Is the Muslim Brotherhood trying to establish its hegemony over Egyptian life and institutions, asks Gihan Shahine "The Brotherhood will not be able to 'ikhwanise' [impose its hegemony over] Egypt as long as I'm alive," swore liberal writer Fatemah Naout, a staunch critic of the Muslim Brotherhood in a recent talk show on the Al-Hayat satellite TV channel. Brotherhood member Ahmed Abu Baraka, host of the same TV talk show, fired back by saying that the term akhwana (ikhwan means brotherhood in Arabic) is "a devilish term created by the secularist and leftist opposition, which has historically enjoyed a tight grip on the media with the aim of stigmatising the Brotherhood and scaring the public about its agenda." This kind of argument has been gripping the Egyptian media over recent weeks, perhaps oblivious to more-pressing needs among the public, which has been suffering from serious shortages of electricity, water and fuel, as well as unprecedented rises in the prices of food. The term akhwana was created by the opposition to the Brotherhood, mainly leftist and secularist intellectuals and perhaps a few sympathisers of the former regime, who took to the streets in their thousands on 24 August to protest against what they called the Brotherhood's "hegemony over state institutions". The present controversy can be seen as the latest development in the almost 19-month-long row over the Islamist or civil identity of the state among Egypt's elite. FACT OR FICTION? Some writers and analysts, mostly of an Islamist-orientation, have been quick to denounce the term ikhwanisation on the ground that this is no more than a "phobia", "rumour", or part of a failed strategy on the part of the losing opposition. Wahid Abdel-Meguid, a liberal political analyst and official spokesman of the country's Constituent Assembly, which has been charged with writing the new post-revolutionary constitution, told Al-Ahram Weekly that "there are two kinds of opposition, one that is a viable rival and is based on hard work and the mobilisation of the public, and another, which has previously proved to fail, that depends on circulating rumours, creating public scares, and talking rather than working." In Abdel-Meguid's view, Egypt's political opposition falls into the second category. In his regular column in the daily Al-Shorouk newspaper, prominent writer Fahmy Howeidy has been similarly critical of the recent "media fuss'" over Brotherhoodisation, overblown, he says, into a "public scare-bomb." According to Howeidy, a cursory look at the percentage of Brotherhood appointments in the different government institutions shows that Brotherhood members do not constitute a majority of any of these, which he said depended more on qualifications than on political affiliation. In perhaps a more academic take on the issue, Moetaz Bellah Abdel-Fattah, a political science professor at Michigan University in the United States and also a member of the Constituent Assembly, suggests that in order for any analyst to tell whether akhwana is fact or fiction he or she will have to see the new constitution first. Will the new draft include phrases that will impose Brotherhood-related principles or ideology, for example, as was the case in communist constitutions in the former Soviet Union, where Leninist ideology was the sacred reference? Will it include a mechanism that will guarantee a peaceful and democratic rotation of power through a fair balloting process, as well as the right to peaceful protest and freedom of expression? Much, according to Abdel-Fattah, will also depend on whether the Brotherhood tries to impose its hegemony over the so-called "deep state", mainly the Interior Ministry, the military, the intelligence apparatus, and the Foreign Ministry. It will likewise depend on whether the group will try to impose its ideology on society by trying to monopolise the ministries of education, culture, information and religious endowments (which supervises the majority of mosques), where appointments should depend on competence regardless of political affiliation or ideological background. Many would agree with political activist Amr Hamzawy, a liberal analyst and a former MP in the now-dissolved parliament, that it is democratically acceptable for the president to appoint members of the ruling party and whomever he finds cooperative and fit for the application of his programme to the government and the executive in general and to take back powers by changing the country's military leaders. What is not democratically acceptable, according to Hamzawy, is for the president to keep the legislative powers in his own hands in the absence of an elected parliament. Even more democratically unacceptable, for Hamzawy, would be for the Brotherhood "to try to impose its hegemony over the Constituent Assembly that will write the constitution and over leading positions in the media and the National Council for Human Rights, where appointments should depend on qualifications and not political affiliation." AKHWANA IN FIGURES: According to Howeidy, if the figures are anything to go by, claims of Brotherhood hegemony look overblown, or even unfounded. Only four of the 33 