In the midst of the continuing uncertainty over whether all the Westgate attackers have been killed, there is an opportunity to reflect on what the attack means in the broader terms of international terrorism and counter-terrorism. In terms of terrorism innovation, Westgate is not unique. The style of the attack with teams of heavily armed men has been seen before, most recently in Algeria in January of this year with the attack on the oil field in the eastern part of the country by international force of Islamist militants, including two Canadians. Westgate has another recent parallel with what occurred in Mumbai in 2008 when ten well-trained and heavily armed men from the group Lashkar-e-Taiba travelled from Pakistan to carry out a series of attacks around India's largest city. Splitting up into small teams, they carried out shootings and bombings at the main rail station, a café, several hotels, and a Jewish centre. Before the attackers were stopped, they killed 164 people and wounded several hundred more. This style of attack isn't even that recent. A variety of it first emerged in 1972 when three members of the Japanese Red Army terrorist group, attacked Tel Aviv's main airport and in the process killed 26 people and wounded 80 more. Having said that, there are two potentially unique aspects to Westgate: one was the use by al-Shabab of Twitter to put out its own narrative throughout the entire event to counter the official line emanating from the Kenyan government; this is a trend that will probably continue and represents a variation of the post attack promotion, such as the release of videos after attacks. The other interesting aspect was the apparent planning and resources that went into the attack. This was not just a blind assault but a well-organized and planned operation that perhaps indicates greater sophistication on the part of al-Shabab or the involvement of others. The potential presence of westerners is interesting but not unique. Rumours remain active that several westerners were among the terrorists in Nairobi. Although the involvement of female terrorists has officially been discounted by al-Shabab, the presence of westerners has not yet been resolved. However, the involvement of westerners in al-Shabab attacks has occurred in the past with, for instance, suicide attacks having been carried out by Americans; as many as 15 have died fighting for the Somali group. The temptation to strike back hard will be great in the centres of power in Kenya but they must be resisted. Smart retaliation in the form of a focused response is the much better approach, particularly in the longer term. After all, the al-Shabab attack was in part a response to the intervention of the Kenyan military in Somalia. A hard response by the Kenyan military in Somalia would simply play into the hands of al-Shabab by positioning the group as the defenders in the face of foreign atrocities while winning them new recruits. This point applies as well to the wider Kenyan populace and its response to the large Somali population living in Nairobi. The Kenyan government must ensure that it does not tolerate vigilantism because that will lead to alienation and that will lead to new members of al-Shabab. Another response, and one equally misguided, is to turn shopping malls into fortresses. It is human nature to try to explain why something has occurred and in the process to assign blame while enjoying the benefit of second guessing. Thus several accounts wondering why security was not tighter at Westgate have emerged in the last few days. It certainly is not fair to say that there was no security. Bags were regularly searched and both armed and unarmed security personnel patrolled the mall. Still the failed to stop the attack, in part because of the extent of the planning on the part of the terrorist group but also because of apparent corruption on the part of some Kenyans. Still the ultimate point still holds: what level of force would have been needed to prevent 10-15 heavily armed and well-trained terrorists from wreaking mayhem? Presumably an equal or greater size force with similar equipment and training would have been the answer. But at what point is this creating a level of security that would not just deter terrorists but also shoppers. And what happens if the next attack is against a restaurant or a library or a school. Will all of these institutions have their own private armies? At some point there needs to be recognition and acceptance, particularly in the public discourse of political leaders, that in a free society it is not just fundamentally impossible but also undesirable to secure all so-called "soft targets." Greater vigilance and better intelligence about potential attacks and attackers is the more effective and realistic response.
