Despite US pressure, there are no signs of much touted Iraqi reconciliation in the build-up to January's general election, writes Salah Hemeid he string of bombings that hit Baghdad and other Iraqi cities and towns this week has again sent a crystal clear message that this embattled country is still far from returning to normalcy even after the withdrawal of the US troops from urban centres. Moreover, the unabated bickering of different ethnic groups has highlighted the fragility of the political process and the need for a more solid national reconciliation to overcome factional divisions and the sect-based power sharing which has been dominating Iraqi politics since the 2003 US invasion. As the United States supposedly prepares to pull out its forces from Iraq by the end of 2011, the Obama administration has increased its pressure on Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki to reach out to his opponents, both Kurds and Sunni Arabs, to resolve their outstanding disputes. Worried that an Arab- Kurdish flare-up over simmering conflicts could delay the withdrawal, US Defense Secretary Gates travelled to Iraq last week for talks with Al-Maliki and the Kurdish leaders in an attempt to defuse the communal tension. Washington is also concerned that Al-Maliki's failure to mend fences with Arab Sunnis on such issues as integrating former insurgent Sahawa groups into the armed forces and the government threatens the understanding it had reached with them when they agreed to turn their arms against the Al-Qaeda terror network and other die-hard resisters. Yet, Al-Maliki, who is increasingly tightening his grip on Iraq, is showing no sign of compliance, and he is probably procrastinating on national reconciliation demands because that will certainly widen political participation and weaken his position ahead of next year's election. Indeed, Al-Maliki has fashioned a system of bribes and payoffs to various tribal leaders to become his new political allies. He has also slowly built up the political, police and military apparatus to strengthen his Shia-dominated government where there is little possibility of a fairly and freely contested election in the near future. On Sunday Al-Maliki travelled to the Kurdish region for talks with its leader Masoud Barzani in a bid to break the deadlock over a range of disputes that have poisoned relations between Baghdad and the autonomous Kurdish region. Aside from getting together in plush villas in the mountain resort of Dokan, there was no actual accomplishment to report to the huge contingent of journalists who travelled to Kurdistan for the highly publicised event. Al-Maliki later said he agreed with Kurdish leaders that their differences should be resolved through political and constitutional means. "The challenges that face the political process require more meetings and cooperation between all Iraqi people," Al-Maliki said at a press conference with Barzani and Talabani. He also warned his Kurdish hosts that the "federal system" which they have enjoyed since the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime should not be turned into "a confederation", or a more self-relying entity. A day earlier Al-Maliki told his Arab Sunni opponents that the only possible way for them to be accepted in a new Iraq is to abandon resistance. "Balloting is the only solution to resolve Iraq's problems," he said in address to a tribal gathering in Baghdad. "It is wrong to resort to force. The pink finger is the only means to make Iraq continue its march," he said, referring to the pink ink which Iraqi voters are asked to dip their fingers in as a sign that they have cast their ballots. He also lashed out at "political partners" who ally with neighbouring countries and do not help Iraq overcome its problems. A casual observer could quickly conclude that the Iraqi Shia leader is simply unable or unwilling to reconcile with the minority Kurds and Sunnis, underscoring fears that a flare-up in the north could derail the whole political process and a renewed Sunni insurgency could spark sectarian violence as the Americans draw down their forces. In fact, relations between Baghdad and the Kurdish government are so bad that Kurdish Prime Minister Nasharwan Barzani declared last month that the two sides are closer to war than at any time since the US invasion in 2003. Among major explosive issues is the oil conflict between the central government and the Kurdish region. Baghdad has been rejecting efforts by the Kurdish government to exploit oil resources independently. The two sides also differ on delineating the border with the Kurdish region including resolving the fate of Kirkuk, an oil-rich city shared by Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen. Another contentious issue is the fate of tens of thousands of Peshmergas, the Kurdish militiamen, who are nominally under the authority of the Iraqi army but reserve their loyalty for the Kurdish regional government. All these are pressing issues in a slew of unresolved conflicts that block any Arab-Kurdish reconciliation. Complicating the landscape further is the failure of Al-Maliki's government to settle differences with Arab Sunnis by reaching out to former Baathists and pardoning insurgents, a key demand for reconciliation. The Obama administration, having failed to convince Al-Maliki to open talks with the insurgents, has been reportedly talking to representatives of Iraqi Sunni insurgents. In one such encounter an American official signed a protocol with a representative of the Political Council of the Iraqi Resistance, an umbrella organisation for Sunni groups, during meetings in Turkey as a precursor to further negotiations. The talks are evidently an attempt to increase pressure on Al-Maliki to press him to open up his own contacts with them. What is most noteworthy is that the fugitive leader of the Baath Party Ezzat Ibrahim called on Saturday for Iraqi insurgent groups to move into politics, suggesting a possible shift away from armed struggle. His statement posted on the Baath Party and Resistance website, urged the formation of a "national, political or supreme leadership council to include all armed and unarmed resistance powers". The move is evidently an attempt to push the Americans to engage the Baathists and help them restore their leading role if Al-Maliki continues to drag his feet in embracing former members of the Baath Party. Meanwhile, violence continues to wreak havoc in Iraqi cities. On Friday simultaneous explosions struck Shia mosques in the Baghdad area during Friday prayers, killing at least 29 worshippers in an apparently coordinated attack against Shia. On Sunday a parked car bomb killed five people and wounded more than 30 in Haditha, a city west of Baghdad on the Euphrates. A day later a suicide car bomber struck a police checkpoint in Ramadi killing at least three people. Persistent violence has raised concerns about the ability of Iraqi security forces to maintain security gains after US troops withdrew from major urban areas on 30 June. The deterioration in security proves every day that the situation in Iraq will only get worse without national reconciliation. Al-Maliki therefore needs to get his hands dirty, not because the Americans need a peaceful exit from Iraq, but because he should start rescuing Iraq from slipping into chaos again.
