Steven Cook (Council on Foreign Relations), Michele Dunne (Atlantic Council and Carnegie Foundation), Mark Lynch (George Washington University), Tamara Wittes (Brookings Institution) and other members of their generation of Middle East specialists have become something in the nature of intellectual luminaries during the past two decades. It is to them that decision-makers, politicians and the public look for knowledge on this part of the world. In spite of occasional differences between them here and there, it is they who collectively shaped the prevalent American “understanding” of the Arab region in general, and Egypt in particular. Although they are all more or less liberal in their political outlook, their studies and contemplations have led them to two important conclusions: that the Arabs are the historical exception to the universal drive to democracy; and, secondly, that the best the Arabs can hope for is to be governed by moderate, democratic and liberal-minded Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. That a particular race or ethnic group could be an “exception” to the general forward marching course of mankind seems to fly directly in the face of liberal thought. The notion that the Muslim Brotherhood is democratic, especially since had become dominated by leaders and ideologues that subscribe to the ideas of Sayed Qutb, is particularly farfetched. But apparently this Qutbist outlook did not figure in these scholars' analyses. These hold that the Muslim Brotherhood had long been the bogeyman of dictatorial regimes, whereas actually — as the Turkish model illustrates — it offers the best available key to rescuing the Arabs from chronic dictatorship. To be fair, this line of thought is not purely “American”. Many Arab and Egyptian intellectuals, writers, scholars, rights activists and others have helped shape and support it because they, too, believed that this was what history had destined for the Arabs, or that this was the most that was possible for that amazing breed of human beings that keeps reproducing despotism in one way or another. All those intellectuals and scholars, both in Egypt and the US, were taken by surprise by the events of January 2011. But as the clouds settled and the Muslim Brotherhood rose to power, they could breathe a sigh of relief. Their theory was coming true. It is little wonder, therefore, that they so readily turned a blind eye to the Muslim Brotherhood “constitution”, how it was produced, what it contained, and the way it was steamrolled into being. They were not interested in the Muslim Brotherhood's attitudes and behaviour towards the state and society. Nor were they concerned by an impending religious-fascist order that was coalescing with alarming speed. After all, a Muslim Brotherhood regime was the best Egyptians could produce. Then came the even greater surprise in the form of the 30 June 2013 demonstrations and subsequent events. The response, here, was to revert to the original premise, namely that Egyptians are unable to break the habit of producing military dictatorships of one sort or another — on this occasion in the hands of General Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi. Which is to say that once again all those liberal thinkers deviated from their presumed liberal beliefs when it comes to Egypt and the Arabs, for whom there can be nothing new under the sun and for whom the mission of history in the land of the pharaohs is to generate more pharaohs, call them what you may. The foregoing is the essence of Steven Cook's recent blog on the Council on Foreign Relations website. The title of the blog was addressed to Al-Sisi and it advised him not to run for the presidency. In Cook's opinion, this would be bad for Egypt, bad for the Egyptian army, and bad for Al-Sisi himself. But the real question is not so much whether or not Al-Sisi will run, but whether or not the dictatorship-producing environment has changed. I believe that Egypt, along with many other Arab societies, is changing. I also believe that the notion of the Arab “exception” to the laws of history and science is a fallacy and that if we actually applied these laws we would find the very idea of an “exception” absurd. Water does not flow through the same riverbed twice. The Egyptian people, including the army and Al-Sisi, have changed greatly. This is because Egypt, itself, has changed greatly during the past two decades — certainly much more than Cook and like-minded scholars care to imagine. With the decline in infant mortality rates, Egypt is much younger than ever, and more populous. When Mubarak came to power it had a population of 40 million; by the time he left it was over 80 million, which is to say that twice as many people now inhabit the banks of the Nile. As a result of the economic reforms that were introduced in 1991, the middle class has grown and overflowed the banks of the civil service/public sector bureaucracy that had monopolised and made controllable that class within the framework of a regulated Egyptian market. With technological developments, the deregulation of the media and the surge in private newspapers and television channels, and other modes of communication, the ways Egyptians communicate and interact have changed immensely. In short, by the time of the January revolution, Egypt had changed in ways and in a magnitude that the existing regime was no longer able to cope with. In addition, that revolution brought politics to Egypt which, because of its conservative nature, had tended to avoid politics. Within the space of just three years, we had three major revolutions: one to overthrow Mubarak, the second that brought the Muslim Brotherhood to power and ousted SCAF, and the third to overthrow the Muslim Brotherhood regime so as to make way for a new order. The Egyptian people are no longer passive or apathetic. They will no longer accept a government that fails to meet their goals. This, in turn, brings us to another major change, which is the army and General Al-Sisi are no longer the same. What has occurred in Egypt took place beneath the eyes and ears of the military establishment, whether directly in the various Tahrir Square moments, or indirectly in ways that forced it into a battle against terrorism in the Nile valley and against the national security threat in Sinai. Egypt's army and its various security forces experienced every fluctuation in this historical phase, including its harshest and most tempestuous facets. Perhaps some quarters in the military harboured nostalgic yearnings for those good old days in the early Nasserist or Mubarak eras. But all that is history and cannot be brought back again. Al-Sisi is fully aware of this. Perhaps this is the secret behind his hesitancy to run for president. He knows that his battle will not be the electoral race, but rather the profound and complex problems and dilemmas that he would have to address afterwards. But it is equally true that Al-Sisi or any other presidential hopeful will be contending with a field that is teeming not just with obstacles but also with great opportunities. Perhaps this is the chief factor that Steven Cook has overlooked. An immense energy has been generated in Egyptian society and this energy will not go away until it is used. Therefore, to suggest that Al-Sisi, should he decide to run for office, will fail from the outset is a form of pre-empting what is required — which is for the people to determine that history should not repeat itself so that a new sun can shine every morning.
