Was King Farouk's sudden death in Italy 40 years ago a secret service plot? Hala Sakr seeks out the views of leading Egyptian historians King Farouk I, the last ruling member of the Mohamed Ali dynasty, left Egypt for the last time on board the royal yacht Al-Mahrousa on 26 July 1952, following the Free Officers' revolution that led to the declaration of the republic, in 1953, and the end of Egypt's monarchy. The years that followed saw Egypt and the Middle East change almost beyond recognition, and by the time of Farouk's sudden death, at the age of 45, in Rome on 17 March 1965, he was virtually a forgotten figure. However, 40 years on, Farouk's death in exile raises some still unanswered questions. Was he involved in plots to restore the monarchy and overturn the 1952 regime? Was he assassinated by the Egyptian secret service? Farouk was granted political asylum as soon as he arrived in Italy, and at the beginning he refused to give interviews or to speak to the press, demanding to be allowed to live in peace and out of the glare of the world's attention. However, the former king's desire to avoid controversy was never wholehearted. In October 1952 the British tabloid Empire News announced the publication of a series of articles under the title "Farouk in Exile Tells his Story", promising its readers that "such an outspoken and intimate series of articles has never before been written by a crowned head." In that series Farouk described the Free Officers of the 1952 regime as communists and Muslim Brothers conspiring against the Regency Council. Such interventions only increased after the declaration of the Egyptian republic in 1953, and Farouk's personal circumstances also became more and more complicated. Already known for his gambling and womanising, at least in Egypt Farouk had been surrounded by members of the country's elite and aristocracy. In Italy this was no longer the case, and Farouk's louche reputation did him no good either with the few sympathisers he might still have had in Egypt or with foreign supporters abroad. This became important later, since with the outbreak of the Suez War in 1956 Farouk may have started to nourish hopes of being restored to the throne, and he may have thought that Nasser's quarrel with the country's Muslim Brotherhood and communists was leading to instability. "I have seen British official documents from the period, including letters sent by Farouk to [British prime minister] Eden and [French prime minister] Guy Mollet," comments Latifa Salem, professor of modern Egyptian history at Benha University and the author of Farouk wa Suqout Al-Malakiya fi Misr (Farouk and the fall of the monarchy in Egypt) . "Farouk also wrote to President Eisenhower during the Suez War, offering his cooperation, which triggered correspondence between the British Foreign Office and the Americans regarding possible alternatives to Nasser. Farouk's name came up during the discussions," Salem continues. "However, all the parties agreed that Farouk was a 'losing card' and his involvement would only trigger another revolution in Egypt," Salem says, adding that she can find no evidence that foreign powers considered attempting to restore the monarchy in Egypt during the 1950s. Raouf Abbas, professor of modern Egyptian history at Cairo University and chairman of the Egyptian Association for Historical Studies, agrees, adding that the American National Archives contains a copy of a 1956 report by a US diplomat in Rome saying that Farouk had offered his services should an alternative to the 1952 regime be wanted. According to Abbas, this report was sent to the US State Department, which did not even bother to reply. "Earlier, before Farouk's exile in 1952, the US ambassador in Cairo, Jefferson Caffrey, had called Farouk a 'rotten apple' of no use to US or Western interests," Abbas comments. "You cannot really blame the Americans for not taking Farouk seriously. He offered himself as an individual, with no agenda or programme," and therefore he could never have been considered as a viable alternative to the 1952 regime. Mohamed Saber Arab, chairman of the Egyptian National Library and Archives, agrees that neither the British nor the Americans would have been ready to consider the restoration of the monarchy. "The monarchical system had long lost its legitimacy, let alone its popularity and public appeal. Farouk had already lost his credentials before the advent of the revolution," he notes. Thus, "neither the British nor the US wished to venture into an uncalculated adventure of restoring Farouk to the throne, particularly when their experience of the Egyptian monarchy already had a bitter taste," Arab says. Any foreign power wanting to intervene in Egypt during these years "would have done better to bet on rival factions within the regime, or on social and political powers outside it", Arab comments. "There were intense disagreements with the Muslim Brotherhood, for example, and it is hardly likely that the restoration of the monarchy was ever considered as a plausible alternative. Betting on the king would have been betting on the dead," Arab concluded. Salem adds "In his early days, Farouk had been an Egyptian patriot. However, things gradually changed, and after [British ambassador] Miles Lampson forced the return of the Wafd to power in 1942, suspecting Farouk of pro-Axis sympathies, Farouk began acting out of revenge, rather than in the national interest. In October 1944, he seized the first opportunity to expel the