Ahmed El-Moslemany* explains the meaning of the slow death throes of a half century of pan-Arabism. Yet are the reforms that will replace it any better? Pan-Arabism was the ideology of choice of the Arab revolution over the past half century. Since the 1950s, Arab politics have revolved around socialist thinking. We did not entertain the idea of a more peaceful pan-Arabism. We didn't stop to think if liberalism was a possible conduit of our national aspirations. Pan-Arabism came in one package with socialism. While nationalism was a capitalist phenomenon in Europe, in our case it was the reverse. We have adopted a brand of pan- Arabism that was anti-capitalist in its approach, that looked down on country nationalism, and that revelled on defying the outside world. Fifty years on, one wonders what would have happened had pan-Arabism been more liberal or what would have happened had the pan-Arab nationalists selected a course that did not collide with the West. Pan-Arabism gained momentum after World War II, when the world was being split into two camps: capitalist and socialist. Even back then, it was clear that the socialists were winning the battle of rhetoric while the capitalists were getting ahead in economy and technology. At that time, the Arab world lacked the sophistication that would have put it in the ranks of first-class nations, but it yearned for a place on the international scene. The post-war world was a place full of hardship as well as promise. Europe came out of the war as impoverished, and definitely more damaged, than the Middle East. The UK, to give one example, owed several millions of pounds to Egypt, a country that it occupied at the time. Iraq, which was under UK occupation, had started on a promising path of democratisation and modernisation. Libya, under the Sanussis, felt comfortable with Egypt and looked forward to close relations with the rest of the Arab world. In the decades that followed, European countries, along with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Malaysia surged ahead, while pan-Arabism with its revolutionary rhetoric and state-run economy lagged behind. Egypt launched its socialist-style modernisation at more or less the same time when Japan started to rebuild itself, and long before South Korea started its development programmes. And yet, where are we today? Pan-Arabism was losing the battle of modernisation, but it kept plodding along. In Egypt, the government introduced state-run economy in the summer of 1961, a few months before Syria severed its union with Egypt. Ironically, this timing would have been perfect for introducing a sensible market economy of the type Anwar Sadat went for in the 1970s. Gamal Abdel-Nasser, Egypt's president at the time, had close relations with the two superpower leaders, J F Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, and it should have been easy for him to steer Egypt back toward a more liberal future. But that was not to be. People think of pan-Arabism as something that started with Abdel-Nasser and the Suez War of 1956. But the history of the movement should be traced back to the Arab revolt of 1916 and the creation of the League of Arab States in 1945. What Abdel-Nasser did, however, was to galvanise the masses behind the ideology. The defining moment of Abdel-Nasser's political career came in 1956, when he nationalised the Suez Canal then stayed the course during the subsequent hostilities. Egypt lost the 1956 war, and yet it claimed it as a victory, thanks to the timely US and Soviet intervention. In the ecstasy that followed the war, Abdel-Nasser became the Arab world's celebrated hero. And the Egyptian president decided to promote Abdel-Hakim Amer, his second in command who had just lost a war, to field marshal -- a decision he lived to regret. From then on, pan-Arabism espoused a revolutionary version of socialism. People who preferred a more technocratic approach to government, like Abdel-Latif El-Bughdadi, became less popular. Liberals such as former President Mohamed Naguib and members of the Wafd Party were pushed out of the way. Abdel-Nasser sent Egyptian troops to Yemen in 1962 in an ill-fated mission, this preceding the catastrophic defeat of 1967. Under Abdel-Nasser, Egypt relentlessly exported its brand of revolution, a brand that equated pan-Arabism with revolutionary socialism. And across the Arab world, the wave seemed unstoppable. Iraq had its revolution in 1958, Yemen in 1961, and Libya in 1969. From Syria to Sudan and across North Africa, the word of the revolution spread, boosting Arab aspirations. But the price was high. While Egypt's 1952 Revolution got the British out, it failed to keep Israel at bay. The 1958 revolution in Iraq expelled the British, but 45 years later the Americans are in charge of the country. The 1961 revolution in Yemen overthrew the monarchy, but failed to improve things. Even the much-celebrated Algerian revolution ended up in years of turmoil and bloodshed. As for Libya, the less is said the better. The misfortunes pan-Arabism, in its socialist and revolutionary form, has brought upon this region is the reason many now think back to colonial times with nostalgia. Millions across the Arab world are wondering where we went wrong. What's so good about being a nationalist if one has to live in a big prison? What's so good about nationalism when one man is in charge? And what's so good about a homeland when citizens have no rights? Since 1956, pan-Arabism has been obsessed with military prowess, though ironically most Arab regimes were anything but militarily adept. The Egyptian revolution of 1952 didn't form a strong army, or even a moderately capable army. During Abdel-Nasser's entire life, Egypt never had an army that could defeat Israel. The actual rebuilding of the Egyptian army took place after 1967, when the first offensive military plan was devised. The first decent military performance of the Egyptian army took place in 1973. The calamity wasn't confined to Egypt. Iraq's Baath Party, which inherited a well-trained army in 1958, performed badly in three consecutive wars starting with the Iraq-Iran war. Gaddafi's Libya never had an army to mention. What we had was an abundance of pan-Arab radical regimes, all using the fiery rhetoric of war, and none having a decent army. In a sense, it was pan-Arabism that elevated Israel to its current position of military invincibility. Had it not been for the Nasserist-Baathist era, Israel would not have risen so high. Now think of what could have happened had the post World War II wave of liberalism continued? We live in the autumn of pan-Arabism. The last half century brought us nothing but grief. Egypt is embattled on all fronts. Iraq is occupied and spiralling into a civil war. Libya has turned the other cheek to the Americans. Yemen is in a vicious circle of stagnation. Algeria was bruised by the Islamists. Somalia and Sudan are falling apart. And Palestine is a shambles. Worse is perhaps yet to come. Now everyone is talking about reform and revisions. But who is in charge of the revisions? In my opinion exactly those who cannot be trusted to put things back together. Pan-Arabism has brought us socialism without justice, revolution without reason, and military rhetoric without victories. And now the proponents of pan-Arabism are fast disappearing from the picture, only to be replaced with a wave of reformists who cannot get anything right. What we have today are not real reformers. They are reformers with no pedigree, liberals with no track record. * The writer is journalist with Al-Ahram daily newspaper.
