Fine-tooth comb

Al-Ahram: A Diwan of contemporary life (603)
Fine-tooth comb
Studies on the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty tend to stop at the signing of the agreement. However, a reading of Al-Ahram reveals that for Egyptians at least the subject did not end there. Within hours of its announcement, the treaty and its various provisions became the subject of close analysis and debate, which is the topic of this episode by Professor Yunan Labib Rizk
The details of 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty were announced in London on 26 August and in Cairo 48 hours later. Al-Ahram opened its own discussion on the pact a week later, on 3 September under the headline "Satisfaction is the prize." What was important, in the opinion of the commentator, was that both sides were satisfied. Of the treaty's 17 articles, "five were for Egypt (the first, second, third, 12th and 13th), five were for Britain (the fifth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and 16th) and the rest concerned both parties." One is reminded of a couple dividing up a pizza. As for the toppings that went into the product, the Egyptian negotiators had sought to pack it with as many conditions and formulas affirming Egypt's sovereignty rights while the British pushed the practical ingredients that served the defence of the empire. With regard to the Suez Canal, for example, the British wanted to establish the vitality of this waterway while the Egyptians wanted to affirm their territorial rights. Article 8 incorporated both desires: "The Suez Canal, which is an integral part of Egypt, is simultaneously an international waterway and a fundamental communications route between the various parts of the British Empire..." Also, in deference to Egyptian sensitivities, paragraphs two and three of the article stressed that the presence of British forces in the canal zone must not be considered a form of foreign occupation but rather a means to defend Egypt from foreign aggression. Similarly, Article 7 stated that Egypt would assist Britain in time of war by making available all its sea and air port facilities and transportation routes, to which the Egyptian negotiator insisted on adding, "in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Egyptian government and its legislation."
Not all the provisions were so equitable in spirit, according to the Al-Ahram editorial. It described the article on Sudan as the most reflective of "British political cunning," in view of how open it was to varying interpretations that served the interests of both sides. Its first paragraph read, "While reserving the freedom to conclude new agreements in the future to amend the agreements of 19 January and 10 July 1899, the contracting parties agree that the administration of Sudan will continue to derive from these agreements." While that accorded with the Egyptian viewpoint, the same paragraph stated, "The two sides agree that the ultimate objective of their administration in Sudan is to promote the prosperity and welfare of the Sudanese people." The wording was very devious, commented Al-Ahram, "because it implies that Sudan belongs to its people and that Egypt must no longer regard it as an integral part of its territory."
The Al-Ahram commentary concludes: "[The British] are happy because Egypt gave them a comfortable roost in the Suez Canal Zone from where they can observe the passing ships and the progress of affairs in Egypt. They, in turn, placated our feelings, having acknowledged our rights and left the rule of our country to its people... One can only rejoice at peace after animosity and rancour. The mutual satisfaction of both sides is in fact the true prize that we have won together." However, from the discussions that made their way to the pages of Al-Ahram it became clear that not all were of the same mind.
The National Party, for one, had opposed the principle of negotiations from the outset, its famous motto being, "No negotiation until after evacuation." It comes as no surprise therefore that it was the first to attack the treaty. Its opinion was voiced by who, in addition to being the National Party secretary-general, was also a noted lawyer and historian. His scholarly article was provocatively entitled, "The ground rules of the treaty: independence or protectorate."
Following a lengthy discussion of "traditional British policy in Egypt," El-Rafie goes on to discuss the provisions of the treaty regarding military relations and the government of Sudan. On the former issue, he emphasises the reference in the treaty to the "eternal alliance" between the two countries. The implication of this, he remarks, is that Egypt will never be released from this bond, in accordance with which Britain has permanent access to all of Egypt's seaports, airports and communications routes "in the event of war or the threat of war or in the event of international emergency." Such a condition is characteristic of a protectorate, not an arrangement between two independent states. "Indeed, it is one of the salient features of a protectorate," he adds. That Egypt had agreed to construct military roads linking the Suez Canal with the Nile Valley underscored the nature of this relationship, for it legitimised a form of foreign intervention in Egypt's domestic affairs. The protectorate spirit was given further substance in the article providing for British supervision of the Egyptian army.
