Dina Ezzat examines Cairo's attempt to regain a foothold in the Arab Gulf and beyond The pace might be slow but the intentions and the rationale are crystal clear: Cairo is becoming increasingly worried about its exclusion from short and long-term security arrangements in the Gulf. It has been growing impatient with the rise of "extremism" around the Gulf zone and anxious about the spill-over effect. In consequence, it has been trying to establish a niche of Egyptian influence in the area. This week, President Hosni Mubarak received Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. The meeting came less than a week following a visit by Afghan Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta. It also came in the wake of an almost regular monthly meeting that brings together Egypt and all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states, the US and Jordan. In all of these meetings the issue of security arrangements, Iran, the rise of extremism and its impact in terms of direct US involvement, have been discussed. And in every one of these meetings, Cairo was keen to demonstrate its wish to see stability maintained and see itself as a part, integral or otherwise, of the maintenance and promotion of stability in the Gulf and beyond. Egyptian officials underline the determination to work against the expansion of instability around Egypt. With Cairo having to cope with the challenges posed by Sudan, Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq, it believes it needs to avoid further headaches that might result from an unbalanced US presence in the Arab Gulf, an expanded influence by Iran (something that Cairo is getting seriously worried about), or the rise of extremism -- especially Taliban -- in Afghanistan or for that matter in Pakistan. For Egypt, it was out of the question to allow the growing confrontation between Iran and the US over the Gulf to be conducted on the basis of the agendas of both sides since this would have excluded the Arab perception. It was with this in mind that Cairo managed to lobby the support of an equally anxious Riyadh to the cause of inducing an Arab presence in the Gulf zone and beyond. "After all, for Egypt, unlike for Iran and maybe even for the US, the Gulf is the Arab, not the Persian Gulf," commented one source. This proposition, sources say, was not opposed by Washington which would want nothing more than to lobby both Cairo and Riyadh against Iran. For Cairo, however, the issue is not joining an axis against Iran -- something that Egyptian diplomats are never too tired to emphasise especially in reference to the five- month-old forum of the GCC plus Egypt, Jordan and the US. Cairo, they say, is opposed to Iran's attempt to expand its influence over the Arab Gulf but it is equally opposed to any potential attempt on the part of the US to contain this influence through a military strike. In the declaration announced by last week's meeting of the GCC, Egypt and Jordan plus the US, Egypt managed to secure the agreement of all parties to the commitment of the nine states to jointly shape the Gulf's security profile. "I think it is safe to say that we managed to end what could have been an exclusion of Egypt from the security arrangements in the Gulf," commented one source. Meanwhile, Cairo has been trying to deal with Iran's growing influence beyond the Gulf. During recent Egyptian-Pakistani talks, including a visit by Foreign Minster Ahmed Abul-Gheit to Islamabad last month, Egypt and Pakistan agreed on the need to press upon Iran to avoid an unwanted confrontation with the US. Sources familiar with the talks say there is a reason for both Cairo and Islamabad to worry about the consequences of such a strike on the overall stability of the region. They say the last thing that either country would want is a confrontation that would prompt radical militant groups with affinity, if not affiliation to Iran, to start a series of retaliatory attacks against US targets or against these two countries that are perceived by such groups as allies of the US in the war on "Islamism". As such there has been agreement that Cairo and Islamabad would each use its contacts, influence and methods to persuade Iran (if not the president then the more influential spiritual leader) of the need to steer clear of the path of confrontation. Both capitals, along with Riyadh, would meanwhile use their leverage to lobby support in the US -- both the administration and the Congress -- against an anti-Iran military strike. Pakistani Foreign Minister Khursheed Kasuri told journalists that Musharraf and Mubarak discussed the presence of Arab militants on the border with Afghanistan. "We have paid a heavy price for that," he said without further explanation. On a parallel track, Cairo, Islamabad and Riyadh are in agreement over lending as much support as they see convenient to the Afghan government which is faced with the growing threats of the re-emergence and increasing support of the Taliban. The three capitals, each in its own way, would provide support for the so far extra-slow reconstruction purposes in Afghanistan. During his meetings in Cairo, Spanta reached agreement with Egypt to train Afghan diplomats and judges. And in a meeting with Interior Minister Habib El-Adli, he also reached tentative agreement on upgrading security cooperation. Antagonising Iran, however, is something that Egypt wishes to avoid. There is a sense of an opportunity lost over improving Egyptian- Iranian relations during the rule of reformist Iranian President Mohamed Khatami. There is also a sense of realisation that while Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is not open for cooperation with Egypt, he is not the sole decision-maker in the Islamic Republic of Iran. "In any case, and no matter how much we agree with Iran, we are not at all seeking a political or diplomatic confrontation; rather the opposite," an informed source said. "If Egypt saw a window of opportunity for reasoning it would pursue this opportunity because we are determined to spare this region from further havoc." Indeed, Cairo has extended an invitation to the Iranian minister of culture to participate in an Islamic conference that will be hosted in Cairo in March. It is debatable whether Cairo's attempt to control the temper in the Gulf and beyond will succeed. Much depends on the plans of the US administration which has not proved to be overly attentive to the concerns either of Cairo or other capitals regarding the implications of its plans.
