In Focus: Not a success story Bush presented Al-Anbar as a US victory in Iraq and a vindication of his troop surge. And then it all fell apart, writes Galal Nassar The Petraeus-Crocker report was an attempt to dupe the American public into thinking that George Bush's security plan -- launched after the December 2006 Baker- Hamilton report -- is a success. Neither this report nor the subsequent speech by President Bush managed to persuade anyone. It is a failure. The report was accompanied by a media campaign in which the US administration tried to present the reduction in violence in Al-Anbar province as the beginning of a long-awaited victory. This fast turned out to be a fallacy. Resistance operations didn't ebb in Al-Anbar because of Bush's security plan, but for other reasons. There are two main schools concerning the confrontation of occupation in Iraq. One is the resistance school, which wants to liberate Iraq and turn it once again into an independent Arab country. The second school is Al-Qaeda, which is interested in bringing the Americans to their knees, not getting them out of Iraq. Al-Qaeda doesn't care for peace in Iraq. All it wants is to keep the battle going, in Iraq or elsewhere. So a conflict between the resistance and Al-Qaeda was inevitable. This may explain recent developments in Al-Anbar. Signs of a showdown between Al-Qaeda and the resistance have been evident for some time. Three years ago, clashes erupted in Al-Qaem, close to Syria's borders, and then in Tal Afar. After weeks of fighting, the resistance managed to expel Al-Qaeda fighters from both towns. Later on, the two sides reached a temporary truce allowing them to continue their military operations against occupation forces. There is a marked difference between the proponents of resistance and those of attrition. The resistance is sending out a message of unity. It wants all Iraqis to stand together, regardless of their doctrinal, religious and ethnic affiliations. Al-Qaeda, for its part, seeks to rally Sunni Muslims to its cause. Ironically, Al-Qaeda is speaking the same sectarian language the occupiers love. Al-Qaeda is sowing the same seeds of division one can detect in the Iraqi constitution and in calls for federalism. Al-Qaeda's divisive message dovetails with the sectarian leanings of groups such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Al-Daawa Party, and followers of Moqtada Al-Sadr. In terms of brutality, Al-Qaeda rivals any of Iraq's notorious US-sanctioned death squads. Massacres and sectarian killings are the trademark of Shia militias. Car bombs and sectarian killings are the trademark of Al-Qaeda. The outcome is chillingly similar: death among Iraqi civilians, possible partitioning of the country into cantons, and displacement of entire communities. In short: ethnic cleansing. When Al-Qaeda announced the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq in Al-Anbar, the clock started ticking. And the Taliban lifestyle Al-Qaeda tried to impose on Al-Anbar inhabitants only served to heighten tensions. In the months preceding the death of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, leader of Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers, local resentment was such that Al-Zarqawi had to move his headquarters into Baquba, where occupation forces tracked him down and killed him. The quarrel between Al-Qaeda and the Iraqi resistance was a bonus to the occupiers. It gave the Americans the chance to regroup in a zone that used to be, until recently, out of bounds for them. Locals were alienated by the infighting among resistance groups as well as by Al-Qaeda's alien morality codes. As a result, the occupation managed to recruit or invent local allies, including Sheikh Abdel-Sattar Abu Risha, who was recently assassinated. Such was the situation that the Bush administration wanted to market as a victory. When President Bush visited Al-Assad US military base in Al-Anbar he made a point of meeting Sheikh Abu Risha, invited television cameras in, and used the encounter for publicity. The Petraeus-Crocker report was keen to give the impression that what happened in Al-Anbar heralded future cooperation with local clans across the country, from Diyala to Salaheddin. It wasn't to be. Abu Risha was assassinated a few days after his meeting with President Bush. News started to filter out that Abu Risha was not, at any rate, what he had pretended to be. The American dream and ruse were shattered. The US administration used a carrot-and-stick approach in Al-Anbar. It attacked Falluja repeatedly with artillery and planes, and the destruction was both systematic and extensive. And yet, each time the resistance rose from the ashes and fought back with resolve. So the Americans used the frustration caused by the local infighting. The Americans even allowed clan leaders to form their own militias and supplied them with arms and assistance, just as the rest of the country clamoured for the disbandment of all militia. The Americans made other promises, including the release of some detainees, a review of the structure of the army and security forces, and an amnesty for former Baathists. What the occupation authorities fail to mention is that the situation in Al-Anbar is far from being under control. There is a strong legacy of resistance in that province, a legacy going back to the time of the British occupation following World War I. The Americans are telling one side of the story. The other is less sanguine. Just as Algerians, the Vietnamese and other nations fought till the end, the Iraqis will. The Americans sent over 30,000 of their troops, 15,000 mercenaries, and 10,000 of the Iraqi army and security personnel to Al-Anbar. Local clan leaders -- said to be spearheading the fight -- sent about 400 men to fight on their side, and at a cost. The Americans paid millions of dollars in donations and bribes to local collaborators, and still had to commit 55,000 men under arms: all this to pacify one of Iraq's least-populous regions. The Petraeus-Crocker report doesn't mention that. Bush doesn't care to go over such details publicly. Is he aware of them privately? Bush's security plan calls for keeping such large contingents in place indefinitely, where they offer a perfect target for the resistance. Al-Anbar is an American mirage, not a success story. Already, US military statements note the continuation of resistance operations in Al-Anbar. Already, the Association of Muslim Scholars is calling on resistance groups to unite and continue to fight against the occupation. Already, several resistance groups, including the Ishrin Revolution Brigades and the Rashidin Army, are forging a united front. Sooner or later, US delusions will prove too costly to maintain.
