The Washington mountain has labored and brought forth less than a mouse. General David Petreaus and President George W. Bush have spoken, but United States policy in Iraq remains as it was. This policy has led the US into a trap, so that now the largest and most important power in the world is facing only bad options. If the US followed its national interests, it would withdraw from Iraq as soon as possible, because the war can no longer be won. It is weakening the West's leading power and strengthening the West's enemies. But the US cannot withdraw without sending the entire region into chaos. The US wanted to establish a democratic Iraq. Instead, after a US withdrawal, the country might fall apart, possibly leading to "balkanization of the Middle East, with extremely dangerous consequences for the whole region. With the war in Iraq, the US also wanted to initiate a democratic transformation of the entire Middle East. Instead, it has helped Iran to gain a regional ascendancy that the country could never have achieved on its own. Instead of a democratic transformation, were the US to withdraw now, the Middle East would face a war of all against all for regional hegemony. There is no indication that Bush will begin to grasp this bitter reality during the remaining months of his term. If he were to admit defeat, his presidency would be destroyed. He will thus pass the war on to his successor. This might be advantageous for Bush's domestic purposes, but as a foreign policy, it will only escalate the risk of a Middle East explosion. The current US turn toward collaboration with Sunni militias holds within it the risk of a final break-up of Iraq into three parts. The key question is whether the consequences of Iraq's disintegration could be contained within its national borders, or whether large parts of the region would be affected. A disintegrating Iraq would draw all its neighbors and other powers in the region into an undeclared war of succession. Moreover, in the Middle East, there is no safety net like the European Union, which has helped lure the Balkans out of the abyss. The only way out of this dilemma is to set a reachable and realistic goal. Instead of victory, the goal must be a minimum of stability - and this still seems achievable. Indeed, US military withdrawal from Iraq can be accomplished without causing a major regional catastrophe only if America manages to establish such a minimum of regional stability. What this requires is a sustainable consensus that includes all the parties involved. Iraq's future, if it still has any, will depend first and foremost on Iraqi Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds, and, secondly, on Iraq's neighbors and their interests and risk calculations. But even if Iraq does fall apart after US withdrawal, it will be of vital importance to contain the consequences of its disintegration within Iraq's own borders. This will require a regional consensus that only the US can bring about. It is hard to understand why the US does so little to advance the goal of regional stabilization, especially since it still retains considerable leverage in this respect. As no regional power is strong enough to win a war of succession outright, all of these powers could only lose if a conflict ensues. Indeed, all will be threatened by internal destabilization as a consequence of such a confrontation. Certainly, talks and conferences make little sense without a coherent policy. But with appropriate preparation, a regional solution is possible, and, of all the parties involved, Syria is uniquely positioned to help bring it about. Syria is the only Arab country allied with Iran, and, as Iraq's direct neighbor, it is crucial for Iraq's stabilization. Moreover, Lebanon's security and independence hinges on Syria, and Syria is one of the main actors in the conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Finally, economically and politically, Syria is in a weak position, and its interests are by no means congruent with those of Iran. It's incomprehensible, then, why the US, having succeeded in striking a deal with Libya, vehemently rejects any initiative toward Syria. If Syria changed sides, the situation in the region would be fundamentally transformed. This would be true for Lebanon, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iraq and, above all, Iran. For Iran, this development would be tantamount to a strategic worst-case scenario, bringing about its definitive isolation. Should it become a realistic prospect, a decisive approach to Iran would make sense. The ensuing "grand bargain should concern the stabilization of Iraq, Iran's nuclear program, and its role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. If successful, the bargain should also aim at a total normalization of relations between Iran and the US. To be sure, even a decisive regional strategy by the US and its Western partners will not stop terrorism and violence in Iraq or, indeed, in the Middle East overnight. But it would be a decisive first step toward changing the regional balance of power that would enable the stabilization of Iraq and the region as a whole. Only this can make a withdrawal of US troops from Iraq realistic in the foreseeable future. Joschka Fischer, Germany's Foreign Minister and Vice Chancellor from 1998 to 2005, led Germany's Green Party for nearly 20 years. This commentary is published by DAILY NEWS EGYPT in collaboration with Project Syndicate/Institute for Human Sciences. (www.project-syndicate.org)
