Bush and his speech writers turn to grand language, grand claims and grand lies in the latest US stage-setting barrage against the Middle East. Azmi Bishara is unimpressed The only unique feature about President Bush's recent speech as it appeared on the White House Web site was the presence of the word "applause" between parentheses, after almost every paragraph. I was reminded of the speeches of Communist Party leaders published by the Progress Publishing House in Moscow in sleek hardback editions on glossy white paper. In these, too, one found the same parenthetical additions, albeit in more precise shadings: "applause", "loud applause", "loud, sustained applause", "standing ovation and cheering". Getting beyond that, one cannot help but be drawn to take a closer look. I don't know who wrote the speech, but he or she was clearly erudite and versed in the fundamental issues of democracy, especially as pertains to the problems of democratic transition. For the first time, I found myself confronted with a speech by George Bush that was, in effect, a position paper containing the primary tenets of the natural right fundamentalists who hold this administration in their grip. This is a historic document. The speech, delivered to the US Chamber of Commerce in Washington, marked the 20th anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy. Bush reminded his audience that this organisation was founded following Ronald Reagan's speech at Westminster Palace in June 1982. Reagan proclaimed that day that the Soviet Union was approaching an end and that the world had reached a turning point in its history; a turning towards democracy. Evidently, Bush's talented ghost writer intended to imply that this speech was just as historic as Reagan's; that it, too, heralded a momentous turning point towards democracy, in the Middle East this time. The implication becomes explicit in the second half of the speech. We already knew that there was nothing "neo" to the "neo-conservatives" -- that their political temperament harks back to the ambiance of such administrations as that of Reagan and Truman. What they like about Reagan is that he refused to accept the status quo. Reagan believed that it was possible to change the communist order, unlike his predecessors whose acceptance of reality led them to a policy of détente and, in the minds of conservative thinkers, to the betrayal of democracy in many parts of the world. In fact, it was not so much détente that betrayed democracy as Washington's tendency, under détente or in conflict, to enter into alliances without scrutinising the ally; beyond, that is, his being "with us or with them". This was the policy that the Bush administration upped to a "with us or against us". It was the ideologues of the present administration who coined "status quo-ist" as a way to disparage a person -- especially an adversary in the administration itself -- as one who has allegedly abandoned "America's historic mission", even if to accomplish it the use of force is necessary. Naturally, the speech writer was not about to pass up the opportunity to take a jab at those "sophisticated" Europeans who derided Reagan's Westminster speech as "simplistic and naïve". Naturally, we are meant to share the joke at the expense of those world-wise defeatists who were ultimately proved wrong by Reagan's "simple" words. By extension, of course, intellectuals from both sides of the Atlantic will come to praise Bush for simple, direct and unpolished style, and the efficacy of this style, unless, that is, he needs a sophisticated speech to justify his unsophisticated ways. Bush, in his speech, dwells for a while on how historians of the future will explain the fact that the number of democratic nations in the world rose from 40 in the 1970s to 120 by the end of the century. He predicts that future historians will focus on two factors. The first is that "the rise of so many democracies took place in a time when the world's most influential nation was itself a democracy," and as such a source of inspiration to the oppressed and to pro-democracy advocates throughout the world. Of course, one could argue that most democrats and others languishing in the world's prisons did not wait for the US to deliver them and that, moreover, a good proportion of them happened to be languishing in the prisons of America's allies. Undoubtedly, this accounts for why the speech placed such emphasis on "our commitment to democracy" -- the writer was fully aware of the scepticism shared by people the world over on precisely this point. The second factor that Bush expects historians to note is the rise of a middle class, "confident enough to demand their own rights", along with the global spread of communications technology and free trade. Historians of the future will also draw inevitable conclusions, it seems, from comparisons between the respective fates of those nations that in the middle of the 20th century chose either dictatorship or democracy. That the democracies always emerged stronger was proof of the intrinsic connection between strength and prosperity and liberty and creativity. The speech then proclaims, "The success of freedom is not determined by some dialectic of history." ("Dialectic?" Where did the White House get this language from?) Rather, "By definition, the success of freedom rests upon the choices and the courage of free peoples, and upon their willingness to sacrifice," as Americans had done in Korea and Vietnam, for example. So, not only does it appear that the ghost writer read some Marx at university, but he also has a score to settle with Fukuyama. Democracy is not inevitably destined to prevail, through some kind of millenarian dialectic. Its victory is a question of resolve, purpose and sufferance. But the discussion is purely academic, because the victory of an ideology also depends on the ability to mobilise converts and instil faith in its ultimate victory. Before moving on to the second part of his speech on his own administration's commitment to democracy, Bush asserts that democracy eventually leads to peace. The proof resides in Germany and Japan, now "democratic nations that no longer threaten the world" because of the steadfastness of the US and its allies. How familiar is this oft-cited example of Germany