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Observations about the inevitable price of freedom The freedoms gained by the revolution will have their price, not figuratively, but in a practical sense given where we choose to steer the economy
The sudden - and to many, unexpected - collapse of the ousted regime released nationwide exuberance. For a few days, Egyptians immersed themselves in celebrating their freedom. The images from Tahrir and elsewhere around the country led many to the belief that Egypt has turned the page, and that powered by the lamented talents and energy of its people, suppressed for too long, the sky is Egypt's new limit, if there was one. No one realized, wanted, or dared to spoil the party, and in a way for a good reason. The motto then, defended voraciously by some till this day, is that this revolution has brought out the best in Egyptians. Almost a month later, the party is officially over and the recognition of the expectations-reality gap is just setting in. From sectarian violence, to the general state of lawlessness, to the disruption of daily lives, many Egyptians are joining the ranks of the disillusioned and fearful. Some have slipped into flat out despair. Some blame our current state of affairs on the so called “counter revolution”. Others blame it on the unleashing of the “worst in Egyptians” brought about by the state of lawlessness. Those go as far as wondering “whether Egyptians are indeed ready for democracy”. In the face of this, one thing remains true: all historical transformations of the nature and scope of what Egypt is about are disruptive in nature. They destroy an order to build another. Realizing that and accepting it is the first step towards turning quickly to the much tougher questions, like: what to dismantle? what to build in its place? when to do it? and how to do it? These and similar questions can't be resolved by despair. Similarly, these questions can't be addressed by a vague belief, laudable as it might be, that matters will eventually turn out to the best or the equally risky proposition that the good will of the Egyptian people will carry us through. These questions are what makes for clear visions of where to go, feasible strategies of how to get there, and the ability to get the overwhelming majority of Egyptians on board. That said; let me make the following clear: we are on the wrong political course. Egypt's military council – which has assumed power since February 11 - has laid down a path, not a vision, for the transitional period, one that is clearly driven (if not distorted) by the Council's desire to hand over power to a civilian authority, rather than the incredibly superior objective of securing a peaceful, meaningful and irreversible political reform course. The Council has thus far, and in an exercise of monopoly over decision-making, refused to heed the mounting calls by Egypt's revolutionary forces, jurists, constitutional experts, political parties, and opinion leaders who have all spoken in opposition to the current transitional plan and timetable (and with it the proposed constitutional amendments), and in support of a road map that starts with drafting a new constitution that paves the way for a truly democratic and representative political process. The dangers of this disconnect (and of a NO vote on the constitutional amendments) are grave for the credibility of the guardians of the revolutions. Even graver are the risks of a political stalemate, if not sliding backwards. The revolutionary forces, concerned citizenry and declared and potential presidential candidates must make this clear, as did Mohamed ElBaradie in his first televised interview. On the economic front, I am particularly alarmed by what the two leading candidates in Egypt's upcoming presidential race have to offer. In his first public appearance, Mohamed ElBaradie described himself as a “socialist democrat”. Amr Moussa, vaguer but no less disappointing, seemed to be giving the crowds what the crowds want to hear. For me, this much is clear: a return to socialism isn't an option, so is the resort to populism. Both lead to artificial and irrational economic orders of distorted price structures and sheltered markets that translate into wasting valuable and rare resources. Egypt doesn't have the luxury of experiencing a return to a socialist economic order, only to realize years or decades later that liberalism is the way to go. Rather, we should be building on the steps taken thus far in liberalizing the economy, while swiftly and smartly addressing the excesses and failures of market forces and the mismanagement, corruption and cronyism of the past. Egypt also does not have the luxury of “giving the crowds what they want to hear.” Egypt needs leadership that informs citizenry and in advance that building a modern productive economy capable of competing in the world will entail costs that will be significant in the short and probably the medium term. Two clear examples in this regard are subsidies and the size of the Egyptian bureaucracy. The first needs to be terminated. The second needs to be cut in half (to say the least) and soon. Any pronouncement of the opposite would be leading the public on. Ashraf Swelam is an Egyptian diplomat, writer and researcher ([email protected]).