Wafd from power and burnt his remaining bridges with the public when he dismissed the Wafd in 1952." For veteran journalist Mohamed Ouda, author of Kayfa Saqatat Al-Malakiyya fi Misr? (How the Monarchy Fell in Egypt?), "While it is true that Farouk tried to offer himself to the British and the Americans, the British held him in contempt but regarded him as tool they might be able to use. The Americans, on the other hand, were thoroughly disappointed in him. US reports following the Cairo fire that immediately preceded the 1952 Revolution show that the then US ambassador was for Farouk and against the Wafd party, thinking of the king at this time as the country's real hope." This did not last, however, and by 1956 changes in the country and in the wider Middle East had made the restoration of the monarchy, whether through the return of Farouk or through the installation of another member of the former royal family, very unlikely. Abbas lists reasons why the choice of Farouk as an alternative to the 1952 regime would have been impossible. Firstly, there was the antagonism of the Egyptian public to any restoration of the monarchy. Secondly, there was the possibility that the 1952 regime would itself draw closer to the West. "What the West, and the USA in particular, wanted from Egypt at that time was acceptance of the proposed regional defence system," he says. In fact, the Americans did not think that the Free Officers, or the "lads" as they were called by the then US ambassador in Cairo, were antagonistic to the West. "One of the reasons for [US president] Eisenhower's intervention on Egypt's behalf during the Suez War was that the Americans never lost hope that they could reach an understanding with the officers that they would serve Western interests. "The Americans thought that all the apparently antagonistic incidents, such as the famous Czechoslovak weapons deal, the conflict over the funding of the Aswan High Dam, the conference of non- aligned countries at Bandung, and the nationalisation of the Suez Canal itself, could all be contained," Abbas says. "When the union between Egypt and Syria materialised in 1958, Nasser was keen to send the Americans a message assuring them that this was not in any way against the interests of the West or of Israel, and that the nationalist rhetoric that had dominated the arena was propaganda. Nasser's attack on [Soviet leader Nikita] Khrushchev, when he spoke against Egypt's union with Syria, and the arrest of the majority of the Egyptian communists on new year's eve 1958/59, were also designed to reassure Washington," Abbas concludes. But if no foreign power took Farouk seriously enough to consider him as an alternative to the regime, what about the Free Officers themselves? Were they apprehensive lest the former king be used by foreign powers? Arab argues that such concerns indeed existed. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry at the time gave great attention to the preparation of weekly reports on the movements and activities of the exiled former king and of other members of the royal family living abroad, he says, these sometimes exaggerating the political implications of actions by members of the former royal family. "During the early stages of the revolution after the expulsion of Farouk these concerns existed. However, they proved to be groundless, especially after the Suez War in 1956, when neither the ex- king nor any other member of the Egyptian royal family played any role in the political manoeuvres that had haunted the crisis," Arab explains. Earlier, following the July 1952 Revolution, the Free Officers had debated the fate of the king, Nasser arguing that he should be sent into exile. Abbas comments that Nasser "believed that for the new regime to survive, the support of the West was needed. Killing Farouk would definitely have antagonised the Western powers. Therefore, they let Farouk go with whatever he wished to carry, and even gave him a formal farewell as we all know. "The officers' fears during Suez were more linked to former president Mohamed Naguib, who was pro- Western and could have been a possible contender if Nasser's regime were to fall. He could have easily responded to the West's aspirations for Egypt's membership of a regional strategic organisation. Naguib was therefore the more dangerous threat -- an alternative from within the regime itself -- which is why Nasser moved him under house arrest to Assiut in Upper Egypt," Abbas concludes. For Salem, though the republic seemed well-established by the mid- 1950s, Salah Nasr, then head of Egyptian intelligence, "used to bombard Nasser with reports about possible conspiracies against him, trying to gain the president's favour. He wanted to give Nasser the impression that the security apparatus was alert to any possible threat." When Nasr fell from grace following the 1967 War, the topic of Farouk's death in Italy in 1965 was brought up during the trial of the former head of Egyptian intelligence, where it was claimed an Egyptian intelligence officer, Ibrahim El- Baghdadi, had arranged Farouk's assassination. However, this was denied by both El-Baghdadi and Nasr. In his published memoirs, told to Abdallah Imam, Nasr dismissed the allegations as ridiculous saying "Farouk had already died on 23 July, 1952, why bother?" Arab agrees that there was "no reason whatsoever for the 1952 regime to kill Farouk," and that it runs counter to Nasser's firmly held beliefs against such tactics. "Nasser was against