The opposition coalition in Yemen has a mixed record when it comes to supporting the struggle of southern Yemenis, writes Mohamed Abdel-Meguid* The major opposition parties in Yemen have almost resolved all their differences with the ruling General People's Congress (GPC) Party. In particular, they have reached agreement on parliamentary elections scheduled in April 2011, extended the parliamentary session by two years, and agreed on fighting corruption, carrying out constitutional, legislative and economic reform, as well as national dialogue. But the opposition is still struggling with a number of problems that have erupted over the past few years, such as the Houthi rebellion in the north and the secessionist movement in the South. Both issues threaten the security and unity of Yemen and add to the burdens on the fragile shoulders of Yemen's opposition. They are problems that are especially difficult to resolve in a society where tribal rule prevails over state rule, where guns are louder than words, and private interests supersede public welfare. Against this backdrop, the opposition parties under the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) coalition find themselves required to mediate between the ruling party's failed policies and the demands of the people. This is compounded by the fact that the opposition is meek in the media and is financially and politically weak. Like other opposition parties in the Arab world over the past two decades, opposition parties in Yemen were deliberately weakened by the ruling party to secure for itself absolute rule. PARTY ORIGINS: The multi-party system in Yemen began in the 1940s, when the Colony of Aden appeared to be the most fertile environment for pluralism, especially after Britain had permitted its colonies in Asia and Africa to partake in political processes and create political parties. Al-Ahrar Party was established in 1944 and the National Unionist Party in 1954, and as Arab nationalism swept the region in the 1950s and 1960s more Yemeni political parties were born. These included the Arab Socialist Baath Party, the Nasserist Party, the Arab Nationalist Movement and the National Front for the People's Socialist Union. After the unification of northern and southern Yemen in May 1990, the country's leadership decided to create a multi-party system, which generated 22 parties altogether. These include the ruling GPC, the Yemeni Congregation for Reform and the Yemeni Socialist Party. Political parties are regulated by Law 66 of 1991, with relations between the parties based on mutual interests rather than common doctrine. This makes it a double-edged sword, because at times this benefits the political reform process when the parties effectively coordinate among themselves. At other times, it hinders reform because of continuously shifting alliances that diminishes confidence among the leaders of these parties. THE JMP: This coalition is a major development for the Yemeni opposition because it added the Yemeni Tagammu Reform Party and the September Coalition Party to what was known as the Supreme Coordination Council for the Opposition, which was created in 1999. The JMP was created on 6 February 2003 and includes the Yemeni Tagammu Reform Party, the Yemeni Socialist Party, Nasserist Popular Unionist Organisation, the Arab Socialist Baath Party, the Truth Party, the September Coalition Party as well as the People's Forces Union. The opposition bloc is led by the Islamist- leaning Tagammu Reform Party with 45 seats in parliament. The Socialist Party has seven, the Nasserist Party has three, and the Baath Party has two. JMP members coordinated amongst themselves the election campaigns for parliament in 2003 and work together to ensure that all six signatories to the agreement are represented in parliament. JMP AND THE SOUTHERN MOVEMENT: Since the southern movement began its revolt in 2007, the JMP has been vague and contradictory in its response to the secessionists, most likely because it is unaware of the real reasons for and demands of the movement. The opposition bloc could not foresee how influential the separatists would become over the Yemeni public, especially citizens in the south. In fact, southern Yemenis rallied behind the movement despite the risk of death or detention at the hands of the state. The JMP's ambiguous position vis-a-vis the movement makes it sometimes support the secessionists and join them in their demonstrations, call on the regime not to suppress peaceful protests in the south, and launch a dialogue with the movement to meet its demands. At other times, the JMP sides with the state and aids it in its confrontation of the separatists through statements and conferences that condemn the actions of the southerners. These contradictions diminish the opposition's influence on the public in Yemen, especially those in the south. In 19 years since unification, the opposition did not deliver any benefits to the people, propose a political or economic agenda different from the one adopted by the ruling party, or even presented itself as an alternative to the regime. Additionally, opposition parties have neither the respect of the southern movement nor the government. Ironically, both sides agree in their condemnation of the opposition. The regime accuses the JMP of assisting the southern movement and in fact arrested several of its leaders, especially from the Socialist Party. On the other hand, the secessionists charge opposition parties with collaborating with the regime, abandoning the south and manipulating separatist successes for their own political gains. Because of the JMP's positions, the southern movement has broken away completely from the opposition, declaring its own goals, demands and independent leadership. Hence, the JMP is challenged by the political demands of the south, which include genuine inclusion in governance and the fair division of resources. VARYING POSITIONS: Tensions between the southern movement and the regime are demonstrative of the problems facing the opposition. The core demands of the secessionists are not on the opposition's agenda as they seek political leverage to pressure the government. Understandably, southerners are not relying on the opposition for support. The Socialist Party, which ruled the south and signed the unification treaty on its behalf, was expected to champion the causes of the south and legitimise their demands. Instead, it let the people down, for reasons that are truly beyond the control of the southern members of the party. In reality, party members from the north took control of the decision-making process after they joined the party en masse following unification. There were even some calls from within the party to reform the integration process, but they were soon muzzled. In time, the leaders and members of the party from the south realised that the northerners have overtaken the party by sheer numbers. Party members from the north began steering the party's political agenda away from the south as widespread protests and popular demonstrations gained momentum. They distanced themselves from the troubles in the south and weakened the separatist movement by describing its leadership as "small fish". In response, southern leaders publicly announced that the party had failed them. The Tagammu Party's view of the southern separatists is identical to that of the regime, alongside which it had fought the movement in 1994. Today, the party is trying to expunge this history and distance itself from the disastrous effects of that war on Yemen, and the south in particular. When the party is criticised for the looting of the south, it is quick to blame the ruling GPC's policies after the war. When the southern movement called for secession, the deputy chairman of the party, Mohamed Al-Yadumi, strongly condemned the movement, saying that his party "will battle to maintain unity, and any attempt at secession will be resisted by every party member on the face of the earth." Al-Yadumi further described any calls for separation as treason. Meanwhile, the party's secretary general, Abdel-Wahab Al-Ensi, linked southern demands of independence with a Zionist plot aiming to lay asunder the unity of the Muslim nation. In fact, under the leadership of the Tagammu, JMP members have attempted to weaken the southern movement and obfuscate its political problems by organising its own demonstrations. Protesters take to the streets in both northern and southern governorates with their own demands, to create confusion about civil upheaval. The rallies also give the impression that marches are taking place across Yemen, and not only in the south that has separate political needs. So far, the JMP has not presented a clear vision of how secession would harm the interests of Yemenis in both the north and south. At the same time, its position remains unclear regarding the rights and interests of the south if unity is maintained, what the south wants, how their demands can be met, and what is obstructing a peaceful resolution and causing escalation. THE INPUT OF THE JMP: The real contribution by the JMP to the crisis in the south has come in the form of expressing sympathy with the southern movement and issuing several statements condemning government actions and aggression. The opposition bloc has attempted to direct the southern movement and even partnered with it on several events. But some southern leadership and organisations continue to strongly criticise the opposition bloc, including the Tagammu Party itself. JMP members have adopted a "national rescue" outlook with the aim of holding a dialogue with the southern movement, the Houthis, and all effective political forces in Yemen. It has also called on the ruling GPC to enter a dialogue with these national forces. At the same time, the opposition bloc held a comprehensive consultative forum that was attended by some 1,000 Yemeni leaders from around the country. * The writer is a researcher at Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
