In investigations of the Sharm El-Sheikh attacks, the spectre of Al-Qaeda may be a bogeyman concealing the real culprits, writes Diaa Rashwan* It may be too early to guess who is behind the bombings in Sharm El-Sheikh, but let's begin piecing together the puzzle. The attack -- the biggest ever in Egypt's history -- took place on the 53rd anniversary of the 23 July 1952 revolution. This may seem a small detail, but not when you recall that the Taba bombings occurred in another significant day, 6 October, which is the anniversary of the 1973 War. Both Taba and Sharm El-Sheikh are on Egypt's eastern borders, and both offer ample opportunity to kill and maim on a large scale. Sharm El-Sheikh differs from Taba, however, in one aspect. It has been considered one of the most secure spots in the country. The president maintains semi-permanent quarters there, and the city has hosted numerous international and regional gatherings since 1995. Sharm El-Sheikh is also a popular destination for local, Arab and foreign tourists alike. Over the past nine months, bombings have taken place in Taba, Sharm El-Sheikh, Al-Azhar and Abdel-Moneim Riad Square in Cairo. It is tempting to lump the four attacks together but that would be a mistake. The attacks in Abdel-Moneim Riad and Al-Azhar were randomly planned, individually motivated, amateurishly conducted, and involved home-made explosives. In Taba and Sharm El-Sheikh, sophisticated explosives were used against multiple targets and with deadly effect. This was another calibre of operations altogether. Terror is back, albeit in two separate modes. It is back as part of a wave of attacks that has engulfed the world over the past three years. The new wave of terror is distinct in its choice of targets and impact. This current wave differs from the one that hit the region -- Egypt and Algeria included -- in the 1980s and 1990s. The Taba and Sharm El-Sheikh bombings bear all the hallmarks of attacks recently mounted around the world, characterised by multiple bombings, sophisticated planning, and high casualties. Who dunnit? Let's look at the pieces of the puzzle. For instance, why would the spectre of organised and experienced terror emerge on Egypt's sparsely populated eastern borders, rather than in areas of high density, where the state apparatus is located? As it happened, only random, individual acts of terror have emerged in densely populated urban areas. Wouldn't an attack in Cairo be more devastating than one in Sharm El-Sheikh? The choice of target may have been related to the current wave of global terror that seems to combine local, regional and international signals all at once. Taba and Sharm El-Sheikh fit the ticket, and both have tourist targets of the type that has been frequently under attack across the world. This is what led some to accuse Al-Qaeda without a second thought. But is it really Al-Qaeda? I am not so sure. First of all, many security specialists doubt Al-Qaeda's existence as one global entity. It is just unthinkable that Al-Qaeda has been able to sustain cohesion after four years of US attempts to eradicate it. According to US officials, Al-Qaeda has lost most of its power and personnel and is now under siege in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some still claim that Al-Qaeda remains capable of organising and guiding attackers from its Afghanistan hideouts. If true, then Washington's four-year long war on terror has been a failure. In which case, it may be time for President Bush and Prime Minister Blair to resign, but this is beside the point. People speak of Al-Qaeda when they should actually be speaking of an "Al-Qaeda model", of a mode of operation that has been copied by small and medium-sized extremist groups in many countries, without any organisational links necessarily binding them with the main Al-Qaeda organisation. Such groups see themselves as part of Al-Qaeda simply because they adopt its ideas and claim to act in its name. It would seem odd that this Al-Qaeda model would surface in Sinai, a low-density area not normally associated with extremism, rather than in high-density urban areas where fundamentalism flourishes. To reiterate, the only attacks that took place in the heart of the country were of a rudimentary, amateurish type. Those who planned the Taba and Sharm El-Sheikh attacks were aware that they are sensitive security areas and relatively tough targets. In all likelihood, their purpose was to humiliate the Egyptian state and show that it is too feeble to protect its own borders. Such a message is not a typical Al-Qaeda one. Al-Qaeda normally goes for soft targets and maximum media effect. The name of the group that claimed the attack offers food for thought. The group, which claims to be part of Al-Qaeda, calls itself the Battalions of Martyr Abdullah Azzam, the Palestinian Islamist who died in Afghanistan fighting the Soviets in the late 1980s. Azzam had no known links with any terror organisations or operations. This is an odd choice of name, especially that earlier attacks in Turkey, Madrid and London were claimed by the Battalions of Abu Hafs Al-Masri, an Egyptian who was a former military leader of Al-Qaeda and related by marriage to Osama Bin Laden. It would have made more sense to claim the attack in Egypt in the name of an Egyptian, you'd think. So, why would the bombers go for a Palestinian rather than an Egyptian? This may seem as a minor detail, but it could offer insight into the identity of those who mounted the attacks. * The writer is managing editor of the annual The State of Religion in Egypt Report, issued by Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
