In Focus: The Vietnam complex Galal Nassar reflects on the similarities between Iraq and Vietnam, and remarks on the failure to learn the lessons of the past he Democratic win in the United States congressional mid-term elections triggered speculations of an early US withdrawal from Iraq. It also brought back memories of the rapid US withdrawal from Somalia, once Bill Clinton took office. Iraq is showing the full range of the Vietnam syndrome with the public, the administration, and the army all having misgivings about the cost of the war. In earlier articles, I discussed the contradiction between President Bush's May 2004 statement that major operations ended in Iraq, and the escalation in fighting that followed. The president's upbeat comments reminded me of the remarks US generals used to make about Vietnam. In both Vietnam and Iraq, the White House blamed others for the debacle (North Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union in Vietnam's case; and Syria, Iran and Al-Qaeda in Iraq's case). In both cases, the White House decided to increase the troops instead of changing tack. Iraq was an instance of history repeating itself. That was the conclusion that one reached two years ago, back when the US official circles systematically dismissed any similarity between Iraq and Vietnam. Things are different now. When the US president was asked on 18 October 2006 whether Thomas Friedman was right to draw parallels between the current US debacle in Iraq and the Vietcong attacks in January 1968, he admitted that Friedman might be right. The comparison with Vietnam has been made by many. And yet it took the US president two years to come around. The US was losing on the ground, and causing great damage to others, and yet the message wasn't going through. The world's sole superpower miscalculated, then took forever to see its mistakes. Even now, one is not quite sure that it can set things right. The Baker- Hamilton Commission, formed by Democrats and Republicans ahead of the midterm elections, is likely to recommend a change in the US strategy in Iraq. But what will the outcome be? President Bush, analysts believe, has several options. One is to order a phased withdrawal from Iraq. Another is to focus more on stability than democracy- building and open diplomatic channels with Syria and Iran. A third would be to divide Iraq into three parts. Baker said that he discussed the idea of partitioning with the US president, but added that his commission was not going to recommend that particular course. The commission, Baker said, preferred to decentralise security but maintain a central government that would be in charge of protecting the borders, allocating resources, and handling diplomatic relations. The Islamic Army, one of the largest armed opposition groups in Iraq, is said to have been engaged in secret talks with a US delegation in Amman for the past few weeks. Representatives of the Reconciliation Front (Sunni) and clan leaders are believed to have taken part in the talks. According to the Financial Times, the US is pressing the Iraqi government to issue a general amnesty for the rebels, in the hope of normalising the situation, an option which some American officials described as "painful". The Americans have taken forever to understand the situation and seek a revision of policy. But then again, this revision may not take place soon enough, even with the Democrats controlling the Congress. The Republicans and the Democrats will have to agree on an exit strategy from Iraq, and that may take months. White House spokesman Tony Snow said on 18 October 2006 that high casualties among US troops in Iraq wouldn't lead to a revision in Washington's policy. US Vice-President Dick Cheney echoed the same sentiment in an interview with Time magazine, saying that the US was not looking for an exit strategy, but for victory. And let's not forget that former defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld was until recently contemplating an increase in the number of US troops in Iraq. It is therefore too early to predict a radical change in US strategy in Iraq, notwithstanding the future recommendations of the Baker- Hamilton Commission. The US went into Iraq without a clear strategy, refused to acknowledge the difficulties in a timely manner, and acted with the same inertia that brought about disaster in Vietnam. It has taken President Bush two full years to acknowledge the fact in Iraq. Now, one wonders, would it take the US two more years to pull out of Iraq? Would the Iraq debacle end in scenes similar to those of Saigon in 1975?
