate choices to prioritise sovereignty, productivity, and social welfare over compliance. Prescription Egypt now stands at a critical juncture. The government must urgently re-evaluate its relationship with the IMF and adopt a bold national economic programme. Such a plan should include: * Replacing foreign borrowing with productive domestic financing * Accelerating import substitution through local production * Reforming the tax system to be progressive and equitable * Redirecting public spending towards education, health, agriculture, and industry * Diversifying international partnerships beyond the Western bloc * Establishing participatory economic oversight mechanisms Of course, this path comes with risks — a possible downgrade in credit ratings, temporary dollar shortages, and potential resistance from the bureaucracy. But each of these risks is manageable. Credit downgrades can be countered by communicating a clear national development vision and offering credible alternatives, such as diaspora bonds, local sukuk, and partnerships with institutions like the BRICS New Development Bank or the Asian Development Bank. Dollar shortages can be managed by restricting non-essential imports, promoting local currency trade agreements, and halting luxury imports temporarily. Inflation can be mitigated through smart social protection programmes and strict market oversight. Bureaucratic resistance can be tackled with a capable economic taskforce, bold reform-minded cadres, and transparent parliamentary oversight. Tasks awaiting post-election government As Egypt prepares to form a new government following parliamentary elections, this is the moment to reset. The new administration's top priority must be freeing the economy from external domination and initiating a sovereign, disciplined reform agenda. This transition should not be a simple reshuffle of posts. It must be the launch of a new national vision. It is now the responsibility of parliament, civil society, and Egypt's economic elite to bring the country's relationship with the IMF into open, serious debate — not as a sacred commitment, but as a policy choice that must be continually assessed against the public interest. A homegrown alternative is no longer a dream. It is a condition for national survival. It is what will give the next government true legitimacy — and place it before a decisive test: Will the government reproduce crisis in the name of reform, or open the door to sovereignty in the name of the people?
