Unequivocally, Israel and the US are the biggest losers from an ill-fated month of war in Lebanon, writes Ayman El-Amir* In the month-long intense military campaign against Lebanon, Israel suffered a debacle beyond anyone's expectations and Hizbullah demonstrated a resilience that upset everyone's calculations. It was this surprising reversal of fortunes on the ground that changed the course of international diplomacy and led to the Security Council adopting a resolution for the cessation of hostilities, which the US had blocked for three weeks. The war in Lebanon has redefined the geopolitical situation and created new realities that will have far-reaching implications for all the parties involved. A reassessment will be required of the situation in the Middle East -- a region that will never be the same again. Hizbullah's resistance and the Lebanese people's stamina have overturned US-Israeli calculations in the wider Middle East region. An observer need only consider the political about face key members of the Security Council made during hectic negotiations to reach a ceasefire resolution. Initially, France worked out with the US a draft resolution that was inexplicably tilted against Lebanon, its old-time ally. The Russian delegate, Vitali Churkin, "advised" his "Arab friends" to read the draft again because there were "many good things for them in it". The Chinese adopted a wait-and-see position and the British tailed the US. Nothing of Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Al-Siniora's seven-point plan was taken into consideration. Everyone was banking on a quick Israeli victory in Lebanon. If the US had its way, the outcome would have been an imposed solution based on the punitive provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Surprises in the confrontation between Israel and Hizbullah changed everything. Israeli tactics of "shock and awe" -- that is, indiscriminately killing as many civilians as possible to intimidate the Lebanese government and people -- failed to achieve the intended results of inciting inter-factional implosion. They only served to strengthen the resolve of Lebanese people of all colours of the political rainbow, from the Shia Hizbullah leadership to the Maronite Phalangist party leaders. Former president and Phalangist leader Amin Jmayel and the current leader Karim Bakradouni, presented a unique show of unity that remains to be tested in the aftermath of the war. Above all, Lebanon stood tall. The implications for Israel are serious. For the first time in its history, Israel faced a war on its own territory, even by short-range missiles fired by Hizbullah. In the past five wars, Israel fought on Arab territory, in Sinai, the Golan Heights and the West Bank. Israeli armed forces, long trained in and used to the tactics of blitzkrieg offensive and quick victory, have been battling Hizbullah fighters in southern Lebanon for more than one month with no decisive victory in sight. A long-drawn-out war with many combat troop casualties is not good for Israeli morale or image, whether in the region or in the world. The war with Hizbullah has given Israel an unprecedented sense of vulnerability and its neighbours an insight into the fallacy of Israeli invincibility. It will not only have to review its military strategy but also to adjust its regional political compass that has long been based on military supremacy. Nothing has reflected this new sense of panic as well as the words of Israeli journalist Shlomo Ganur, who told Al-Jazeera satellite channel, "Israel cannot allow anyone to undermine its military capability; it cannot, as a state, as a people, or as an entity in this region, have its prestige challenged." Well, Israeli military prestige has been challenged and undermined. For the US, this poses more than one dilemma. The Bush administration had resisted mounting international pressure for a UN Security Council ceasefire resolution to give Israel a military edge on the battleground that could be used as a bargaining chip in a future political settlement. It pursued foot- dragging tactics beyond the limits of tolerance. But Israel failed and embarrassed its closest ally. The administration could not be unhappier with Israel's poor military performance and failed results. The US would have liked nothing more than for Israel to crush Hizbullah, which is on the top of its list of terrorist organisations. A successful blow to Hizbullah would have bolstered the US's sagging image in its self-professed holy war against global terrorism. To US strategists, the elimination of Hizbullah in Lebanon would have set back Iran's growing influence and weakened the position of Syria, both of which are strong supporters of the resistance movement. It would have vindicated US daily battles and casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the Israeli murderous campaign against the besieged Palestinian people in Gaza and the West Bank. It did not work. The image of a vulnerable Israel backed by a failed US strategy for a new Middle East will have long-term consequences in the region for both. A lesson on the limits of power will eventually sink in, although the US does not seem to have absorbed it despite the disastrous consequences of its invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Israel continues to practice systematic killing of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Classical Arab regimes, including the closest US allies who two years ago squirmed in their seats of power as they heard murmurs of the much- touted new, democratic Middle East, are now gleefully breathing a sigh of relief. As Israeli warplanes pounded Lebanese civilians, and Hizbullah fired its rockets into Israel, Arab leaders fired misguided statements of wisdom and pontificated on the political course of events. Masses in Arab capitals who had little faith in the US clarion-call for democracy in the Middle East, have now been emboldened by the performance of Hizbullah's fighters -- a grassroots movement with which they strongly identify. For dictatorial Arab regimes, the writing on the wall could not be clearer. Implementation of the cessation of hostilities resolution still lacks an effective mechanism and can and likely will break down several times before it really takes hold. It provides for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the shaky strongholds they occupied in the south in parallel with the deployment of the Lebanese army, backed by UNIFIL -- the UN force in southern Lebanon. Here is the catch-22. The Lebanese army will not move into position unless the area is cleared of both Israeli and Hizbullah combatants. Hizbullah has vowed not to withdraw for as long as "one Israeli soldier remains on Lebanese territory". And Israel said it would not withdraw and leave Hizbullah in place -- a perfect zero-sum game for diplomats. Hizbullah has come out of the war as a stronger partner in the Lebanese body politic but even a more integral part of the socio-political fabric of Lebanese society. There is a near unanimous consensus in Lebanon that Hizbullah could not, and should not, be disarmed, as Israel and its backers demand under US-crafted Security Council Resolution 1559. However, under certain conditions, Hizbullah fighters can be integrated into the Lebanese army as an elite force with a special organisational structure and military strategy. Tragic as the just-ended war may have been, particularly in view of the severe casualties suffered by Lebanese civilians targeted by Israeli warplanes, it provides politicians and diplomats on all sides with an opportunity to search for a durable and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This has long been labelled the core issue of the Arab- Israeli conflict. For Israel, it will require a great deal of soul- searching; for the Bush administration that has no soul to search it means sending its entire Middle East strategy back to the drawing board. * The writer is former Al-Ahram correspondent in Washington, DC. He also served as director of the United Nations Radio and Television in New York.