The article on Sudan stipulating that the administration of that country would continue in accordance with previous agreements and that the governor-general would continue to exercise his authorities as stipulated by these agreements meant, in El-Rafie's opinion, "that Sudan has become a British colony." He explains, "The governor-general serves, in effect, on behalf of Britain. He does not consult Egypt with regard to any of his decisions or actions. Nor is he responsible to Egypt in any manner. In addition, his so-called Governor-General's Council, a form of cabinet, consists entirely of British. There is not a single Egyptian member on it."
The foregoing article was merely the opening salvos in a battle that would rage with increasing intensity over the next few months. It was not just because El-Rafie was a prominent and respected politician and a leader of a long- established nationalist party that Al-Ahram featured his attack against the treaty. This was very much in keeping with its tradition of serving as a public forum, in which spirit it opened its pages to opposing views. Interestingly, the response in Al-Ahram to the National Party secretary's article did not come from the Wafd Party, whose leader as prime minister and head of the Egyptian negotiating team Mustafa El-Nahhas signed the treaty. After all, the Wafd had its own newspapers -- Al-Jihad and Kawkab Al-Sharq -- in which to respond to critics of the treaty. Instead, the individuals who appeared in the Al-Ahram debate on this subject were noted for their non-partisanship.
One of these was Al-Ahram staff writer Abdel-Halim Elias Nosseir who held that if one were to be truly objective one had to take circumstances into account. Egypt, he said, had to take advantage of the opportunity with which it had been presented and under the current circumstances no one could claim that they could have made greater progress than the Egyptian negotiating delegation. "The National Party was and remains represented in the National Front through its chairman Hafez Bek Ramadan who was invited to take part in the negotiations but declined. Just when official talks produced an agreement, the head of the National Party turned hostile and let loose his venom in a speech on the eve of El-Nahhas' departure to Europe. Then, hardly had the ink on the treaty dried than the National Party secretary issued a statement that was all hand-wringing, lament and foreboding."
Another was Mohamed Zaki Abdel-Qader, a journalist who had written for Al-Siyasa and Al-Shaab and who had joined Al-Ahram staff the previous year. On 9 September, under the headline, "The Egyptian-British Treaty: through national and realistic eyes", he urged a broader and more long-range perspective. While the treaty did grant the British a number of rights that constituted an encroachment on Egyptian sovereignty, "the British position before the treaty was such that Egyptians were deprived of a range of rights and hence were obstructed from the pursuit of many of their material and moral interests." Abdel-Qader cautions against "a purely emotional attitude" and urged "a balanced rational approach based on realities. Otherwise, we will be accused of being an impractical people and the worst that is expected of people such as this in this practical age is to submit to its rules whether they like it or not." The Al-Ahram writer acknowledges that in signing this treaty Egypt had not obtained full independence. However, it was a significant step towards ending British control. He urges his fellow commentators to bring a similarly objective spirit to their analysis of the treaty. "A writer must keep things in perspective. His praise of the treaty should not blind him to its flaws. Nor should the treaty's critics overlook that it offers the Egyptian the opportunity to work and produce in a climate free of restrictions or as unrestricted as possible."
Al-Ahram also gave space to the Egyptian feminist and champion of peasants' rights Bint El-Shati'. The treaty did have its strong points, she declared under the headline, "After the treaty: our national pride and the peasant's share in it." "However great the optimism the treaty has inspired in its supporters and however harshly its opponents criticise it, we must admit that the treaty has restored our dignity and our trampled national pride." It was no small consideration that the British had recognised Egypt as a sovereign nation and a friend, that it resolved to end its military occupation, that the Egyptian government alone would henceforth be responsible for the lives and property of foreigners in the country and that the British occupation forces would withdraw from the Nile Valley, "removing those soldiers who patrolled our streets and whose very presence was an insult to our dignity and pride."
Indicative of Al-Ahram 's stance on the subject was the fact that one of its own writers, Abdullah Hussein, sent a letter to the London Times urging "the building of trust, not just between the Egyptian and British government but also between their two peoples." What inspired his joy and confidence was that it was "the leaders of the independence movement in Egypt who signed the treaty" and that "they are now in power at the time of its implementation."
