While Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser was perceived by American diplomats as the ‘power behind the throne' with General Mohamed Naguib, the President, as a mere figurehead, archival evidence shows that Naguib had considerable influence over negotiations for arms deals with both the US and the Soviet Bloc during the first two years of the new regime. Like his predecessors, Naguib was trying to acquire weapons from the West. However, he tended to turn to Washington rather than London. In September and November of 1952, Naguib sent messages to the US, saying that he was prepared, in return for economic and military assistance, to join the planned pro-Western defence alliance then known as the Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO). When there was no meaningful American response, Naguib reiterated several times to Ralph Stevenson, the British Ambassador, that he badly needed military and economic assistance in order to survive politically. US Ambassador Jefferson Caffery wrote at the end of November that several members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) told him they were convinced that the only way for them to preserve the loyalty of the armed forces was to prove that they were able to obtain substantial military aid from the West. In January 1953, a delegation of two Egyptian officers was sent to Washington to discuss a future arms deal with the US. By the end of that month, however, it was clear that contrary to earlier Egyptian expectations, the officers returned to Cairo empty-handed. Caffery wrote to the State Department that this failure bitterly disappointed the Egyptian leadership. Consequently, at the end of January 1953, Naguib brought up the arms issue during a meeting with Soviet Ambassador S.M. Kosierev. Naguib explained that Egypt was required to join the planned Middle East Command in order to obtain arms. Kosierev remarked that this did not sound like a good offer. It seems that Naguib was waiting for this reply: he asked Kosierev whether the Soviet Union could become an alternative source of tanks and planes. Kosierev was evasive. The remarks that he added to his report to Moscow show that he was suspicious of Naguib, convinced that Naguib was trying to entrap the USSR by making him refuse the Egyptian request, supplying Naguib with a perfect justification to sign a deal with the West. On February 10, 1053, Vishinski ordered Kosierev to inform Naguib that the Soviet government was not interested in selling arms but that that position could be reconsidered if the Egyptian government so wished. Naguib, however, did not meet again with Kosierev until October of 1953. Even then, Naguib stated that he did not want to raise the arms issue again and that Egypt was primarily interested in buying agricultural machinery. As in the case of the Wafd government, Naguib made attempts to approach the Czechoslovak government directly. [email protected]
