During their recent meeting in St Petersburg, Putin, the Tsar of the “new Russia”, and Erdogan, the sultan of the “new Turkey”, may not have managed to fundamentally change the nature of the relationship between their two countries, given acute geostrategic rivalry that often causes modes of conflict to outweigh modes of cooperation. However, both leaders fully appreciated the potential for seizing on unexpected events to reorient the course of their relationship in a manner that serves the strategic interests of both countries. This was not the first time such a situation has occurred. For example, the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution toward the end of World War I helped create the objective circumstances that enabled Ataturk to build a modern Turkey on the back of the collapsed Ottoman empire. Tsarist Russia was a key player in the interplay between the countries, jockeying to divvy up the Ottoman empire between the powers allied against Germany and Turkey in World War I. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov was an enthusiastic participant in the negotiations that took place between France and Britain in 1916, resulting in the Sykes-Picot agreement. Had Russia not withdrawn early from the war due to the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution, the agreement would have been called the Sykes-Picot-Sazonov agreement and Russia, by virtue of that agreement, would have gained control over Istanbul and the straits connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean. We can therefore say that the Russian revolution was the unanticipated event that prevented Russia from obtaining its envisioned share of the legacy of the collapsed Ottoman empire. Moreover, these same objective circumstances would subsequently help the Russian Marxist Vladimir Lenin and the Turkish nationalist Mustafa Kemal Ataturk forge a special bilateral relationship that would enable the latter to build a modern state in Turkey and the former to consolidate Russia's nascent socialist experiment and protect the Soviet enterprise from foreign intrigues and conspiracies. That bilateral relationship lasted throughout the interwar period and then was irremediably sundered by massive upheaval in international power balances after World War II, which would drive Turkey into the embrace of the Western camp and the anti-Soviet NATO alliance as of 1952. It is probably difficult to find points in common between the military coup attempt that took place in Turkey on 15 July this year and the Bolshevik Revolution against the tsars in 1917. Nevertheless, when we consider the impact of those two sudden internal events on the course of the Russian-Turkish relationship we might find some similarities from that perspective. Had it not been for that aborted coup in Turkey last month, the objective conditions would not have been in place to realise the historic meeting that took place in St Petersburg last week and that opened new and previously unavailable horizons for the development of these two countries' bilateral relationship, which had reached an all-time nadir following the Turkish downing of a Russian military plane near the Turkish border with Syria a year ago. Some observers believe that Erdogan's swing toward Russia is a mere tactical manoeuvre intended to pressure the US into handing over Fethullah Gulen whom Turkish officials allege masterminded the aborted coup. I disagree. I believe that the failed military coup marks a definitive turning point in the history of Turkey. There are two main reasons for this, the first having to do with the ramifications of the failure of that coup attempt. All previous coup attempts in Turkey, virtually one per decade since the 1960s, succeeded in accomplishing their aims and securing control over the institutions of the state. Clearly, the first failure in the history of Turkish military coups is a landmark event that, in and of itself, stands as proof that Turkey has changed and that the Turkey of today is not the Turkey of yesterday. This is something that will have repercussions at home and abroad. The second reason relates to timing. The failed coup occurred at a moment in which Turkey was at a crossroads. The Erdogan regime, which had managed to achieve a high degree of political stability on the strength of a huge developmental boom domestically, and which had enjoyed a vibrant and dynamic foreign policy (based on the principle of “zero problems” with Turkey's neighbours) appeared to have run out of gas several months prior to the coup and seemed to heading into a slow senescence. Growth rates receded, violence and manifestations of instability proliferated, the scope of civic liberties was narrowing and human rights abuses were mounting while, on the foreign policy front, “zero problems” had segued into the policy of “problems with everyone”. If the coup had succeeded in conditions such as this, Turkey could have easily been dragged back to the years in which the military establishment controlled the political system. But, as the coup failed this should naturally open the path to the establishment of a new, stable and democratic Turkey, but on the condition that Erdogan seize this opportunity, which entails reining in his imperial ambitions. To be fair, even before the coup Erdogan appeared to have begun to realise the nature of the predicament to which his ambitions for power had driven him. Evidence of this is to be found in his apology to Moscow for having downed the Russian plane and the deal he signed with Israel to settle the Mavi Marmara issue. However, the failure of the military coup and the success of Turkish civil society and standing up against it opened new horizons for Erdogan to reorder the Turkish house from within and to reformulate Turkey's foreign policy at the same time. With regard to the former, it is important to note that Erdogan did not confine himself to restructuring the military establishment and reordering its relationship with the civilian establishments so as to forestall further military meddling in politics. He also devoted great energies into uprooting Islamist opposition factions that could pose an alternative to his own party. This helps explain his determination to accuse Gulen of masterminding the coup and to purge all institutions of government of Gulen's supporters. On the foreign policy front, we can observe that Erdogan did not confine himself to blaming the US and the EU for not being forceful enough in their condemnations of the coup and even to hinting that some Western powers had abetted the coup-makers. He also took pains to convey his gratitude to Putin, the first to condemn the coup and the first to support efforts to counter it. For this reason, Turkey is likely to distance itself more and more from Western powers, though not to the point of a complete break. At the same time, it will move closer and closer to Russia, though not to the point of the latter becoming an alternative ally. I believe that both Erdogan and Putin realise that their two countries need each other in light of current regional circumstances and that the horizons of cooperation between them at present are infinite. Both sides desire and need to revive their bilateral economic relations to levels before the downing of the Russian jet and it difficult to perceive any obstacles to this. Russia will gradually lift restrictions imposed on Turkish imports, and it will take the necessary measures to resume construction of the Turkstream natural gas pipeline and the Akkuyu nuclear power plant. Russian tour groups will flock again to Anatolian coasts and Turkish tourists will return to Russia. It is not at all unlikely that the two countries will reach their target volume of trade, which they set at $100 billion, within a few years. But what is new in the dynamics of the Russian-Turkish relationship in the period after the failed coup are the open horizons for strategic cooperation. As the Ukrainian question is Moscow's foremost concern from a Russian national security perspective and as the Kurdish question is Ankara's foremost concern from Turkey's national security perspective, any concept for developing the Russian-Turkish strategic relationship will inherently emanate from what each can do for the other with respect to those central concerns. But between the Ukrainian and Kurdish questions, which are Russia's and Turkey's red lines respectively, there is a vast range of other issues and crises that concern both countries. Chief among them are the Syrian crisis and fighting terrorism, with regard to which both countries can work to contribute solutions through mutual agreements as well as through mutual concessions. The regional and international repercussions triggered by the military coup attempt in Turkey confirm, once again, that the Middle East is still the epicentre of global conflicts and that the Arab world is the “Sick Man” of the region whose moribund condition is driving Turkey, Iran and Israel to vie for the largest possible slice of his legacy. Are there any wise men left in this Arab world with the courage to spearhead an attempt to salvage what is salvageable? The writer is professor of political science at Cairo University.
