A shaky ceasefire struck, Palestinians and Israelis now face the task of taking the next step forward, writes Khaled Amayreh in the West Bank Palestinians have reacted to the de facto ceasefire with Israel, reached over the weekend, with a combination of scepticism and ambivalence. Indeed, while the vast majority of Palestinians strongly support the ceasefire (the term itself is misleading to a large extent, since it gives the impression of parity between the two sides), many are suspicious of Israel's intentions. Their caution is not without justification. On the very day the ceasefire went into effect, Israel's occupation army assassinated two Palestinians, including a 60-year-old woman in the northern West Bank town of Qabatya. The killings prompted Fatah's armed wing, Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, to fire a Qassam rocket on a Jewish settlement outside Gaza. On Tuesday 28 November, Israeli Defence Minister Amir Peretz told the Israeli media that the ceasefire agreement didn't cover the West Bank. The Palestinian Authority (PA) and various resistance factions rejected Peretz's statement, the factions warning Israel that the ceasefire would collapse immediately if the Israeli army continued to carry out assassinations in the West Bank. Further, Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, pointed out that Palestinians in both Gaza and the West Bank were one people and that there was no point in maintaining a ceasefire in Gaza while killings continued unabated in the West Bank. Israeli officials, apparently worried that the international community would blame Israel in case the ceasefire collapsed, have indicated that a ceasefire in the West Bank could be worked out with the PA. This possibility was also raised by PA official Saeb Erekat who told reporters in Ramallah Monday that the ceasefire would soon cover the West Bank. Erekat didn't say when the ceasefire would be arranged or whether Israeli occupation forces would have to leave Palestinian towns and villages first. Another important factor contributing to Palestinian scepticism with regard to the ceasefire is the fact that the "mechanism of the occupation" is itself a constant and unrelenting act of provocation. "Stopping the shooting and killing is good. However, we must never forget that the real problem is the occupation itself, which is a constant act of rape. The ceasefire might work for a few weeks, or even a few months, but then the virulent mechanism of the occupation would make the resumption of resistance inevitable," said Mahmoud Amr, a medical doctor from Hebron. "You simply can't eradicate the 'effect' and leave the 'cause' intact," he added. This is not to say that Palestinians don't wish to see the ceasefire hold and be consolidated. On the contrary, the vast bulk of Palestinians, especially in the Gaza Strip, have welcomed the ceasefire in the hope that it will enable them to restore a semblance of normality to their shattered lives. Needless to say, five months of unceasing Israeli bombing and killing has devastated Gaza and left hundreds of Palestinians, mostly innocent men, women and children, dead or injured. Hence a "respite from hell" was not only desired but also urgently needed. It is still far from certain if the ceasefire is an integral part of a larger "package" that includes a prisoner swap between Israel and the Palestinians, a renewal of peace talks, the lifting of harsh Western sanctions on the Palestinian government, the formation of a Palestinian national unity government, and possibly the deployment of the Jordan-based Palestinian "Badr regiment" in the Gaza Strip to monitor the ceasefire as has been reported in the Israeli press. What is clear is that Hamas has of late been adopting a moderate tone, not only in form but also in substance, to some extent. Last week, Khaled Meshaal, Hamas's increasingly powerful political leader, said he would give the international community six months to end the conflict in the Middle East by pressuring Israel to end its occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip and allow the Palestinians to create a viable state there. Meshaal, who was speaking in Cairo following talks with Egyptian officials, including Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman, also warned that a third Palestinian Intifada would erupt if the international community kept dragging its feet and failed to force Israel to end its occupation. Meshaal's statements are significant for two reasons. First, he used the term "end the conflict", meaning that a total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, along with a just resolution of the refugees' plight, would be sufficient to end the conflict with Israel. Second, Meshaal suggested that Hamas would do nothing to derail or impede political efforts during this period and would give PA President Mahmoud Abbas open- ended authorisation to negotiate a final settlement with Israel. This position by Hamas is more or less compatible with the rule of international law and should be viewed by the international community, especially the EU, as a positive and serious evolution in Hamas's political discourse. With regard to the contemplated national unity government, Meshaal attributed the delay in forming the government to three factors: the absence of guarantees that sanctions on the Palestinians will be lifted the moment the new government is formed and becomes functional; the insistence of some segments within Fatah that the next government be a government of technocrats or experts, which Meshaal said would be ineffective and weak; and the yet to be resolved issue of the captured Israeli soldier. It is widely expected that Palestinian Prime Minister Haniyeh will assert this "new line of thinking" during his current visit to Egypt, Iran, Syria and possibly Saudi Arabia. Interestingly, Haniyeh's visit to Cairo -- the first ever -- seems to have been facilitated by Hamas's positive posture and perceived flexibility, not only with regard to the ceasefire, but also its willingness to allow the holding of serious final status negotiations pursuant to UN resolutions 242 and 332, which amount to a de facto recognition by Hamas of the Arab initiative and also, indirectly, of Israel. In short, Hamas, by accepting the ceasefire, authorising Abbas to conduct negotiations with Israel and voicing content with a Palestinian state on the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, has effectively succeeded in hurling the ball into the Israeli court. This is probably what Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert understood when he agreed to the ceasefire, and more importantly, spelled out his own "proposals for peace" during a speech he delivered in southern Israel, marking the anniversary of the death of Israel's first prime minister, David Ben Gurion. Speaking in general terms and avoiding specifics, Olmert said Israel was extending its hand to the Palestinians for peace. He added that Israel was willing to withdraw from "a lot of territories" and free "many" Palestinian prisoners and allow the creation of a viable and contiguous Palestinian state. Public relations spin, or genuine peace-making? Every Palestinian knows that "a lot of territories" is nothing but a familiar Israeli euphemism for the stubborn Israeli refusal to give up the spoils of the 1967 War. This explains the swift rejection by Hamas and other Palestinian factions of Olmert's proposals which Hamas dismissed as a "conspiracy" while Fatah says that Olmert would be judged by his actions not his words. But does Olmert really think he can cope with a third Intifada?