It also seems that the newspaper was rather selective in the letters to the editor it chose to publish under the heading, "Views on the Treaty." The following are this column's sampling from 24 September 1936:
In the opinion of Mohamed Sidqi, "Licentiate in Economic and Financial Sciences," Britain had acknowledged the end to its military occupation of Egypt. To suggest that the deployment of British forces to the Suez Canal Zone was merely a relocation of these forces was to misunderstand the spirit of the treaty. "The Egyptian side had taken great care to ensure that the wording of the provisions could not be open to interpretation in a manner that would infringe upon national sovereignty," Sidqi argued, adding that the British had "pledged to withdraw all their land and air forces when Egypt is militarily equipped to safeguard its own sovereignty, at which point they will work in coordination with the Egyptian army."
El-Sayed Abdel-Maqsoud Abu Hussein, member of the Manoufiya Directorate Council, was more euphoric. 26 August 1936 was "a day unprecedented since the dawn of the modern Egyptian awakening," he wrote. The treaty was, in effect, "a declaration of the independence, freedom and sovereignty of the nation, rendering it as independent as any free nation that has set its eyes on the horizon of happiness. It has paved the way for eternal Egypt to take its place beneath the sun next to all other free and independent nations." Although Abu Hussein acknowledges that the treaty imposed certain restrictions on Egypt's freedom and independence, these were small obstacles and did not stand in the way of a wise nation that understood the realities of life. "After all, is there such a thing as a free and independent people without some forms of restriction?"
Under the headline, "We must hasten implementation," Mohamed Sidqi El-Bashbishi urges Egypt to continue the struggle, which now should focus on domestic reform. The treaty committed the Egyptian government to construct military roads and to elevate the Egyptian army to its rightful calibre. "The foreigner fears nothing so much as might and the army is the backbone of might. So, let Egypt perceive this as a platform for attaining admiration and prestige... Whereas formerly the Egyptian army was in chains, today it has been set free from these fetters. So let us take this as the source of our strength in the future and the pillar of our strength, for this is the only language that aggressors understand."
A reader from Assiout, who signed his letter only with his initials -- MA -- lashed out against the National Party, even if he did not mention it by name. He reminded the "critics of the treaty" that in 1935 they had clamoured for unity and solidarity and that this appeal was realised in the form of the National Front. However once they got what they wanted they reneged on their commitment.
Al-Ahram also showed its bias when it decided to offer only a synopsis of the lengthy statement it received from the Young Egypt Society, known for its links with the National Party. Following a review of the history of the negotiations and the surrounding political circumstances, the Young Egypt Society charged that the National Front was misguided in having adhered to the understandings that had been achieved before the negotiations broke off in 1930. It then proceeded to discuss the purported achievements of the 1936 treaty, such as the end of the British occupation, Egypt's right to build up its armed forces, British support for its membership in the League of Nations and the path the treaty opened for an end to the Capitulations System. The society's conclusion was that the treaty brought Egypt no substantial advantages.
The newspaper did give more space to the National Party to explain its slogan, which had long since become the object of ridicule by the Wafd Party and the general public. The principle, "No to negotiation before evacuation," according to Al-Ahram reader and National Party member Shukri Hafez, rested on historical, legal and national foundations. Historically, National Party leader Mustafa Kamel had established the principle when he proclaimed, "We have been dispossessed and the British are the dispossessors. We demand a sacred right that they have usurped. It is impossible to reach an understanding with them until they recognise our right and restore it to us." When the national struggle adhered to this position, it won many battles, Hafez maintained. The National Party was not misled in adopting this principle. In its struggle it had always been guided by the historical fact that it was the British, not the Egyptians, who invented and persistently promoted the idea of the negotiations. "Should we be surprised after all this that the National Party issued the call not to negotiate and has tenaciously adhered to its decision to boycott?" The decision not to negotiate at this stage emanated from national principles. "We will agree to negotiate on the day that the British truly evacuate the country. From that day forward we will not refrain from discussing with them matters of interest that are indispensable to our country, for at that point the negotiations will be between equals and not between subordinate and master."
Perhaps Al-Ahram was curious to see if British opinion was equally as divided on the treaty. In all events, the newspaper charged its London correspondent to submit a report on the British position. It appeared in the 11 October edition under the headline, "The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty: the position of parties and the press in England."
According to the information gleaned by Al-Ahram 's London bureau, there was no indication in the press or in parliament of strong opposition to the treaty. The Morning Post and the Daily Mail were critical, but "this will not have a significant impact on British public opinion because these extremist newspapers are not greatly influential on subjects of this sort." In parliament, "opposition will most likely be for form's sake. The official opposition, which consists of a collection of Labour and Liberal MPs, can only approve the treaty with Egypt because they had always promoted the conclusion of such a treaty."
