One year on from the January revolt, it is not leaders that stand between the people and their goals, but the rigid and autocratic state itself, writes Ziad Akl* Upon approaching the January Revolution's first anniversary, it seems that the post-revolutionary pink cloud is long gone. The enthusiasm and optimism that washed over Egyptians in the months of February and March last year have been replaced with sheer uncertainty, blatant pessimism and severe confusion. The outcome of the Egyptian revolution so far seems not to fulfil the basic demands the revolution raised a year ago. This pattern, however, is not particular to the Egyptian revolution. Revolutions in general seem to fail in fulfilling their initial promise of equality, social justice and democracy, especially in the short run. The blunt fact is that revolutions do not undo dominant pre- revolutionary conditions and realities. However, the course of development of the January Revolution outcome was affected by a number of factors. First, there was the pattern of revolution itself. The millions who took to the streets in January and February chanted anti-Mubarak slogans in search for democracy. However, these political demands were embedded within a social context demanding social justice, equality and dignity. Thanks to the solidarity that existed among protesters and the high rate of resource mobilisation, the initial demand of the revolution was achieved and Mubarak was out of presidential office. However, as time passed and events raced each other, we realised that the post-revolutionary political process did not address the original demands of the revolution. The fundamental demands and goals were social, but the revolutionary model employed was political. This contradiction created the revolutionary paradox in which Egypt and its revolution swing back and forth. Requirements of social revolution (class-based mobilisation, elite conflict, military defections and revolutionary leadership) were not present, while requirements for a political revolution (conflicts within state elites, nationalist mobilisation and dominant urban sector) were. A political revolution is unlikely to yield radicalising policies (land reform, re-distribution of resources and policies of social reconstruction) resulting in social change; it rather breeds a weak democracy with little interest in political competition and radical change. Second, the course of post- revolutionary developments was influenced by the fragmentation of the original revolutionary coalition. The endurance and cohesion of the state represented in the military, the bureaucracy and the judiciary after the fall of Mubarak allowed it to create a new structure of political opportunity. The new structure consumed the revolutionary coalition in mustering resources to consolidate presence within the structure and divided the coalition between mobilising against its legitimacy and rallying for its effectiveness. The new political opportunity structure created an elite that is highly polarised and readily contentious. Moreover, behind the scene politicking shows that the state is maintaining a careful balance between segments of this elite to keep it divided and yet loyal. The new political opportunity brought the street to a halt after weakening its potential and co- opting a number of its supporters. In other words, the revolutionary anti- state coalition was dragged to act on the state's platform with the state's rules. Third, a supportive international context played a role in developments post-January. Despite the failure of the state to keep its promises of securing freedom of expression, refraining from the use of violence and increasing transparency and accountability, international powers fully support the state- sponsored process of transition. Therefore, one of the tools that could have applied political pressure on the state is actually working to further consolidate the state's vision, a vision that contradicts the initial demands of the revolution. With all these factors at play, it is not surprising to realise that the outcome of the revolution has not fulfilled its demands. It is more important to realise that the struggle now is no longer a struggle of the public against a corrupt ruler, but the struggle of revolution against a rigid and autocratic state. * The writer is a researcher at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
