Australia's position on the war in Iraq may be misguided, given its dubious success in the "war on terrorism", writes Damien Kingsbury* in Canberra It is a rule of thumb that when the general environment becomes increasingly uncertain, or dangerous, one should increase one's alertness -- take whatever precautionary measures are practically available and, most of all, not aggravate the situation. Since 11 September 2001, the Australian government has done almost the opposite. Australia's involvement in the 2001 military intervention in Afghanistan was relatively successful in that there were few Australian casualties. But with the scattering of Al-Qa'eda operatives throughout Southeast Asia and Afghanistan sliding back towards fractious warlordism and regaining its place as the world's largest producer of opium and heroin -- now prevalent on Australian streets -- the war seems somewhat less of a success. However, Afghanistan did mark Australia as being actively involved in an ambiguous global conflict and has been openly identified by the still-free Osama Bin Laden as a provocation. Australia's alertness -- its intelligence analysis -- has since then been woeful. The United States government has generally regarded Australia as having greater expertise on Indonesia than Washington. Yet it was the US that warned its own citizens of an attack against a Western target in Indonesia -- not Australia. The consequence of that was last September's terrorist attack in Bali. The government of Australian Prime Minister John Howard is at least as ill-informed in its positioning for war against Iraq. Like Afghanistan, it is highly likely that a US-led attack on Iraq will crush most opposition relatively quickly. But the consequences of that attack do not appear to have been accounted for, and it remains unclear how Australia's interest will be served by having a presence there. Continuing to follow the US lead, last week Australia expelled an alleged member of the Iraqi intelligence service. If he was genuinely a spy, Australia would probably have gained more advantage from not alerting him to the fact that he had been identified as such, while watching him closely to secure a larger network. However, if he was a low-level analyst, as most "spies" are, his expulsion has achieved little but minor publicity. US President George W Bush's view that a change of regime in Iraq will lead to democratisation in the Middle East -- which has virtually no direct impact on Australia -- is at best wishful thinking. In any case, "liberated" Kuwait remains undemocratic, while monarchic Saudi Arabia would only be alienated from the US-led cause by a push towards democracy. At least as likely as democratisation in the Middle East is that a US-led attack will conversely strengthen the cause of anti-Western Islamic fundamentalism in the region. Quite conceivably, governments from Egypt to nuclear- state Pakistan, which have just managed to hold the line against Islamic revolutionary fundamentalism, could collapse. The geostrategic environment would then be vastly more uncertain, and Australia's position in it even more, rather than less, exposed. If one thing can be said for the Australian leadership's understanding of this, it is that there is an awareness that such provocation may lead to a more hostile environment. Hence the suggestion that Australia should investigate a "son of Star Wars" missile defence system like that being developed in the US. Defence Minister Robert Hill has also returned to the worrying proposition that Australia should renew its links with the Indonesian military's brutal special forces, Kopassus. "Son of Star Wars", even if it could work, which is widely doubted, has already been identified by Australia's neighbours as a provocation, and its cost would be overwhelming. One does not have to be a rocket scientist to work out where the money would come from: major cuts in education, health and social services, and another "special" tax. As for the Indonesian military (TNI) and Kopassus, perhaps Canberra has forgotten that the military officers that perpetrated the horrors of East Timor in 1999 remain free, and, according to Indonesia's foreign minister, Hasan Wirajuda, the responsible generals will never have to face the latest UN charges. This is not to mention that Kopassus has been sighted on numerous recent occasions as training the notorious Laskar Jihad Islamic militia in West Papua. The Laskar Jihad, many of whose fighters trained in Afghanistan, announced that it had been disbanded immediately after the Bali bombing. However, Indonesian generals clearly still see a use for an army-trained fundamentalist Islamic militia in resolving political questions. And these are the people Senator Hill wants to get back into bed with? When such Australian policies seem so wrong-headed, and are opposed by such a large section of the Australian population, it is easy to be critical. But what of alternatives? With Afghanistan there is little hope short of a massive and long-term aid programme. Afghanistan, though, has a long and deeply embedded history as a failed state, and expecting real, positive change in the near future is probably not realistic. Given the links that have spread from Afghanistan and Pakistan closer to Australia, Australian intelligence in these areas not only has to be upgraded, but the analysis has to provide more and more closely considered potential scenarios, including some that might not be palatable to our neighbours. In terms of Iraq, Australia should strongly support a policy of containment and further strengthen the investigative capacity of the weapons inspectors now there. The official rationale for a war against Iraq as it has been presented remains unconvincing, while the unofficial rationale of legitimising Bush's presidency and securing long-term oil supplies to the US is of doubtful benefit to Australia. In relations with its closest major neighbour, Indonesia, Australia must continue to support that country's otherwise uneven process of democratisation, and expand aid, trade, educational and cultural links. The Indonesian military, however, has nothing to contribute to any of this, and indeed its most recent bid to be able to declare emergency without recourse to the government is being widely seen in Indonesia as potentially setting the stage for a military coup. Indonesia's post-2004 political environment looks at best uncertain. To that end, Australia cannot renew links with the TNI until it is firmly under civilian control. That will mean the dismantling of its independent business empires, which make it largely independent of government funding, and that is a very long way off. In the interim, Australia must keep at best a studied neutrality towards Indonesia's security forces. We do live, it is fair to say, in increasingly uncertain times. But as noted at the outset, that is all the more reason for Australia to be cautious about its responses. Australia's goal at this stage should be to contribute towards the reduction of tensions both global and local, not their escalation. * The writer is head of philosophical, political and international studies at Deakin University.