As for the other parties, the Independents would not be contributing much to whatever debate ensues, for "their most influential figure, Sir Lloyd George, will be away from England on holiday at the end of the month." The Conservatives consisted of two camps, moderates and extremists. The former, which made up the majority of the party, had no serious reservations, while the latter, who were abreast of the Anglo- Egyptian problem, "have given no indication of discontent in their private conversations as they are inclined to believe that the treaty furthers Britain's fundamental interests." The Colonialists were another matter. Although they were knowledgeable on Egypt and Egyptian affairs, "they want to make a stand against the treaty and will therefore say whatever occurs to them on the matter with the purpose of attracting attention." The correspondent adds, "Parliament's seats will most likely be vacant on this occasion, unless Mr Churchill speaks. He is a polemicist who parliamentary members enjoy hearing. However, he has not yet made his position on the treaty clear. Nor is it certain that he would openly speak out against it on the floor of parliament."
On 12 November 1936, the treaty was put to the Egyptian parliament. In preparation for that day, Makram Ebeid delivered a lecture in the Egyptian University, the purpose of which was to persuade the Egyptian public to accept the terms of the treaty. The lecture, which appeared across three pages of Al-Ahram on 2 November, was testimony to the Wafd Party secretary-general's celebrated rhetorical skills.
With this treaty, Ebeid said, Egypt had won independence and equality. In this regard he reminded his audience of Prime Minister El-Nahhas' words during the signing ceremonies in the British Foreign Office: "[The treaty] lays the foundations for the relations between our countries. We can consider it a symbol. Great Britain and Egypt have appeared before the world as two equal and friendly nations that have united beneath the banner of free cooperation and faithful alliance."
Following a historical overview of the negotiating rounds since the Milner Mission in 1919, Ebeid stated that the treaty succeeded in incorporating the best fruits of these successive efforts. He then turned to an "analytical study of the treaty," the aim of which was to refute the various criticisms that had been levelled against the treaty since it was signed in the British capital.
In that "historic parliamentary session," as Al-Ahram described it, Liberal Constitutional Party leader Mohamed Mahmoud, who had been a member of the coalition that negotiated the 1936 treaty, was the first to speak. It would not be accurate to say that the treaty achieved all Egypt's legitimate national demands, he stated. "The most I can say is that it is a step towards the realisation of these demands." Mahmoud's opinion was echoed by former Prime Minister Ismail Sidqi: "We did not say that we have attained full independence, for this accords neither with principle or with fact. However, we can say that we have laid a clear path towards the realisation of full independence domestically and internationally when [Great Britain] fulfills all its pledges." As Mahmoud, too, had been a member of the negotiating delegation, one would not have expected to hear a negative remark.
As was anticipated, the dissenting voices came from the National Party MPs: Mohamed Fikri Abaza, Abdel-Aziz El-Sufani and Abdel-Hamid Said. The first of these was the most vehement. Not a single point of the treaty was advantageous to Egypt, in Abaza's opinion, from the "eternal" nature of the alliance through the military terms and the question of Sudan to the burden some of the provisions would place on the national budget. In his response to this attack, Prime Minister El-Nahhas seized upon the last point. "We should not let money stand in the way of independence," he proclaimed to great applause.
Also as expected, several Wafdist MPs took turns to praise the treaty. Ibrahim Abdel-Hadi expressed his surprise at the unmitigated bias of the treaty's critics, not one of whom had anything good to say about the treaty. "Is it not good for Egypt to have a better army? Is it not good for Egypt to be rid of the Capitulations?" he asked. Mohamed Tawfiq Diab targeted Abaza's speech, refuting the National Party MP's arguments and attacking his style as well: "Was that not typical of the caustic tone he strikes in Al-Jihad ?" he asked to the amusement of his parliamentary audience.
At the end of this parliamentary session, which Al-Ahram reports lasted until 8.15pm, the treaty was put to a vote. It passed by an overwhelming 202 to 11 votes.
Al-Ahram did not close its file on this subject without a final word. In its editorial of 20 November 1936 it observed, "What particularly merits our consideration is the policy of national concord that brought the negotiations to a successful conclusion. This concord, made possible by the efforts of the prime minister and the heads of political parties, must be adhered to as a matter of principle and strengthened, for national unity is what produced the agreement with the British." Al-Ahram 's hope has yet to be realised.