Last week, the Sinai Bedouin tribes took a major step in the fight against terrorism and the armed violence that have gripped the Sinai since 28 January 2011. The step acquires particular significance as it is the first time such an action has occurred in all this time. Although this lengthy period of terrorist activities has brought diverse waves of escalation and abatement, the Sinai tribes Egyptian citizens who live on the land that is the theatre of events have not been entirely clear or open in their positions. Generally they have opted for silence on the developments in and around the cities of the northern part of the peninsula, despite the terrorist acts that have claimed numerous and different types of victims: officers and soldiers of the armed forces, police officers and recruits, not to mention many civilians. Such passive silence did not sit well with public opinion and observers, and eventually it stirred suspicion. Not only were the tribes accused of furnishing an environment that fostered militant extremists, it looked like some of their members were actively supporting the terrorist groups. This gained credence as certain names were mentioned, because they occupied leadership positions in the militias or because they were accused of direct involvement in the planning and execution of some terrorist assaults. A notorious case was Shadi Al-Maniei, a member of the Sawarka, one of the largest of the Sinai tribes. Al-Maniei was a senior leader in the Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis (ABM) organisation. The group recently declared its allegiance and affiliation to the Islamic State (IS) group and changed its name to the Sinai Province of the Islamic State (SPIS). Last week, the Sinai tribes collectively broke with that long-sustained ambiguity and openly declared their support for the state, its armed forces and security agencies against ABM or SPIS. That it took so long to reach this critical stage requires us to take a look back at some previous significant stages, and also to pose a number of questions that might help us answer the most crucial question: Have we, in fact, arrived at a point of real success in efforts to confront terrorist organisations? Otherwise put, is the declaration by the Sinai tribes that they have entered the line of confrontation truly a step in the right direction and will it contribute to beating back the terrorist threat? The first important stage we should consider is the period that followed the 25 January 2011 Revolution. Suddenly, there appeared to be a drive by various agencies, bent on taking advantage of the security breakdown at the time, to introduce large numbers of terrorist elements from abroad and to assemble them in Northern Sinai. The northeast part of the peninsula was particularly attractive as there were no Egyptian army forces present in that area due to restrictions in the Camp David protocols concerning Area C, which is roughly the region where the abovementioned events have been playing out. The area stretches from the east of Al-Arish City, the capital of Northern Sinai, to the eastern border strip near Rafah, including the town of Sheikh Zuweid. The Sinai tribes did not have a strategy or common position during that stage, which continued throughout the post-25 January interim period. This problem grew more complicated for them after the rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood during the Mohamed Morsi presidency. This period ushered in the golden age for militant extremists in the Sinai. Between Morsi's assumption of office in June 2012 and the 30 June Revolution the following year, the Islamist forces were able to form a number of paramilitary organisations that were numerically and military strong. They enjoyed the protection and support of the Muslim Brotherhood organisation in Egypt and its nearby branch, Hamas, across the border in Gaza. This stage led to difficult and confusing situations for the tribes, as this was also a period that saw an intensification in recruitment activities by these organisations, especially among the younger members of the tribes who were given leadership posts. The terrorist organisations were less interested in attracting recruits to carry out attacks; they were interested in building up logistical support. This logistical support included people to camouflage the movements' activities, house terrorist operatives, transport and conceal the weapons that had begun to flow into the Sinai in unprecedented quantities and, more importantly, to operate the illegal tunnels that ran under the border between the Sinai and Gaza. This latter activity increased to an unprecedented level during this stage and also aggravated the problems of the Sinai tribes. The tunnels gave rise to the oft-repeated suspicion that the tribes had vested interests in the terrorist organisations because of their alleged involvement in lucrative smuggling operations. This issue adds yet another aspect to the complicated security landscape in the Sinai, and I wonder whether the tribes there have formulated a strategy to deal with this multifaceted connection between many of their youth and the terrorist organisations, and also with the other side, namely Gaza. Hamas will not readily allow for the dismantlement of its Sinai connections as the tunnel network and smuggling operations are vital to it because of the blockade imposed by the Israeli occupation. The second crucial stage that marked a major turning point for the Sinai followed the 30 June 2013 Revolution. This was when the armed forces arrived in the region to end the security breakdown and halt the militia chaos that had grown too great for Interior Ministry agencies to handle alone. The Sinai militant organisations that had enjoyed the shelter and support of the Muslim Brotherhood sprang into action to return the favour, declaring war against the new order following the overthrow of Muslim Brotherhood rule. These militias united beneath the banner of the largest organisation — ABM —to pool human and material resources against the armed forces and the police. From that point forward, the state has been locked in a fierce battle with a large, well-equipped terrorist organisation that receives support from several foreign agencies, the nearest being Hamas in Gaza. Cooperation between the Sinai tribes and the army during this complex confrontation was far from ideal. ABM had naturally realised that such cooperation would be highly detrimental to it and would strip it of its most important sources of strength. Therefore, it began early on to intimidate civilians to prevent them from assisting security agencies in any way. Its tactics included brutally murdering people whom it suspected of cooperating with these agencies. Moreover, after ABM declared its allegiance to IS it adopted the same methods of massacring defenceless people and then posting video footage of their crimes on social media sites to spread panic and fear among the tribes. For a while the terrorist tactic worked to prevent the tribes from cooperating with government agencies, which is all the more reason why the recent conference that preceded the declaration (announced by the Tarabin tribe) marks the beginning of a new chapter in the Sinai. That the tribes have collectively resolved to purge their areas of that cancerous danger is unquestionably a positive step forward. However, the leaders and peoples of those tribes must still contend with those difficult issues mentioned above, namely how to end the connection between many of their youth and the terrorist organisations, and how best to combat the tunnel trafficking and smuggling that some members of their tribes are involved. Both of these questions, in addition to a number of other complicated matters, must be handled with the highest degree of wisdom. There should be planning in coordination with all the agencies of the state, so as to avoid arbitrary actions, unacceptable repercussions or a greater threat to civilian lives. Such questions need to be addressed by agencies of the state, in order to benefit from the step taken by the Sinai tribes and, simultaneously, to avoid making the situation in the Sinai more complicated than it already is. The writer is director of the National Center for Security Studies.
