Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia casts a long shadow over the country's peace process, writes Gamal Nkrumah It may not have been the Armageddon some pessimists predicted, but it was a ferocious bout of fighting. Ethiopian fighter jets ran sorties and bombarded Mogadishu international airport and other key infrastructural installations of the Somali capital. Ethiopia has emerged as the chief backer of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) headquartered in Baidoa. The aim of the attack was to send a warning to the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC), whose militias control much of the southern and central regions of the country, including Mogadishu, captured in June. The international community, including neighbouring countries, refuses to recognise the CIC. By the end of 2006, resistance to the militant Islamists in Mogadishu had all but petered out. Ethiopia invaded Somalia to confront its old enemy, Islamist militancy. The unanimous adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1676 in November emboldened the Ethiopians and threw the CIC into disarray. The African Union stands behind the Ethiopians and the TFG. The Arab League, on the other hand, has urged Ethiopia to pull out of Somalia. Somalia has teetered on the verge of humanitarian catastrophe throughout the second half of the year. The flooding of much of the southern part of the country laid seeds of an explosive humanitarian disaster that the next drought might ignite. Alternate years of flooding and drought have wreaked havoc in Somalia and other Horn of Africa countries in the past. The region is prone to periodic humanitarian catastrophes. The volatile political situation only worsens matters. The Horn of Africa has become a battleground for political and ideological protagonists. Donor agencies claim that they have dutifully begun to prepare for the worst. Louis Michel, European commissioner for development and aid, was on a fact-finding mission to Somalia when fighting between the Ethiopians and the CIC broke out. Only a centralised government could cope, and the CIC came close to forming precisely that, to the consternation of the Americans and the Ethiopians. That the CIC controls much of the country afforded them de facto recognition, especially in Arab and Muslim circles. The Ethiopians stepped in on Christmas Day to avoid certain political disaster as far as they were concerned. The Arab League had been playing a mediating role, organising meetings between the TFG and the CIC in the Sudanese capital Khartoum. This week, TFG troops fought alongside Ethiopians, warding off CIC militias who fast lost ground. Until now, TFG forces had always scurried back to their barracks after confronting militant Islamist militias. Somali President Abdallah Youssef has the full backing of the Ethiopians. He runs the TFG based in Baidoa as his private fief. Since rising to power, however, he has failed to impose his will or vision on the Somali people. Across Somalia, and even in his home stronghold of Puntland, he faces excited defiance by CIC sympathisers. The question now is whether the TFG can survive as the internationally recognised Somali government, and what may be necessary to ensure this. Alone, the TFG cannot govern Somalia. It needs the backing of both the Arab League and the African Union. Previous rounds of negotiations failed. The CIC, meanwhile, is divided into hardliners and moderates. The forces behind the CIC are plain enough. They rendered powerless the much-dreaded warlords of the TFG and brought together quarrelsome clans under the banner of Islam and Somali nationalism. The TFG is now exposed; ridiculed by many Somalis as a lackey of the Ethiopians. A steady Ethiopian political encroachment backed by force of arms continues to keep Islamist militias at bay, but only just. Ethiopia threw its considerable weight behind the TFG, but this has only boosted the popularity and credibility of the CIC. Until now, the TFG has been unable to stop the steamroller of anti-Ethiopian sentiment in Somalia. Once the powerful strongman of Puntland, President Abdallah Youssef is today unable to lead his noisy and recalcitrant constituency of secularist and discredited warlords. Militant Islamists have proved impervious to cries of sedition and havoc. The Ethiopians have come to Youssef's rescue, but it is unlikely that he will win the allegiance of the Somali people anytime soon. On the other side of the border, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zennawi is considered too stiff-necked to liberalise his regime and it is widely feared in the region that he is seeking a diversion in Somalia to deflect attention from a deplorable human rights record at home. Why should ethnic Somalis of Ethiopia help the Ethiopian authorities that have repeatedly questioned their patriotism? Eritrea, on the other hand, is accused of blindly and recklessly backing the questionable goals of Somalia's militant Islamists. Yet, whereas the TFG is heavily reliant on the Ethiopians for political survival and military backing, the CIC is not dependent on Eritrea to the same extend. There are an estimated 9,000 Ethiopian troops in Somalia, as opposed to only 2,000 Eritrean troops. With the TFG quiescent and the CIC biding its time, it is hard to tell what is in store for Somalis in 2007. There is also the problem of the self-styled independent Somaliland, not recognised by anyone, but effectively an Ethiopian client state. With steep mountain ranges and arid desert eating up vast tracts, Somaliland has a far more rugged terrain than central and southern Somalia. The CICs might turn their attention on the strategic northwestern region of Somalia. That leaves room for dramatic moves in the Horn of Africa in 2007. Somali leaders must keep trying to build a government of unity as well as fighting poverty. But on a broader level, unless leaders across the Horn of Africa come to their senses, the region will be embroiled in war in 2007. "Our country has been invaded by Ethiopia. We should have thrown [the Ethiopians] out a long time ago," thundered Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweis. He flew into Mogadishu airport soon after the Ethiopian bombardment. Ethiopia and Somalia have fought several wars before. That history should stand as the ultimate warning.
