The revolution and pacts (38). Ring of bilateral pacts (i). Introduction: It seemed that a full Arab Pact, excluding Iraq was too ambitious a project to be accomplished in spite of the evident danger represented in the presence within the Arab world of the Jewish state of Israel and the tremendous aid it was receiving from the West in general and from international Zionism in particular. It also seems the proposed Arab alliance was merely a customary emotional and instantaneous initiative which, on second thoughts, proved to be far fetched Suddenly, all talk about the proposed ‘Arab alliance' came to an end. Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul Nasser did his best to dissuade the Arab states from adhering to the Baghdad Pact. In the struggle which ensued between Iraq and Egypt, the latter succeeded in winning over Syria which had vacillated for a short while before fully aligning with Egypt. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, enthusiastically supported Egypt owing to the age-long rivalry between the Saudis and the Hashemites. Although Egypt had succeeded in crystallising a camp which opposed the Baghdad Pact and particularly Iraq's role in it, she failed to establish the cherished rival Arab pact which would have isolated Iraq. Therefore, Nasser had to content himself with signing interlocking military agreements with Syria and Saudi Arabia in 1955, and urge similar bilateral pacts between each couple of neighbouring Arab states. The world, thus, began to hear of Arab moves to establish bilateral pacts or security arrangements, ultimately forming a ‘ring' of such pacts around Israel. These were regarded as a ‘better and quicker' alternative to the otherwise complicated bid to form a broader pact. Here again, the inability and ineffectiveness of the Arab League had manifested themselves. There had existed the Collective Arab Security Pact, and if revived or activated would have served the purpose, particularly as the structure of the League itself incorporated the position of Assistant Secretary General for Military Affairs, one that was traditionally held by the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces. However, lack of confidence among the Arab League member states had paralysed the initiative. Bilateral arrangements between each couple of neighbouring Arab (sometimes non-neighbouring) states began to be considered as a ‘face-saving' solution;, one that seemed to tell Israel and the world “We coordinate; therefore we are”. And as if in a competition, such bilateral accords came in quick succession forming, as it appeared a ‘ring around Israel'. These were met with tremendous official and popular support throughout the Arab world. However, they were met with great alarm in both Israel and the West. The immediate objective of the bilateral accords was to coordinate the Arab ‘war effort' for a second round against the common enemy – Israel. However, in the long-run, such an accomplishment was hoped to result in greater and broader Arab co-operation that would lead to real Arab unity. They were ‘purely Arab agreements' binding none of the parties to any commitments with any foreign country, unlike the Baghdad Pact which had been established to serve the interests and security of Western powers. In the following articles, the author will present and analyse the various Arab defence pacts that came up in 1955 in a bid to offset the impact of the Baghdad pact and to organise resistance threreto. [email protected]
