Iraq is at the heart of a complex and volatile game of international relations. Those involved would do well to watch their backs, Ayman El-Amir* writes With the interim government of Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi in power, all the chips are down on the future of Iraq and the wheel of fortune has begun to spin. The scene in Baghdad is that of a mixed crowd of political gamblers, some with high stakes, others wielding big sticks to spoil the game, and a majority with only modest hopes that the outcome will be a win-win situation. However, the United States' indefinite military presence in the country, Iran's burgeoning role as the region's superpower and Israel's stealthy entry onto the scene as an ally of the Kurds makes it hardly likely that there will be winner at all further down the line. In this precarious melee, the US has the highest stakes in shaping the future of Iraq in its best interests. A 140,000-strong military presence and a US pro-consul, supported by an estimated 1,000 embassy staff, heavily guard these stakes. The bet is on a stable, democratic and federated Iraq closely allied with the US. In such a model, the world's only superpower would be able to expand its military stronghold in the Gulf region, and create what it would advocate as a successful model for democratic change in the so-called Greater Middle East. To stress the point, President George W Bush, speaking at Istanbul's Galatasary University after concluding a NATO summit meeting on 29 June, celebrated the formal transfer of sovereignty in Baghdad to the Allawi government as a sign that Iraq has become "the world's newest democracy". The pundits of the Bush administration believe that setting up Iraq as a role model for democracy will have a domino effect, particularly on recalcitrant regimes in the region, including Iran and Syria. In order to create the new order envisioned in the form of a new democratic process -- to be spearheaded by parliamentary elections scheduled for the end of January 2005 -- the US will have to forge a number of uncomfortable alliances, primarily with the Shia majority. Unlike the firebrand rebel Moqtada Al-Sadr and his Al-Mehdi army, the mainstream Shia movement has maintained its integrity under difficult circumstances, closely guarding its interests as Iraq's credible future majority. To the US, a majority Shia victory in the anticipated parliamentary elections would mean a formidable Iran-Iraq religious front of more than 75 million Shias. It would make Iraq much less malleable than the US would like to see it. However, this religious coalescence may not necessarily produce a seamless political alliance, given the bitter memories of the 1980s Iran-Iraq war, where one million were killed on both sides of the war front, and Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani's apparent tendency to leave his options open. For the US, the other option is to carve up a federated state of Iraq under a new constitution. While this may sit well with the Kurds of Iraq, it would be politically, economically and ethnically controversial and may sow the seeds of a new conflict. Indeed, a Catch-22 situation seems to be emerging for the US. Continued military presence in Iraq to maintain stability and guard against a total breakdown of security is in itself the chief reason for instability as it gives the armed resistance in the country its raison d'être. For Allawi's interim government, the best bet is on crushing the violent resistance that is bent on destabilising the situation and rendering the country ungovernable. Violent insurgency draws its pseudo-legitimacy from the time- honoured international right of resistance against foreign military occupation. The interim government's pseudo- legitimacy, on the other hand, rests on the United Nations Security Council resolution that approved interim arrangements leading to the establishment of a freely-elected, representative legislature and government. The interim government and the resistance movement are mutually exclusive, and only one of them will be able to survive. Lurking in the wings are the ex-Baathist, predominantly Sunni professionals who constituted the power base of Saddam Hussein's regime. The Shia majority will probably eclipse their former pre-eminent position if a proportional government is established. Their best hope is to regain power within a restructured army and police force, if the US military feels they have purged their ranks enough to trust them. From a geo-strategic perspective, the high stakes of Iran come close to rivalling those of the US. The fall of Saddam Hussein's regime has created a regional power vacuum that cannot be filled, even by the mighty US dominance that will always be viewed as a foreign military presence and thus a legitimate target by a rag-tag of resistance movements. But the Iranian old guard will need to offer more than religious credentials to persuade their brothers-in- faith that they hold the key to regional stability, progress, development and democracy for a population that has long been starved of these privileges. Two more reckless gamblers have to be counted: Israel and the Kurds. Recent press reports strongly indicate that Israel and the Kurds have forged an alliance, under which the Israelis provide commando operation training, sabotage, infiltration and intelligence-gathering skills to the Kurds. In return, the Iraqi Kurds are establishing communication channels for the Israelis with the Kurdish minorities in Iran, Syria and Turkey. For Israel, it is a near-perfect coup. Israeli intelligence agents, posing as businessmen and project managers, are helping train the 75,000 peshmerga into a lethal commando force capable of sabotaging any political arrangement in Iraq that does not meet their demands. It also gives rise to the Kurdish nationalist fervour for a state of Kurdistan that would become the meeting point for Kurds from Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran. In other words, it would constitute something like a "new Israel" in the Gulf region. The obsessive Israeli mentality estimates that the US gamble in Iraq is bound to lose and is keen on creating a counter- balance to Iran's potential nuclear power that would rival Israel's nuclear supremacy. Destabilising the region through a series of Kurdish rebellions and commando operations would be Israel's best response to keep Iran off balance. For the Kurds, it is a big gamble, with as much risk involved as potential reward. Arab governments of the Gulf region have reconciled themselves to the prerogatives of the US military presence and commanding power. Others that are far removed from the scene are watching the unfolding situation in Iraq, with some concern. If Iraq should become the US model for democracy, the domino effect will roll and considerable regime compromises will have to be made. It is reasonable to expect that Iraq will be a mixed bag of success and compromises. For now, it seems that the best way for the US to hedge its bets is to acknowledge a new regional balance led by a moderate coalition of Iran and Iraq, and to rein in Israeli spoiling tactics. For this would be the only win- win scenario. * The writer is a former correspondent for Al-Ahram in Washington, DC. He also served as director of United Nations Radio and Television in New York.
