The first glimpse the Egyptian public had of the growing power of the army movement – later known as the Free Officers Movement – came during the elections to the Officers Club on 31 December 1951, in which Mohamed Naguib, referred to in the palace as “Orabi 2” after the full-scale army movement of 1881, decided to run for the club's presidency, winning by a landslide. The elections meant that a coup was in the works. Before the elections, the Free Officers had worked underground and had been able to bide their time. After the elections, their names and connections became known, and it was only a matter of time before they would find their way either into power or into prison. The idea of the coup had taken shape even before the Cairo fire of 25 January 1952, and the early weeks of 1952 saw the palace contemplating a set of narrowing options. A crackdown on the army could have brought the monarchy to a bloody end, but an appeasement policy could have caused it to wither away. As a result, the palace, acting through government mediators, tried to intimidate and placate the officers by turns. In January 1952, defence minister Haydar Pasha summoned Naguib and Rashad Mehanni, another army officer, and told them that the king wanted Hussein Sirri Pasha to be included on the club's board of directors. When the two men refused, Haydar started to make not-so-subtle threats, wrote Salah Al-Shahed, chief of protocol under Farouk and then under Egypt's first three presidents, in his later memoirs. “Naguib went home riding in a car that was not his as a way of avoiding possible assassination,” Al-Shahed wrote in his “Memories of Two Eras.” The next morning, Naguib received Galal Nada, a former officer who now worked as a military correspondent for the newspaper Akhbar Al-Youm, and Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, editor of the magazine Akher Saa, in his office, both of whom asked about his meetings with the king's aides. “Heikal had been a military correspondent during the battle for Palestine in 1948,” Al-Shahed wrote in his memoirs. “Naguib had also introduced Heikal to Abdel-Hamid Sadek, a lawyer who used to make generous donations to guerrilla groups during the struggle against the British in the Canal Zone after the abrogation of the 1936 Treaty in 1951.” This meeting between Naguib and the two prominent journalists was not merely a matter of routine. Two Free Officers arrived at Naguib's office at the same time unannounced: future president Gamal Abdel-Nasser and future defence minister Abdel-Hakim Amer. It was clear that the army was now thinking of taking the game to the next level. Farid Pasha Zaaluk was also part of these events. Minister of trade and industry in Ahmed Naguib Al-Hilali's government, toppled by the army on 23 July 1952, 19 hours after its formation, Zaaluk was one of the main negotiators of the events that preceded and followed the 1952 coup, at the time referred to as the “army movement” or the “blessed movement.” On the night of 22 July 1952, Al-Hilali called Zaaluk at home and told him that a coup was in the offing. Interior minister Mortada Al-Maraghi also called Zaaluk to say that the army was going to stage a rebellion that Ahmed Talaat, the then governor of Cairo, would be ordered to suppress. Zaaluk, a cautious man by nature, voiced fears that arresting top army officers could trigger a bloody confrontation. Like many officials at the time, he was aware that change was needed and he may have wished to use the army movement to accelerate the kind of reforms he believed the country needed. When Zaaluk got in touch with Naguib, the latter told him that Al-Maraghi had already called him and asked him to calm the army officers, a request that he had turned down. Zaaluk told Naguib to do what he thought fit and then went to see Al-Hilali at the cabinet offices to tell him what had happened. Al-Hilali called Naguib and informed him that British troops had moved to within 45 km of Cairo. “We don't want a repeat of the Orabi events [which led to the British occupation of Egypt in 1882],” Al-Hilali advised. Then he struck a reconciliatory note: “if the army movement has demands, my plane is at the ready for me to come to Cairo,” he told Naguib. At 11pm that same night, Zaaluk called Naguib to tell him to keep the army in its barracks. “We have nothing but respect for Al-Hilali and his government. But we object to some of his ministers,” Naguib said in reply. The army was already sensing its power and was trying to chisel away at that of the palace. Whether a compromise between the palace and the army would have been possible is still debated to this day, but with these moves the bargaining had started. With the soft-spoken Naguib being perceived as the leader of the army movement, it was conceivable that the army might have wished to come to a compromise. “Who are the ministers you object to,” Zaaluk asked. “[Defence minister] Ismail Sherine and [interior minister] Mortada Al-Maraghi,” Naguib answered. “We could have been ready to see Al-Hilali Pasha stay as prime minister. But the majority of the movement wants Ali Maher Pasha,” Naguib added. Al-Hilali went to the palace and told the king what had happened, and the latter refused to have Ali Maher form a government. He said that Maher had called him earlier in the day to tell him that his loyalty was to him alone and that he had said the same thing to a group of officers who had come to him in order to sound out his opinions. Al-Hilali advised the king to let Ali Maher form a new government, then calling Maher to