The many terrorist attacks that have taken place in Egypt since the end of Muslim Brotherhood rule underscore the need to prioritise measures to mobilise society against terrorism and transform civil society organisations into an effective partner in this fight. We now have an anti-terrorism law that the government must enforce firmly. However, this law and other precautionary measures are not enough to defeat terrorism and its practitioners. It is essential to destroy the social incubators that furnish it cover, protection, camouflage and, perhaps, funding. It is also crucial to raise public consciousness and create a social environment capable of repelling extremist ideologies and drying up their sources. Confronting extremism in all its forms and attitudes is a prerequisite for eliminating the wellsprings of terrorism and building the modern democratic state. It is also a process that is essential to immunising the Egyptian state and society against terrorism, radicalism and the negative effects of globalisation, as well as fortifying the revival of the moderation and wealth that are intrinsic to the Egyptian character and civilisation. But if we are to create a society that is resistant to extremism, it is important to bear in mind that this term does not just mean religious extremism and belonging to terrorist organisations. It refers to all modes of behavioural and moral extremism. Extremism, regardless of its form or orientation, weakens the state and social cohesion. Therefore, everyone must bear responsibility. This applies to all quarters of the state and society. But whereas most commentaries and analyses have focused on the role of the state, here we will take a look at the other side: the responsibility of all social forces and community organisations. Clearly these have an integral role to play in combatting extremism through the performance of their various social and cultural functions and the activities they could undertake to promote and cultivate the moderate Egyptian personality and identity which, through the ages, has always been able to absorb all ideas, including some of the oddest and seemingly alien to society, and fuse them into that resilient substance that has made Egypt the oldest existing nation in the world. There are a number of institutions that can communicate and interact with the public to build networks and pressure groups with the power to counter the dangers of extremism and the socio-political fluidity that has increased over the past four years. Foremost among these institutions are the religious establishments (Al-Azhar and the Egyptian Church), the press, the cinema, community societies and civil society forces and organisations. These, today, need to develop a broader and deeper philosophical vision that looks beyond their designated roles as dictated by the original philosophies for their existence. This new vision should respond to the demands of the current moment and the dangers that threaten the structures of the state and society, and it should respond to the need to develop more profound and comprehensive roles and responsibilities related to the formation of the Egyptian human being and fortifying him or her against the dangers of radicalisation and extremism. Perhaps a focus on developing the awareness of the citizen and linking it with the process of building the collective social consciousness is the best and, indeed, necessary avenue towards promoting the values of citizenship, not least of which are the principles of participation and civic responsibility. The challenges and dangers that need to be addressed are many and deeply intertwined in the social fabric. One of the main challenges and dangers is the multiplicity of forms of political and religious activities. The phenomenon mirrors many problems related in various ways to, first, the nature of the existing political and social elites; second, disruption in the process of building civil society; third, the political stagnation that Egypt has experienced for long periods of time and the inability to build a democratic system; fourth, the intervention of the state in civil society and its manipulation of civil society organisations as an instrument of power; and, fifth, the weak cultural and ethical component in community work. It is possible to identify three models for the degrees of utilisation of religion and its extension into the political realm. One is epitomised by the Muslim Brotherhood, which since the 1990s poured its energies into penetrating the fields of charity work and professional syndicates as a means to expand its presence and influence in the social and political domains. Some segments of the Salafist trend have inherited this role. The second model is embodied in the now dissolved National Democratic Party (NDP) and some of its key figures. The third is to be found in some business magnates. What the three models have in common is their predatory exploitation of people's need to meet basic daily requirements, and their exploitation of religious and cultural factors to attain social status and forge cliques and leaderships capable of mobilising the public during election seasons or in other manifestations of political support for a movement, faction or even particular political figures. In this context it is important to emphasise various measures that should be taken. Perhaps the foremost is the need to separate mosques from community associations so as to better be able to control the former that are so often used for political ends. At the same time, it is essential to stimulate civic frameworks and strengthen the forces they embody to better counter the forces of extremism and terrorism. Towards this end it will be important to develop a vision for maximising integration and networking between these frameworks and their diverse means and capacities. In view of the nature of the current situation it remains necessary to address the ability to transcend perspectives restricted to short-term or patchwork remedies. The issue involves much more than such tasks as scrutinising and dismantling the connections between community associations and political forces that promote violence and terrorism. Building a robust civil society and restructuring community organisations as strong units requires legislative reform covering all the laws pertaining to community associations (including NGOs, syndicates and cooperatives) with an eye to underscoring the role of society and the citizen to repel extremist thought. The foregoing means that we must also address the issues of foreign funding (whether from other Arab countries or outside the Middle East) and the politicisation of human rights through legal and civic frameworks. We require financial oversight and safeguards for national security, in order to prevent infiltration of the state and society. This particularly crucial moment in the building process requires not only a strategy to confront all radical and extremist religious and sectarian ideas, but also to address the manifestations of anarchy and moral dissolution. In this regard, it is critical to address such dangerous phenomena that threaten a number of sectors of Egyptian society, above all youth, such as atheism, feeble national allegiance, lack of a clear identity, reliance on the ideas of globalisation and other such notions and behaviours that one finds difficult to imagine that they could help the building process at this moment of intense political and social fluidity, institutional weakness and the gulf between political elites and society. Clearly, the type of strategy I refer to must look well beyond security and policing instruments, or even an anti-terrorist security policy that aims to isolate, pursue and defeat proponents of extremist thought. What is required is a strategy whose various political, economic, social and cultural dimensions work in concert to attain the aim of socially isolating everything that is extremist and could pose a threat to the state and society. It follows, therefore, that we are speaking of phases and an extended timeframe for targeting the many sectors of society, and youth in particular. The challenge facing the state and society is formidable. It requires political and social capital that is willing and able to confront the attempts to undermine, divide or diminish the state. It must also promote the concept and practice of effective collective responsibility in which roles and responsibilities are conceived and designated in relation to the process of building the modern Egyptian state. The writer is editor-in-chief of the monthly magazine Ahwal Masriya.
