In the aftermath of the American presidential elections that pitted Al Gore against George W. Bush, perpetual candidate Ralph Nader was widely blamed for costing Gore the crucial votes from the left that ended up losing him Florida by a mere 537 votes (can we put aside the whole “Gore Won Florida” Argument for now?). These few votes turned out indeed to be the difference between a Left leaning and a Right leaning administration leading the most powerful country in the world. Until this moment in post-revolution Egypt, not a single presidential candidate seemingly unifies the “Civil” (The official Egyptian euphemism for “Liberal”) wing of the electorate. The clear frontrunner remains former Egypt Foreign Minister and Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa, reflecting an overwhelming desire for a leader who can “steer” the country during this current state of “loss and confusion,” as many have put it. Such a leader, the common narrative continues, would be one who knows the “secrets of governing Egypt” and be capable of “holding and pushing the country forward from day one,” especially with security and economic woes far ahead of political reform as the main concerns of the voters. Moussa indeed seems to neatly fit that profile. A charismatic, experienced, and internationally recognized statesman, he enjoys and flaunts the popular reputation he cultivated during his tenure at the Egypt Foreign Minster as “a man who frequently stood up to Mubarak” and “who was not afraid to say what needed to be said to Israel when everyone else remained silent” (He recently was sung to once again in a Ramadan Iftar campaign event by Shaa'ban Abdelrehim, who years ago sang the hit song “I hate Israel, but Love Amr Moussa” – a song widely believed to have contributed to Moussa's dismissal as head of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, in fear of his rising popularity and the possibility of him standing against Mubarak in an election). If we choose to ignore fellow significant candidates Dr. Selim El Awwa and Dr. Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh as more of right wing-appealing candidates, that virtually leaves Mohammed ElBaradei as Moussa's main competition over the civil wing's vote. But ElBaradei's actual popularity on the streets and (still scarce) polling numbers are hardly a cause for excitement. In June, a poll by the International Peace Institute put ElBaradei at two percent of the vote (an earlier poll by the Egyptian Media Group Al Hayat Network 100 days after the revolution put him at three percent – both polls have been somewhat criticized), compared to Moussa's 32 percent. These numbers were followed by non-candidates SCAF Head Field Marshal Tantawi, and current Prime Minister Essam Sharaf with 16 percent and 8 percent, all votes representing said desire for experience and leadership, and therefore are more likely to eventually end up in Moussa's count. While the selection of candidates has noticeably changed since that poll, Moussa remains the civil wing's most likely candidate to win. On the other hand, ElBaradei still suffers from the massive defamation campaign instigated against him by the former regime, succeeding in portraying him, most famously, as “a foreign agent”, “irreligious”, a man who “conspired to help the Americans invade Iraq”, and that “he spent most of his life outside Egypt and does not understand it's nature and how to govern such a complex country (Moussa recently played that card by stating that he is “better than ElBaradei…” because he “…has lived his entire life here”). Even those who do not “distrust” El Baradei see him as an uncharismatic academic who could serve as Prime Minister at best. Counterintuitively perhaps, ElBaradei remains somewhat the clear preferred candidate of the liberal, well educated and activist segment of society, and represents a figure who seemingly could lead a true transformation of Egypt into an open and thriving democratic nation (quite ironically, reasons for his appeal include having lived abroad for a long time, and not having “sullied his hands with the filth of Egyptian Politics” – think Chicago Politics). This appeal was quite apparent with his clear 25 percent lead in the SCAF Facebook presidential poll, with Moussa coming 7th at five percent, behind even staunch former regime figures like Ahmed Shafik, Omar Suleiman, and Moderate Islamist Selim El Awwa and Salafi Hazem Salah Abu Ismail (Islamists are quite active online as well – and these result should be also taken with a grain of salt after Al-Masry Al-Youm broke the story of a group that was paid by a mysterious source to boost non-candidate & former Intelligence head Omar Soleiman's ranking in the poll). Nevertheless, there are only 8 million Facebook users in Egypt at best, representing 10 percent of the population, of which only a quarter million participated in the poll. Assuming his public image and general voter trends do not significantly change with time, and given the sudden credible rise of right wing presidential candidates, the votes that El Baradei wins could lead to Moussa's (or the entire civil wing's) own Florida, and such a possibility means that El Baradei might have to choose to bow out of the race eventually for the greater good of the social left, at least after becoming significantly certain of his inability to win, and after adding his own candid voice to the first ever presidential debates in an effort to affect and elucidate the debate, push towards greater candor on the issues, extract more substantial policy commitments from the front-running candidates, as well as to have a true opportunity to affect the electorate and how they perceive the political process. Can ElBaradei actually change his unpopular standing? Even if the answer is yes, it won't be simple at all. Egyptians are not exactly known to change their opinions easily. A sizable portion of the population still sympathizes with Mubarak despite an overflow of evidence incriminating him and his close circle (including his family) in colossal corruption on all levels of government. Even more tellingly, they still remain deeply uncomfortable with ElBaradei as a person, seemingly unaffected by his recent media blitzkrieg attempting to improve his image and dispel myths with facts (the same IPI poll put his unfavorable rating at 61 percent, followed by fellow liberal and 2005 Presidential race runner up Ayman Nour at 42 percent, compared to Moussa's staggering 73 percent favorable rating). If ElBaradei is to even have a chance at winning, he must begin by clearly reaffirming his commitment to the elections and not continue to seem hesitant and too stoic about his ambitions. He would need to cultivate a personal narrative, one that presents him as a champion of the anti-Iraq war effort; as someone who had the courage to dare stand up to Mubarak and spark the revolution; and as a capable leader with a complete visionary project for Egypt in this critical point of its history. Most importantly, he needs to acquire one very crucial element, which might end up being his Shibboleth: Charisma. There's still time for the Nobel Laureate to try and turn the tides to his favor, and anything is possible. If he does fail to do so, however, I doubt that he would like to be remembered as the Ralph Nader of the Egyptian liberal…sorry…civil movement… ** Bassem Sabry is Media Executive, Producer and Blogger who writes about Egypt and Current Affairs. His Blog, An Arab Citizen, can be found at http://anarabcitizen.blogspot.com, and you can follow his Twitter feed @bassem_sabry BM
