By Salama A Salama The French and Dutch rejection of the EU constitution does not mean the collapse of European unity though it does set a ceiling on hopes for a United States of Europe that could vie with and counterbalance the US. Not that this should overly concern the Arab world. Recent history has shown the more cohesive and influential the EU becomes the more it will pressure the Arab world. These pressures tend to conform to American policy in the Middle East in the expectation the US will reciprocate in other areas. We saw this dynamic in action in the handling of the Iranian nuclear issue, when Europe worked in tandem with the US. It manifested itself more explicitly in the recent Euromed conference in Luxemburg, during which the EU attempted to remove the Arab-Israeli conflict from the agenda. It's an old subject and it's being handled at another international level so why keep bringing it up in meetings that should be concentrating on political, economic and cultural reform in Arab countries? So ran the argument, echoing Washington's insistence upon prioritising the spread of democracy. The Arabs halted this bid. It's hardly in their interests to be at the mercy of two large power blocs -- the US and the EU -- all the more so when the pressures work in favour of Israel, aim to sap Arab resources and subjugate the Arab world under such sobriquets as European partnership, Euromed dialogue and cooperation with NATO. The French and Dutch rejections of the constitution suggest the Europeans are unwilling to place their fate unconditionally in the hands of their leaders, even if those leaders are democratically elected. The European people are determined to put the breaks on the dreams of an elite of professional politicians who seek a European entity steered by a single governing apparatus, ruled by a single constitution and adopting uniform domestic and foreign policies regardless of how these might clash with the interests of its 25 members. The French detected and expressed more quickly than other peoples of "old" Europe the problems involved in admitting 15 new members to the EU from Eastern ("new") Europe. To the French this development became a vehicle for their mounting anger and frustration. It was not just that social benefits were crumbling, unemployment rates climbing and economic security was threatened by an influx of cheap labour from Eastern Europe. Nor was it just right- wing xenophobia or more general fears over European culture and values aggravated by Turkey's EU candidacy. There was strong scepticism about the very feasibility of a United States of Europe and a general reluctance to being swallowed up in a unified European identity. The constitutional referendum debacle may have powerful repercussions. German Chancellor Schroder, Chirac's foremost ally in promoting the EU constitution, is currently so unpopular that if elections were held tomorrow he would certainly loose. EU partners face a long period of discord over the next steps to take as well as over their relations with the US which did not even bother to hide its pleasure at the EU setback. It is difficult to predict the direction Europe will take next. Will it overhaul the constitution and put it to referendum again or will it place the whole thing on hold? Will it opt for some compromise solution, such as a two-tiered approach that will permit some countries to fully integrate and others to hold off for a while? Whatever route the Europeans go one thing is certain. The Arabs, as they currently stand, are too weak to benefit from a strong united Europe and too weak to benefit from a fragmented quarreling Europe. They remain, as ever, easy prey for all.