ministers recently appointed to the new government belong to the Muslim Brotherhood, while only six of a total of 17 of the president's advisory team are members of the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). Recently-appointed Prime Minister Hisham Qandil is not a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, but his personal religiosity may make him appear to be the Brotherhood's man in the government. Judge Ahmed Mekki, the newly appointed vice president, is not a Brotherhood member either, though he can be referred to as one by the group's sympathisers. Out of the 10 newly-appointed governors, only three belong to the Muslim Brotherhood: FJP member Saad El-Husseini, governor of Kafr Al-Sheikh, Yehia Taha Keshk, governor of Assiut, and Mohamed Ali Beshr, governor of Al-Menoufiya. Members of the Brotherhood were historically excluded from posts such as governors or university presidents under the former regime. "I cannot single out any public institution or government authority that is dominated by the Brotherhood," Howeidy wrote in one of his columns, arguing instead that Brotherhood members remain excluded from working in many domains where they were banned under the former regime, including diplomacy, the military, the intelligence agencies and the Interior Ministry. Many would agree with Howeidy that the fact that the Brotherhood's FJP Party enjoyed a majority in the now-dissolved parliament, and still does so in the Shura Council and many professional syndicates, should not be taken as a sign that the Brotherhood is imposing its hegemony over Egypt. "After all, they were elected by the people, and as such their dominance should be blamed on the democratic process itself, and not the practices of the group," Howeidy wrote. However, the group has come under fire as a result of its appetite for power, notably when it contested 50 per cent of parliamentary seats after having promised that it would not contest more than 30 per cent of them. The group also lost much of its credibility when it went back on an earlier promise not to run for the presidency. Ayman Al-Sayyad, editor of Weghet Nazar [Point of View] magazine and a member of the president's team of consultants, argues that in all political systems it is only natural that parties should attempt to win a majority and have the right to change their positions according to political circumstances. "It has never happened in any democratic system that one party will define a quota of seats for other rival parties," Al-Sayyad said. "It is equally normal for a president to select members of the ruling party for his government and for the presidential team, as is the case in the United States." In France, for instance, President Fran��ois Hollande's Socialist Party won an absolute majority in the recent parliamentary elections, and yet no one has slammed this as a monopolisation of power. TAPPING INTO HUMAN RIGHTS: Such arguments, however, do not apply to Brotherhood dominance of the new appointments to the National Council for Human Rights (NCHR), a government watchdog previously dominated by the now-dissolved National Democratic Party (NDP), when the NCHR was no more than a cosmetic attempt to polish the heavily tarnished image of the former regime. Last week, the Shura Council general committee replaced NDP members by those from the FJP and its sympathisers, who now account for some 12 of the council's 25 members. Judge Hossam El-Gheriani, the current head of the Constituent Assembly who is known to have Brotherhood sympathies, was appointed acting head of the NCHR, though Socialist Popular Alliance Party member Abdel-Ghaffar Shokr was also named as El-Gheriani's deputy. The NCHR's secretary-general will be elected from among the 25 members of the council, or be appointed from outside in accordance with established regulations, sources at the Freedom and Justice Party said. However, the reshuffle at the NCHR, while it included a range of Coptic and leftist figures and academics in its new formation, drew sharp criticism as another case in point of how the Brotherhood and its Salafist allies have been attempting to impose their hegemony over state institutions in imitation of the actions of the former-ruling NDP. THE MEDIA AT A CROSSROADS: Even more worryingly perhaps is what critics see as the Brotherhood's attempts to seize control of the state-owned media, which historically toed the government line under the former regime. FJP spokesmen had previously complained that the media generally adopted a hostile line towards the group and the state-owned media had joined forces with the now-deposed Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in moves to undermine the president. This may explain why the Brotherhood has been moving fast to gain influence over the state media, especially since the Shura Council, which is tasked with reshuffling leading positions in the state press and currently has a Brotherhood majority, may soon be dissolved by virtue of a court ruling. Last week, the Shura Council's general committee, which is dominated by the Brotherhood, announced the appointment of new members of the Supreme Press Council and a reshuffle