It is past time for the ruling Egyptian regime to recognise the popularity and strength of the Muslim Brotherhood, writes Khalil Al-Anani* The escalating confrontation between the Muslim Brotherhood and the regime is hardly surprising considering the long-standing mistrust between the two. For the past five decades or so, both the Brotherhood and the regime have resorted to various manoeuvres, gimmicks and forms of pressure to get their way. They both think in terms of a zero-sum game and this is the crux of the ongoing crisis. Any room for compromise between the two--if any exists--has been consistently overlooked. The Brotherhood and the regime are of unequal power. And the way they act reinforces the impression that the road to democracy is going to be long and winding. Both believe that "finger-biting" is a good way of settling differences. The current situation suggests that both the regime and the Brotherhood foster exclusion rather than inclusion and believe in defiance rather than competition. Even at the risk of looking intransigent, the regime does not want to give credit to the Brotherhood. Many of the regime's supporters still view the Brotherhood as a "refined" version of violent-leaning groups, refusing to recognise the obvious differences. When President Mubarak said recently--for the first time ever--that Brotherhood members have the right to join any political party as "individuals" but mustn't form their own party, many took this to be the beginning of rapprochement. But soon afterward, the showdown began, with the government arresting Brotherhood members and the Brotherhood upping the ante. The regime's position on the Muslim Brotherhood is symptomatic of how it views the entire issue of reform. What the regime wants is choreographed reform, one that preserves for the regime its aura of invincibility, allows it to call all the shots and excludes any experimentation or alternate visions. This version of reform is both rigid and superficial for it overlooks the complexity of the country's political scene. The regime underestimates the magnitude of needed reforms. The regime sees reform as a gift, not an overdue process following decades of political repression. The regime wants to draw the line for reform, for it sees it not as a means to an end, but as an end in itself. The regime is demanding respectability for individuals rather than institutions. Any reform that may shake the respectability of key figures is something the regime avoids like the plague. For instance, the change of one of the Constitution's articles was viewed by the regime not as a normal procedure, not as routine in a country that is vibrant and full of aspiration. The regime presented the constitutional change as a "miracle" worthy of the nation's everlasting gratitude. What the regime has been trying to do is lower everybody's expectations, so as to stem further--and more genuine--steps for reform. Easing the way for democracy does not seem to be high on the regime's agenda. This is why it imposed impossible conditions for the implementation of amended article 76. For the regime, reform is more of a ploy than a promise--an action taken in self-defence. The regime is responsible for much of the current tension with the Muslim Brotherhood, for it insists that the Brotherhood is a social anomaly that needs to be extricated. The regime refuses to admit that the Brotherhood is a part of the fabric of this society, a part that may need to refine its methods but is entitled to work in the open. The regime has been willing to treat other forms of opposition leniently, but it doesn't deign to recognise the Brotherhood, although the latter surpasses other opposition groups in influence and strength. Such a bearing is unfortunate. At a time when the country needs to integrate the Brotherhood into the political process and acknowledge it as a major player, the regime is trying to belittle its importance and exaggerate its threat to society. Meanwhile, it is the nation that is being punished, for it is being denied democracy on account of the perceived peril of the Muslim Brothers. The regime wants to discount the Brotherhood as a political force by associating it with violent political groups, but--if recent demonstrations by the Brotherhood are anything to go by--the tactic has backfired. What the regime seems to forget is that the domestic and international scene is changing. As things stand, it is desirable to have the Brotherhood, or any other popular movement, emerge as a rival to the regime. Change is more than a Brotherhood demand. It is a demand voiced by all across the Egyptian political gamut. The regime's slogans of stability, development, prosperity and superiority have been discredited. Getting along with the Brotherhood is no longer optional. It is something the regime has to do if it is to avert multiple internal and external problems. The Brotherhood has been acting in a pragmatic manner and many people abroad are willing to talk to it, perhaps even cooperate with it. This is why it is in the regime's interest to tolerate the Brotherhood, at least until the wind of change, now sweeping the regime, blows over. That the regime is not moving in that direction is a sign of how inflexible it has grown. The Brotherhood feels that its low-key era is over. Even if the Brotherhood were to accept a truce or a "deal" with the regime that would--in all likelihood--be a mere tactic. The Muslim Brotherhood is not going to be forced underground again. The Brotherhood senses that it has much in common with other segments of the opposition, and wants to keep things that way. Some Brotherhood leaders believe that the regime needs them more than ever before, if just to deflect the unprecedented wave of foreign pressure crashing down upon it; if just to make sure that "outsiders" won't use the Brotherhood against it. The Brotherhood is under the misguided impression that pressuring or embarrassing the regime is enough. It isn't. The Brotherhood needs to come up with an alternative plan, with a credible course of action. It needs to sort out political and theological issues that have alienated other opposition groups. And it needs to rethink its indoctrination methods to enable its members to be part of the political process in this country. The Brotherhood is the wild card in the reform game. Second to the regime, it is the country's most influential political force. The Brotherhood stood side by side with other opposition groups and challenged the regime. Other opposition groups need the Brotherhood and must not exclude it from the push for democracy and reform. The Brotherhood's exclusion has distorted our political life in a way that we can no longer afford. * The writer is an Egyptian political analyst.