brief him on the discussion. Maher asked for an hour to think it over. Zaaluk later on reported that Al-Hilali had also asked the king to abdicate and place his son on the throne. He contacted Mostafa Sadek, uncle of queen Nariman, and told him to negotiate with the officers. Meanwhile, the US ambassador in Egypt at the time, Jefferson Caffery, called Al-Hilali to inquire about the situation and was told that it was a “domestic matter.” M J Creswell, minister plenipotentiary at the UK embassy, also called Al-Hilali to warn him that turbulence of the kind seen in January 1952 could imperil foreigners living in Egypt. Al-Shahed was at the Shooting Club in Alexandria on the night of 22 July when he received a phone call. “At 9.30 pm, Asila Hanem, the queen's mother, called me and asked me to come to her house. There I found Farouk. Asila Hanem said that the army seemed to be conducting unusual movements in Cairo,” Al-Shahed wrote in his memoirs. “Your Majesty, you need to put on the uniform of army chief-of-staff and go to the headquarters of the army in Cairo. You need to meet the officers of the movement and discuss their demands,” Al-Shahed advised. The king thought Al-Shahed's suggestion over, but found it too risky. “Do you want me to risk being assassinated or arrested,” he asked. Later, one of the members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) that later ruled Egypt told Al-Shahed that had the king done as he had suggested there would have been a good chance he could have kept his throne. “After the success of the army movement, an RCC member told me that they had considered what to do if the king came to them to ask the reasons for their movement. They agreed that were this to happen they would be willing to go back to barracks,” Al-Shaded wrote. Of course in the event nothing of the sort happened, and on Wednesday 23 July Anwar Al-Sadat broadcast the revolution's first communiqué. The broadcaster in charge refused to let him read out the communiqué until the censor, Anwar Habib, had agreed. Al-Sadat called Habib and the latter agreed to let him go on air. On Thursday 24 July, the king appointed a new cabinet led by Ali Maher who was given the jobs of prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, interior and defence. Ibrahim Shawki was made minister of health, Ibrahim Abdel-Wahab minister of trade, industry and provisions, Saad Al-Labban minister of education, Mohamed Ali Roshdi minister of justice, Abdel-Galil Al-Imari minister of finance and economy, Alfonse Greis minister of agriculture, Zoheir Garana minister of transport and social affairs, Mohamed Kamel Nabil minister of public works, Fouad Sherine minister of awqaf, and Abdel-Aziz Abdallah minister of municipal and rural affairs. Meanwhile, Naguib asked for six courtiers to be dismissed, giving the names of Elias Andraos, Anton Pulli, Hassan Akef, Youssef Rashad, Mohamed Helmi Hussein and Mohamed Hassan. Karim Thabet, another courtier detested by the officers, had already resigned. The king agreed and even promoted Naguib to full general. The king then drove himself from Al-Montazah to Ras Al-Tin Palace in Alexandria. Queen Nariman and crown prince Ahmed Fouad were with him in the same car, while his daughters followed in another. In his memoirs, Al-Shahed says he was puzzled by the king's removal from al-Montazah to Ras Al-Tin. But whether the move was symbolic or tactical, the message was that the king was being edged away from power, and it would not be too long before he was removed entirely. “I didn't see a reason for this move from Al-Montazah, which the king never entered again,” Al-Shahed wrote. At 9 am on Saturday 26 July, Mohamed Naguib met Ali Maher to discuss a shooting incident at Ras Al-Tin in which “army movement soldiers had fired at Ras Al-Tin Palace to return fire from the Royal Guard, which had thought that [the soldiers] wanted to take the palace,” Al-Shahed wrote. A US embassy official, a certain Mr Sparks, had contacted government officials to ask about the shooting and discuss its consequences for the country. Naguib in his avuncular manner reassured him that the whole thing was due to a “misunderstanding.” But in fact the army may have been playing for time. On 25 July, Naguib gave Maher the army's ultimatum to the king to abdicate before 12 noon and leave the country before 6 pm the next day. Just after 10 am that same day, Maher went to Ras Al-Tin, handed the king the ultimatum, and advised him to accept it. The king said he would leave on the royal yacht Al-Mahroussa and would need an escort from the navy until he landed in Italy. He also wanted to take his wife Nariman with him, along with his son Ahmed Fouad and his daughters from his first wife queen Farida. He asked for an official send off, as befitting a king who had abdicated voluntarily. The requests were all met, except for the escort, which was granted only until the yacht had left Egypt's territorial waters. The text of the abdication, issued as royal decree 65 for 1952, read: “We, Farouk I, king of Egypt and Sudan, having always sought what is good for our country, its happiness and progress, wishing to spare the country any further troubles at these critical moments, and complying with the wishes of the people, have decided to abdicate the throne in favour of crown prince Ahmed Fouad. Orders to this effect have been given to prime minister Ali Maher Pasha.” The abdication decree was signed in Ras Al-Tin Palace on 26 July 1952. That same day, Farouk, aged 32, left for exile in Italy. He later died in Rome on 18 March 1965.
