Who, ultimately, benefits from the bombings in Dahab, asks Ammar Ali Hassan* Although news commentators went to great lengths in describing the goriest details of the recent bombings in Dahab, they devoted much less time to the kind of analysis that might help identify the perpetrators. Not that that should have come as a surprise, not in a country so efficient in impeding the release of facts and possessed of a security apparatus that is quick to accuse but sluggish to the point standstill when it comes to revealing the basis on which it has made accusations. Any critical view of the Ministry of Interior account as to who was behind the Dahab bombings, as well as earlier attacks in Taba and Sharm El-Sheikh, would soon detect avenues that remain unexplored. The first leads to Al-Qaeda, in the strictly organisational sense. Was the attack ordered from above and relayed by code? If so this would place the Dahab attack in the same category of the Aqaba and Amman bombings, for which "Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Tigris and Euphrates" is responsible. Al-Qaeda could also have inspired others to follow its principle of striking the "near enemy". These could include young Bedouins in the Sinai or Egyptians from the Nile Valley, who felt that by carrying out the attack they would aid Al-Qaeda's wider strategy. There is, too, the possibility of an extremist group among Sinai's Bedouin. In targeting tourists in Dahab they could be pursuing a radical Islamist agenda, or equally be reacting to the human rights violations perpetrated by the security apparatus in Sinai following the Taba and Sharm El-Sheikh bombings. Human rights organisations in Egypt and abroad have repeatedly condemned the mass detentions of young Bedouins, and their torture by the police. There is too the possibility of the emergence of nascent fringe groups. Limited in membership and material means, such groups gravitate towards soft civilian targets. There are increasing numbers of individuals who refuse to accept the retraction of violence made by the Gamaa Islamiyya and who are angered by the fragmentation of Jihadist organisation following the US campaign against terror and there is no reason to suppose they would not be drawn to ultra-radical splinter groups of the kind that emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The minister of interior recently announced it had uncovered a hitherto unknown group, the Mansoura League, said to be bent on targeting tourism. If true, there is no reason why there should not be other such groups. Then there is Israel, already accused by some as the invisible hand behind the Taba and Sharm El-Sheikh bombings. They point to the fact that the three attacks were timed to coincide with national holidays, the October War victory, the annual commemoration of the July 1952 Revolution and Sinai Day, and to warnings issued by the Israeli government against travel to Sinai. Tel Aviv, they say, seeks to destroy Egyptian tourism in order to create a permanent security dilemma for the Egyptian authorities that would force them into ongoing security coordination with Israel. The Ministry of Interior, which accuses Sinai Bedouins of being behind the attacks in Taba and Sharm El-Sheikh, also assumes they are behind the Dahab bombings. Yet the ministry has yet to build a convincing case against any party. Moreover, even if Bedouins were immediately responsible for the bombings it does not preclude a connection with some foreign agency, whether Al-Qaeda or Mosad or, alternatively, the possibility that they were recruited by a domestic extremist organisation operating in the Nile Valley. We must also expect that whoever the perpetrators are there is a likelihood of a repeat attack. The security agencies have not adopted a more enlightened treatment of Sinai Bedouins. Nor are the Bedouins sufficiently integrated into the new economic life of Sinai feel it is in their interests to defend tourist enterprises. In Egypt policies continue to breed violence. Not only does the priority given to "national security" continue to overshadow all other considerations, the security apparatus depends exclusively on the most heavy-handed tactics. At the same time, the regime remains determined to close off avenues that might absorb moderate Islamists into the political process. It is an approach that has skewed the relationship between the state and people from all classes. On top of this Egypt is still prevented under the Camp David accord from establishing a strong enough security presence in the parts of Sinai adjacent to Israel, creating a vacuum easily exploited by any agency targeting Egypt's economic and political stability. But who gains from such atrocities? The recent bombings cast a shadow over the ability of the regime to guarantee security. But that the incident targeted tourism, a mainstay of the national economy, gave the government an opening to extend the emergency law. The government is unlikely to have been so confident in its request for a renewal of emergency laws had it been appealing for the extension to combat peaceful protests such as those staged by Kifaya and the Judges' Club. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB), too, might stand to benefit. Having won 88 seats in recent parliamentary elections it is now in a position to present itself as the moderate Islamist alternative to radical groups that refuse to work through legitimate political channels. The MB's opponents, whether from within the establishment or from other ideological trends, are quick to point out that extremist groups that advocate violence originally emerged from the MB fold, conveniently ignoring the time gap that separates the ideological founders of the Muslim Brotherhood from the extremist fringe groups that emerged in the wake of the dispersion of Jihad and Gamaa Islamiyya. The MB long since renounced its advocacy of violence and is now actively engaged in peaceful political practices. Indeed, the Muslim Brotherhood has come under attack by more radical Islamist leaders, notably Al-Qaeda number two Ayman El-Zawahri, who accused it of colluding in a deal struck between the US and Egypt by participating in recent parliamentary elections. The Islamist parties currently under formation -- the Wasat (Centre), the Sharia (Islamic Law) and the Islah (Reform) -- could also turn the recent spate of bombings to their advantage as they seek official approval. Many, including some on the regime' fringes, believe that allowing these parties access to legitimate political activity will eventually work to close off the avenues to radical groups. It would also pave the way for a reconciliation between some radical Islamists and modern political processes. This would be no small accomplishment. It is important to recall that until 1997 the Gamaa Islamiya had condemned democratic procedures as contradictory to Islamic Law. Liberal and leftwing forces could use the bombings to persuade the regime to relax its grip over political life. If political parties were allowed full freedom the young would have an outlet for its anger other than militant underground organisations espousing violence. They could argue that the stagnation in political life that has occurred over the past two decades has widened the gap between the regime and the public, something extremist groups have exploited in recruited the frustrated and dispossessed. We saw signs of this before the Dahab attacks, when leftist intellectuals tried to draw the attention of the government to the fact that its real enemies were not those forces openly campaigning for reform but rather clandestine organisations working to debilitate or topple the regime, killing innocent people and destroying the livelihood of ordinary Egyptians in the process. Instead of clamping down on Kifaya demonstrators, beating up judges who are staging a sit-in or smearing Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition figures, the government, they argued, should focus its attention on safeguarding Egypt's national security. It is possible a situation will arise in which liberals, moderate Islamists and perhaps some elements within the regime join forces to push in two directions. The first is towards a healthier political climate, which will involve rescinding emergency laws that have clearly failed to prevent terrorist attacks. The second will be to work for an amendment to the peace treaty of 1979 so as to permit Egyptian security forces to extend their control over the whole of Sinai. There is considerable discrepancy between the abilities of the various parties to turn developments to their favour. The government still has the upper hand and can impose its policies, however poorly managed and ineffective. Since opposition forces are probably too weak to deflect the government from its course the chances are that the government will tighten its security grip, bringing on board other agencies to work alongside the Ministry of Interior to fight extremist organisations, prolong the emergency laws and introduce harsher security measures, while pressing ahead with hereditary succession to the presidency, regardless of the costs. * The writer is director of the Centre for Middle East Studies and Research, Cairo.