in the board chairmen of the state-owned press institutions. In its new incarnation, the Supreme Press Council now includes the head of the Shura Council, Ahmed Fahmi, 16 senior editors of state-owned newspapers, and four chief editors of party-owned newspapers, including those of the Wafd Party, the Freedom and Justice party, the Salafist Nour Party and the Ahrar Party. Although the council's new appointees belong to a relatively wide variety of political currents, several observers have been frustrated by the new appointments, especially by the Islamist figures who have been included. Critics say that the newly appointed board chairmen also include figures belonging to, or having hidden sympathies with, the Brotherhood. Among the seven new board chairmen of the state-owned press, at least two are said to be sympathetic to the Brotherhood: Shaker Abdel-Fattah Gamaleddin, chairman of the board of the Middle East News Agency, and Mamdouh El-Wali, board chairman of Al-Ahram. The Shura Council has also recently made changes to the chief-editors of the state-owned newspapers, but again critics say that many of those selected have hidden sympathies with the Brotherhood. However, Al-Sayyad argues that although the Brotherhood constitutes a majority of the Shura Council that appoints the chief editors of the state-owned publications, the 14-member selection committee that actually made the appointments contained only six Shura Council members and only three of these belonged to the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party. According to Al-Sayyad, the new appointments, which, he said, were "very bad at best", were made by journalists themselves and cannot be blamed on the FJP, which had only a small representation on the selection committee. Besides, none of the new chief-editors are actually Brotherhood members, and not more than four out of the total of 55 new appointees are known for their support for the group. Some of the appointees are even known for their opposition to the Brotherhood. "The problem from my point of view is not that the Brotherhood is trying to impose its hegemony over the state media," Al-Sayyad said. Instead, the real peril to the future of the media comes from "al-taakhoun", a readiness among journalists and those working in the media to change from supporting the former regime and opposing the Brotherhood to supporting the new president's ruling party. Leftist activist and TV presenter Hamdi Qandil concurs. In a recent article published in the daily Al-Hayat newspaper, he lamented that many senior editors had volunteered to ban some stories critical of the Brotherhood because many of those working in the state-owned media are programmed to show their loyalty to the authorities, which have the upper hand over their appointments, as was the case under the former regime. However, Qandil said, one could not infer that the Brotherhood was not trying to impose its influence for all that, since this remains the practice of any ruling party. The appointment of Brotherhood member Salah Abdel-Maqsoud, a spokesman for President Mohamed Mursi during his election campaign, at the helm of the Information Ministry is a case in point. Moreover, the Supreme Press Council will be headed by FJP member and Shura Council speaker Fahmi, even if it also includes university professors, legal experts and public figures from different ideological backgrounds, including one FJP member and a member from the Salafist Nour Party. Such steps have been seen as an attempt on the part of the Brotherhood to seize power over the state-owned media, biased, the Brothers claim, towards the SCAF and wanting to undermine President Mursi. The Information Ministry governs the editorial policy of all state TV channels, and many had been calling for its abolition and replacement by an independent professional body. Until that happens, it remains possible that the state channels will continue to toe the government line, as they did under the former regime. STIFLING DISSENT OR CURBING OFFENCES? So far it is not so good in the eyes of many observers. President Mursi's new government has made a number of alarming moves against journalists and media presenters that many in the field have seen as reproducing the former regime's tactics to stifle dissent and curb freedom of expression. The private TV channel Faraeen has been taken off the air, for example, and its owner, controversial TV presenter Tawfiq Okasha, is facing trial on charges of slandering the president and allegedly inciting his murder. Okasha, already a controversial figure, faces charges of openly calling for violence to be used against the Brotherhood, saying on air that he would "make your [Mursi's] blood permissible as well". Okasha said that he had "wild beasts and fierce lions" ready to support him should the authorities clamp down on him. Editions of the daily Al-Dostour opposition newspaper have also been confiscated and its chief editor is now facing trial on charges of having called for the ouster of the president, hinting that this could happen with the help of the military, in a confiscated issue on 11 August. The Al-Dostour editorial had claimed that the