By Salama A Salama When the calming-down period ended and Israel launched its aerial attack on Gaza, few imagined that the aggression would last more than a week or 10 days at most. Israel, most thought, would wreck Hamas's military structure, break its bones and spirit, and pave the way for the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza. Hamas leaders would be killed or captured and that would allow Israel and the PA to resume talks without hindrance. Few doubted that Hamas would only hold out for a week or so. At one point, European mediation and diplomatic efforts would gather momentum and consultations outside the UN Security Council would bear fruit. Israel would call a ceasefire, but only after having achieved its goals. Hamas would be out of the way. The tunnels would be filled in. And no more smuggling of weapons or contraband would be possible. Gaza would not be the same again, as Secretary Rice put it. To be frank, some Arab countries are not particularly averse to such a scenario. Hamas has no shortage of critics in this region, and many of those frown on its close links with Syria and Iran. After days of aerial bombardment, the ground assault, phase two of the military operation, started. Israel's aim, once again, was to destroy the infrastructure, hideouts, and offices of Hamas. Israel didn't do too well in this stage either. It killed hundreds, including entire families, and wounded thousands more. But it couldn't break down Hamas. If anything, Hamas got a second wind. Impatient, Israeli leaders ordered phase three of the offensive. There is no question that the steadfastness of the resistance in Gaza is what foiled UN Security Council calculations and derailed the Egyptian-French initiative, the latter meant as a mechanism for implementing the ceasefire, opening the crossing points, restoring calm, and resuming national dialogue. Israel rejected the Security Council resolution because it couldn't withdraw before eliminating Hamas. Barak and Livni wanted to see results, for their political future depends on it. As for Hamas, it has survived a tough test and despite the heavy humanitarian loss, kept its wits together. Its mere survival gave it the strength to turn down Israel's -- and Egypt's -- conditions. What Hamas now expects is to be represented in any talks involving future arrangements. In all likelihood, Israel will lose in Gaza, just as it lost in Lebanon. Hamas is going to survive, and its survival will be seen as a defeat for Israel. So what will happen next? What will happen once the guns have fallen silent, once the protesters have gone home? Will Israel reoccupy Gaza? Will it divide Gaza into four sections? Or will it impose another blockade? Either way, Israel won't win much. And there is no guarantee that the Qassam rockets are going to stop. How will Hamas react to the Egyptian initiative? Judging by the fiery rhetoric of Khaled Meshaal, the prospects of Hamas accepting any agreement it doesn't help formulate is rather slim. Egypt now knows that ignoring Hamas as a political force on the Palestinian scene is not a good idea. In fact, it was the insistence of Washington, Europe and Israel on ignoring Hamas that triggered this mess in the first place. The only way out of this tragedy is through flexibility in dealing with Hamas. For instance, Hamas should get more actively involved in the implementation of the Egyptian initiative. Hamas has many sympathisers, many of whom took to the streets to denounce the carnage in Gaza. But what Hamas -- and its sympathisers -- must understand is that there is time to fight and time to talk.
