The NGO workers crisis is not about Egypt's dignity so much as its lack of free will, writes Ahmed El-Tonsi* On 18 July 1972, late President Anwar El-Sadat surprised the world with his decision to expel 16,000 Soviet military advisers working in collaboration with the Egyptian army undergoing preparations for the October 1973 victory. Against all odds, Sadat had the courage as well as the vision to take what he described as "a stand" with a friend. Basically, the Soviet Union was the superpower that had been in support of Egypt in nearly all spheres -- political, economic and military. Yet Egypt, massively beaten in the 1967 setback and avidly longing for a chance to assuage the disgrace, enjoyed wide decisional latitude, enabling it to define independently its own policy. Regrettably this has not been the case with Egypt in the aftermath of its January revolution. Under Mubarak, Egypt lost a great deal of its free will, particularly when it comes to its strategic partners, or to its humiliating role as a peace broker in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is the legacy of the ousted regime that has been casting its shadows on Egypt. Nonetheless, there should be no break from the US. What should be pursued is a more balanced and healthy relationship with the world's superpower, not as a strategic ally or partner, as both are sugar coated terms for a patron- client relationship. As such the foiled case of the American NGO workers and its deliberate escalation has not served Egypt's short and long-term foreign policy objectives and orientation. Directing the attention as well as the energies of the Egyptians towards an evidently ill prepared if not fictitious legal case while deliberately playing outdated power games has been a serious mistake committed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the cabinet and some elements within the judiciary. The SCAF should not have been involved in such a grave error. More devastating still was the catastrophic management of SCAF's retreat from its original hard line position. The episode is just one act, though an awful one, in the play called SCAF's mismanagement of the transition period. That SCAF has not been able to able to manage the transition phase has been evident since the amendment of the constitution last March. SCAF's record in the internal context has been below expectations, with growing sectors of Egyptians criticising its repeated failure to secure society, to restore order in the streets, to establish a competent cabinet to run the state, and finally to slow down the economic downturn. Instead, the SCAF has become embroiled in many needless and at times ruthless confrontations with the youth and its vanguard of revolutionaries. The last act of the American NGO workers case has been essentially a failed attempt to tarnish the image and reputation of human rights activists as a prelude to raising doubts about the sovereignty of the revolution. In fact, this attempt has been part of SCAF's repertoire since its attack on the 6 April Movement last July. In the external context, SCAF has not fared well either. Recent statements from Putin and Hillary Clinton conveyed that they have not been able to identify whom to talk with in Egypt. The "third party" theory, if it holds true, should be applied to many of the anonymous advisers who have been misleading the patriotic army institution. Two facts should be always remembered: that the army has been determined to transfer power to civilians as per the agreed upon schedule; second, that the army has been Egypt's most loyal institution and that in seeking to lift the travel ban on the concerned American citizens it has been pursuing what it perceives as the ultimate interest of Egypt. Elements within the judiciary enhanced the crisis and have been helped by similar elements inside the media in an attempt to politically assassinate many of revolution's activists. No one should be surprised by the existence of such elements within the judiciary. However, it would be wrong to generalise criticism to the entire institution that paved the way for the revolution through may of its historic verdicts. These verdicts, from the constitutional, administrative and regular judiciaries, decisively ruled against the ousted regime in many cases while asserting the inviolability of rights deemed essential for the establishment of a vibrant civil society. Egyptians' right to strike was decided by judicial verdict. Moreover, many of the political parties established under the old regime have been based on judicial verdicts, including the Wafd and the Nasserite parties. Similarly, other verdicts safeguarding property rights, the right to free association, were decisive in the evolution of such rights. Another important verdict was issued by Al-Bishry abrogating right of the president to transfer civilians to military tribunals. During Mubarak's era the record of the judiciary in the domain of safeguarding liberties and rights was pivotal to the development of such rights, a fact that has added much momentum to the evolution of a broader public sphere. Such a judiciary cannot and should not be labelled as part of the ancien regime. That said; the judiciary should address its own pathologies that may act as loopholes through which the executive or the media can find room to manoeuvre. Despite all inflammatory speeches, declarations, communiqués and writings, we should remember that Egypt's dignity was not at stake in the ongoing crisis over the US human rights workers. Rather, what we witnessed was the fact that Egypt has not yet restored its free will and that the legacy of the ousted regime, with its pragmatic and vague definition of national pride, is still around. The crisis must be defused as there is no need for self-torture or defeatism while Egypt has a plethora of thorny issues that require proper attention. * The writer is a political analyst.