Brotherhood was attempting to establish an "emirate" in Egypt through a "bloody takeover" of the country. The one-page editorial warned that unless the group was ousted, "Egypt will see the destruction of the citizen's dignity in front of his family and his children and the removal of his private property rights." The editorial ended with a call for public protests to topple President Mursi with the help of the military. Brotherhood critics may have a strong case over what they see as the group's aggressive intolerance of criticism, which they say reproduces the heavy-handed tactics the old regime used to stifle dissent and undermines the new president's legitimacy. However, Brotherhood lawyer Abdel-Moneim Abdel-Maqsoud has countered that recent government measures have been taken against cases of deliberate offence and slander and have not been meant to stifle dissent. "This crazy man Tawfiq Okasha, and the material in Al-Dostour, is this journalism?" he asked in an interview. "Is this freedom of the media? When has the media ever stopped insulting the Muslim Brotherhood?" While he opposes government measures against the media, Qandil also argues that the cases of Al-Dostour and Faraeen may be more sophisticated than they appear. Whereas in democracies presidents should be tolerant of "all kinds of severe criticism", Qandil said, he also said that slander and misguiding public opinion through the circulation of rumours should be penalised by law, though the legal cases should rely on Mursi acting as a citizen and not as president. In the same vein, Qandil has similarly argued that Faraeen should have been closed for its deteriorating standards, rather than its comments about Mursi. MURSI'S COUNTER-COUP? Media aside, the question remains whether the Brotherhood is gaining influence over the deep state. A few days following the militant attacks that claimed the lives of 16 Egyptian border policemen in Sinai, the newly-elected president made the decision to retire the powerful head of the military, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, and the military Chief of Staff General Sami Anan, together with a number of senior military leaders. In the same vein, Mursi annulled the SCAF's supplementary Constitutional Declaration, which was meant to extend SCAF powers at the expense of the presidency. That meant that the president no longer shared power with the SCAF, which had ruled the country for 17 months after the outbreak of the 25 January Revolution and that all the mechanisms of government rested with the president. The decisions gave the president a free hand to carry out extensive changes, from replacing the minister of defence and chief of staff to the commanders of the Republican Guard and the intelligence apparatus. In the absence of an elected parliament, earlier dissolved by the SCAF following a Supreme Constitutional Court ruling that had declared the parliamentary elections law unconstitutional, or a constitution that defined and limited the powers of the president, critics expressed their concerns that the Islamist president now held all the executive and legislative powers of the state. Brotherhood critics are particularly afraid that this could mean that the Brotherhood will be able to impose a kind of permanent hegemony over the state, gradually extending its influence to the military and the judiciary and ultimately leading to the establishment of an Islamic state. Mursi's move to change the commanders of all branches of the armed forces was seen by the opposition as perhaps an attempt by the president's FJP to extend its hegemony to the country's most crucial institution, the military. Among such critics was prominent columnist Ibrahim Eissa, who wrote in the daily Al-Tahrir newspaper that "the disaster will be that we find ourselves with an army like Pakistan's, which grows beards and fights a war for the implementation of the Sharia," according to the Associated Press (AP). The apparently personal religiosity of the new defence minister, 57-year-old General Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi, has been another reason behind such suspicions, as critics claim he was appointed because he had sympathies with the Brotherhood. However, military sources have rebutted such claims on the grounds that El-Sisi was already a prominent figure under the former regime that opposed the Brotherhood, again according to AP. Mohamed Qadri Said, an expert on military affairs at the Al-Ahram Centre for Strategic and Political Studies, argued that El-Sisi was chosen because he "is useful for this period. This is a period that needs information, not a period of war," Said told AP. "There is an internal war against terrorism, and there is information needed for anything related to the next political moves." As a former military man, Said regards recent changes in the military commanders in the context of "a re-arrangement of the relationship" between the military and the president and a "recognition that the armed forces cannot be in direct competition with an elected president." The changes, according to Said, were also an achievement of the younger generation's hopes for change in the military.