and Japan, whose non-democratic pasts are held responsible for the outbreak of world wars, as though these bore no connection to capitalist competition. The reference is obviously meant to draw the audience's mind to the Middle East, where it is to be inferred Arab countries would become less "aggressive" (against whom, we don't have to wonder) if only they became more democratic. Not that the agreements the Arabs signed with Israel uphold this hypothesis. But perhaps Bush will expound in the second half of his speech? In all events, it is apparent that there are people now in the higher echelons of the Bush administration who subscribe to Sharon's long-held claim that Israel can only make peace with democratic Arab countries. Perhaps these people are haunted in a perverse way by another radical left dialectic that maintains that the road to Palestine, and hence peace with Israel, passes through Arab capitals. Again preempting historians of the future, Bush opens the second half of his speech with the proclamation that today the US has "reached another great turning point". The US, he continues, is still committed to democracy and its resolve is being tested in countries like Cuba, Burma, North Korea and Zimbabwe -- "outposts of oppression in our world". Bush is confident that, "one day, from prison camps and prison cells, and from exile, the leaders of new democracies will arrive." Bush does not make clear the extent to which the Americans will help these people "until the day of their freedom finally arrives". But then, he is not waging war in those places. And after all, these countries are cited only in passing, since, he admits, his speech will concentrate on the Middle East, not the above-mentioned "outposts of oppression". Before turning to the Middle East, however, he touches upon China, which now has "a sliver, a fragment" of liberty. With the nation that has many times the population of the Middle East he is much more cautious. The Chinese people, he said, had discovered that economic freedom leads to national wealth. He is confident that China's leaders will discover (on their own, one presumes -- without the assistance of the US and its armed forces, to which he makes no allusion here) that "freedom is indivisible" and that "social and religious freedom is also essential to national greatness and national dignity." Believe it or not, Bush has descended to flattery in the hope, perhaps, that the US can brown-nose the Chinese regime into the democratic persuasion. However, there is a definite change in tone when he turns to the Middle East, which is not only the focus of this day, but the focus of American policy "for decades to come". As though placing himself in the position of a frustrated citizen of the Arab world, Bush asks: "Are the peoples of the Middle East somehow beyond the reach of liberty? Are millions of men and women and children condemned by history or culture to live in despotism?" Curiously, he did not raise the same doubts with regard to China, Burma or other countries he mentioned. The plaintive ring to the questions leads one to suspect that his ghost writer has heard Arabs grumble. Bush's speech proceeds to take issue with sceptics who have questioned whether certain peoples were "ready" for democracy, specifically whether Islam was consistent with democratic rule. Here, we discover that he believes that Bangladesh is a democratic nation and that Turkey, Indonesia, Senegal, Albania, Niger and Sierra Leone are well on the path to democracy. He further stresses that "Muslim men and women are good citizens of India and South Africa, of the nations of Western Europe, and of the USA." But regardless of what Bush says, his policies are roundly supported by racists and fanatics everywhere who have diagnosed a fundamental contradiction between democracy and the Arab and Muslim peoples. And these same policies have spurred the opposition of democratically minded people. What would Bush's answer to Huntington be were it not for the fundamentalist democratic rhetoric in which he has clad himself? No, Islam is not inconsistent with democracy, he stresses. The transition to democracy took place in those above-mentioned Muslim countries, "not in spite of their faith, but because of it". He elaborates: "A religion that demands individual moral accountability, and encourages the encounter of the individual with God, is fully compatible with the rights and responsibilities of self-government." Are we now to understand that China, India and Japan have no hope, whether with regard to democracy or to the encounter of the individual with his maker? Bush's ghost writer is obviously educated, but his education contains all the diverse ingredients of an American omelet, complete with democratic flavour enhancers. It is easy to make an omelet, but one cannot convert an omelet back into eggs. The problems surrounding democracy have been so whisked together in this speech that it is difficult to disentangle them. Not that this presents much of a problem to the speech writer, who picks and chooses with every new paragraph. Perhaps he knows his ABCs of democratic theory, but, perhaps too, he saw no need for rigorous scholastic exactitude in a political speech. In all events, this is not the first time the world has encountered a racist policy propped up on universalistic theoretical underpinnings. Bush goes on to quote a whole paragraph from the first Arab Human Development Report on the "freedom deficit" in the Middle East (how thoughtful of him). This phenomenon and its consequences, he said, were "not the failures of a culture or a religion ... but the failures of political and economic doctrines". By way of explanation, he treats us to another historical overview: "As the colonial era passed away, the Middle East saw the establishment of many military dictatorships. Some rulers adopted the dogmas of socialism, seized total control of political parties and the media and universities. They allied themselves with the Soviet bloc and with international terrorism. Dictators in Iraq and Syria promised the restoration of national honor, a return to ancient glories. They've left instead a legacy of torture, oppression, misery and ruin." Curious, no mention of Algeria or Libya here. Interestingly, too, Ha'aretz homed