resolving conflicts in a bloody way, and the July Revolution itself was bloodless. I do not believe that Nasser wished to kill Farouk, who was in any case completely innocuous," says Salem. But if Farouk himself was no threat to the regime, could another member of the dynasty have replaced Farouk in a possible restoration of the monarchy? Abbas argues that there were no other options. "Prince Ahmed Fouad, declared king on Farouk's abdication in 1952, was still in his cradle. Prince Mohamed Ali, Farouk's uncle and crown prince until the birth of Ahmed Fouad in 1952, had never been interested in Egypt, spending most of the year in Europe and only visiting Egypt during the winter months to look after his property." Moreover, the domestic and international context had changed almost out of recognition. "The monarchy had ended, a republic had been declared, and the people supported the Free Officers," Salem says. "There was no support for the return of the monarchy, especially after the officers' movement turned into an actual revolution, with the nationalisation and agricultural reform laws." "Even before the end of the monarchy, the aristocracy was not on good terms with Farouk, and his relationship with the rest of the royal family was no better. They did not back him. The 1954 Evacuation Agreement between the Egyptian state and the British was also binding on all parties, and the British did not want to appear as breaking their commitment to the treaty, or to alienate the new regime further, despite underlying animosities," she adds. There still remains the mystery of Farouk's sudden death at the early age of 45. Is there any evidence to suggest that the Egyptian secret services may have been to blame? During his Italian exile, Farouk put on enormous amounts of weight, which affected his health. On the night he died, he was again eating, this time a favourite dish of oysters, collapsing in the middle of the meal. He died shortly after reaching hospital. No autopsy was performed, and though it is thought that Farouk suffered a heart attack, nobody knows for sure the cause of his death. Farouk had made public his wish to be buried in the Al-Refai Mosque in Cairo, together with other members of the Mohamed Ali family. Nasser was uncomfortable about this, "but gave in to pressure from King Faisal of Saudi Arabia", according to Salem. In addition, Ismail Sherine, the king's brother in-law who had not left Egypt and had connections with the new regime, interceded on behalf of the Mohamed Ali family. Thus, the ex-king's body arrived in Cairo on the last day of March 1965 and was buried in the early hours of the morning after a brief ceremony attended by very few people from his family. His initial resting place was not at Al-Refai, but at another tomb belonging to the family. It was not until Nasser was dead and Sadat was president that Farouk's body was transferred to the Al-Refai Mosque, where his father Fouad and his grandfather Ismail are both buried. Salem insists that there is no evidence to suggest that Farouk was killed by Egyptian intelligence, believing that Farouk died, as stated at the time, from his medical condition. "Speculation to the contrary can only be based on conspiracy theories, and history needs to be based on solid evidence and concrete proof," says Arab. However, in contrast to most Egyptian historians of the period, Assem El-Dessouki, professor of modern history at Helwan University, believes that the poisoning theory cannot be entirely dismissed. "After the failure of the 1956 Suez War and the withdrawal of French and British troops, followed by the evacuation of Israeli troops from Sinai at the beginning of 1957, the regime embarked on a policy of what was then called 'positive neutrality', enhancing its relations with the former Soviet Union and gradually distancing itself from the capitalist West. With the outbreak of the revolution in Yemen in 1962, and the involvement of the Egyptian army, relations between Egypt and the West reached a nadir," Dessouki explains It was at this point that "the Western powers, now led by the USA, began seriously to contemplate scenarios for containing Nasser's influence in the Arab world, including getting rid of him. It was within this framework that contacts with Farouk in his exile in Italy were established, with the aim of looking into the possibility of restoring him to the throne in Egypt. "This would not have been such a far-fetched scenario, given that during WWII the British had contacted the ex-Khedive Abbas Helmi II in Turkey -- where he had been in exile since 1914 -- to explore the possibility of his replacing Farouk, who had refused to declare war on Germany," Dessouki adds. In his view, "it is highly likely that when the contacts between the exiled king and Western intelligence came to the knowledge of the Egyptian authorities, they decided to act swiftly to get rid of Farouk. This is a scenario that must not be excluded." To support this hypothesis, Dessouki recalls a Masters dissertation submitted to the University of Alexandria on the end of the Mohamed Ali dynasty that he had examined, in which the researcher stated that "in the course of his research on the circumstances surrounding the death of Farouk, he had written to the American National Archives asking for the available documents related to Farouk's death, getting a reply from the archivist in charge that any documents related to that question were classified, as an issue bearing on US national security."
