A war within a war, this is in fact the most significant event in recent times in the Syrian conflict, and will have long running and profound repercussions on the overall outcome of the crisis in Syria. Large scale and seemingly well-coordinated and panned attacks by an alliance of Islamist factions and rebel groups have been taking place across northern Syria on the strongholds and strategic positions of Al-Qaeda-inspired Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), taking them, and indeed many observers by surprise. ISIS losses have been high, and so far they've retaliated in the only way they know how, by issuing ominous threats and executing prisoners as well as scrambling suicide bombers to sow death and mayhem. It's not clear whether this unprecedented offensive was pre-planned, or simply came as a counter-reaction to the increasing abuses, crimes and atrocities of the ISIS which has recently grabbed large swathes of territory and consolidated its hold on many towns and villages across northern Syria. The horrific torture and killing of a rival Islamist faction commander, Dr. Hussien Sulieman of Ahrar el Sham (Ahrar el Sham being a powerful constituent of the recently formed "Islamic front") may have been the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back and prompted the vicious backlash against an organization that has very little friends at home or abroad. Whatever the case maybe, tensions were clearly simmering under the surface, and an imminent power struggle was inevitable. The scale and ferocity of the attacks against the ISIS is quite unlike anything seen so far in Syria, even against regime forces, which suggests a high level of planning and coordination. Major ISIS positions and strongholds were assaulted across a wide swathe in northern Syria from Idleb into Aleppo province, with many of their commanders killed and towns formerly under their control lost. From Harem to Hazano, to Atareb and Izzaz and Manbej and even Al Raqqa city itself. Once safe havens have turned into danger zones with reports coming in of ISIS headquarters surrounded, their men and commanders killed or captured. Caught off guard, the ISIS has had very little time to mount any sort of defense or a counter offensive, but indications are, if they're ever given any breathing space, the response will be swift and very bloody and brutal. Leading the offensive against the ISIS is the newly formed Islamic front, a conglomeration of Islamist Jihadist factions supported and financed by various Gulf States. It was only last month that they spectacularly ousted and usurped the moderate FSA battalions supported by the west and took over their bases and weapons, causing their leaders (General Salim Idris) to flee in humiliation. Thus they cast themselves as the new power to be reckoned with in Syria, and it seems that now they're putting their money where their mouth is by going on the offensive against everybody's "bogey man" Al Qaeda's ISIS. Make no mistake, this isn't an extremist versus moderate ideological rebel realignment. The factions now fighting the ISIS are all very ideologically similar to it, too comfortably so in fact, and they make no secret of it. The Jihadist mindset is prevalent and all-consuming here, with the ultimate goal of setting up of an Islamic state ruled by strict Shari'ah laws. No secular democracy or progressive liberal society is the aim of any of these fighters, which puts them starkly at odds with the main opposition block in exile, the National Coalition. The Istanbul-based coalition has quite expectedly and now almost comically thrown its lot in with the factions fighting against the ISIS, just as it once threw its weight behind Jabhat Al Nusra and other Al Qaeda affiliated groups fighting against the Syrian regime when the US designated them terrorist organizations.
Regardless, this latest fight back against the ISIS enjoys widespread support among the opposition's supporters across Syria, especially those who have suffered greatly under their unjust and harsh rule. Coinciding with military operations, widespread protests and displays of public outrage, resentment and renunciation of their practices were seen in many areas across rebel controlled territories. It is fair to say that Al Qaeda may have extended itself and overplayed its hand in Syria, just as it previously did in Iraq, to its detriment. In both cases, the fighters that were once welcomed as brothers in arms are now seen as worse than the enemy, and a full scale rejection and armed resistance against their presence eventually occurred in the areas they subjected to their intolerable rule. In Syria, it remains to be seen how the ISIS will react once it has had a chance to regroup and plan a counter offensive. They're down but not out, and their retribution will likely be swift, bloody and brutal. They're still a very deadly force to be reckoned with by any account.