in on this paragraph and gave the following title to its coverage of the speech: "Bush compares Syria to Iraq." The schadenfreude needs no further explanation. Finally, there is that fact, glaring for its absence, which is that not all post-colonial dictatorships in the Middle East allied themselves with the Soviet Union. Some allied themselves with the US. Another form of dictatorship, according to Bush, is to be found in those governments that espouse "an ideology of theocratic terror". Although he makes specific mention of the Taliban in Afghanistan, one has little doubt that he is also alluding to Iran. Nevertheless, he asserts, "many Middle Eastern governments now understand that military dictatorship and theocratic rule are a straight, smooth highway to nowhere." Again, an important fact has escaped the attention of the speech writer. The majority of the countries in this region, including Saudi Arabia, even if we were to consider it a theocracy, have little to do with Afghanistan and Iran. But how does "our commitment to democracy" broach the majority of the other countries in the Middle East, which are neither democracies, nor theocracies, nor dictatorships, and many of which share a mutual affection for the US, such as Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries? Bush advises these governments to confront their real problems, instead of "dwelling on past wrongs and blaming others". After all, blaming the West, colonialism and -- perhaps -- Israel, is only a form of escaping their own problems. So, presumably we are supposed to sweep under the carpet of oblivion America's historic animosity to secular, progressive and Arab nationalist forces in the Arab world, as well as 1948 and 1967 too, because the Palestinian cause is only an illusion that Arab leaderships brandish before their peoples in order to divert them from their "real problems". It may well be the case that Arab regimes attempt to draw the attention of their peoples away from some issues. However, Palestine, occupation, Arab identity, fragmentation and dependency are not illusions but rather fundamental concerns. Bush lauds the democratic progress made in some Arab nations. He cites as examples Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Morocco, Kuwait and Jordan, which have instituted some electoral and constitutional reforms. Let us not forget, however, that none of these governments have become constitutional monarchies. Saudi Arabia gets a pat on the back for "taking the first steps toward reform", and "the great proud nation of Egypt" is exhorted to "show the way toward democracy in the Middle East" just as it had "shown the way toward peace". Are these words of encouragement or veiled threats? What is particularly disconcerting, however, is that the most democratic country of the Middle East does not even merit mention. What happened to Lebanon? Why has it vanished? Be that as it may, Bush imparts other gems of wisdom: "As we watch and encourage reforms in the region, we are mindful that modernization is not the same as Westernization." It's all in a single speech: theory and practice, two films for the price of one. Everything you wanted to know about US policy on democracy but were afraid to ask -- or imagine? He is determined to offer up Afghanistan and Iraq as examples of how successful this policy is. America will defend democracy in Iraq as it had in Greece in 1947 (which ultimately gave rise to a military dictatorship) and in the Berlin Airlift. At the same time, he appeals for democratic reform in the rest of the Middle East, even though the democracies he claims are coming to life in Afghanistan and Iraq were not brought about by reform. He rejects the status quo in the Middle East and takes these adventures as his pledge to change it. The status quo in the Middle East, with its endemic dictatorships, breeds violence, which rebounds against the West, he reasons. It therefore follows that it is in the West's immediate interests to create democracies in the Middle East. Perhaps due to lack of time Bush expounds no further on this complex causal relationship. But then how could he without running into the contradiction that most of the perpetrators of the bombings of the World Trade Centre did not hail from those dictatorships and theocracies he wants to change? Moreover, he and his ghost writer know that the US had originally helped create that theocracy of terror in Afghanistan. In any case, the speech has already prohibited selective harping on the past. Not that this prevented the speech writer from ignoring another principle he had set early on in the speech. Although he had rejected the notion of a historical dialectical imperative, his uncontrollable democratic fundamentalist zeal leads him to proclaim the inverse: "[W]e believe that liberty is the direction of history. We believe that human fulfillment and excellence come in the responsible exercise of liberty." Had I not known that this was Bush speaking, I might have thought it was the young Marx who held that the end of history would deliver mankind back to its intrinsic state of freedom; the same Marx driven to understand history's vehicle, which he eventually found in the proletariat. The factory smokestacks have emitted their last gasps proclaiming the salvational role of the working class. No one speaks anymore of a social vehicle for freedom, other than in the form of an awareness and ethics of freedom which, translated into political undertakings, generally jar with America's policies up until now. Bush wants us to learn by heart, and to repeat, that the bearers of the mission of liberty are crew- cut marines from Iowa and Minnesota, remnants of the Reagan administration, and a revamped president who overcame his addiction to alcohol by embracing a staunch fundamentalism and who recently signed a law restricting women's right to abortion in the US itself. More ominously, this president derives his greatest support from the most conservative and reactionary forces, whose faith in what he says is so fervent that they are pushing for an aggressive application of his stance against the "status quo". Don't get me wrong. I'm not mocking Bush's simplicity. His speech, as I have said, is far from simplistic. But it certainly doesn't defy comprehension.
