Egyptians once more have to remain in their homes at night in accordance with the curfew imposed on some of the country's governorates. They stay glued to their TV sets till early morning to follow news of the hunt on key Muslim Brotherhood figures that are suspected of inciting violence in the wake of the 30 June popular revolution that led to the ouster of president Mohamed Morsi. The great attention being paid to the arrest of Muslim Brotherhood strongmen in the media and public discussion undoubtedly overshadows an inevitable debate, which should have started, on the future of Egypt. Similar to what happened in January/February 2011, after the ousting of p[resident Hosni Mubarak, the media dragged the whole society into discussions on sensationalist stories of corruption and the crimes of the regime, leaving no room for serious debate over rebuilding the country plagued with social, economic, political and cultural predicaments for decades. Egyptians are also dragged into another conflict, namely the legitimacy of the revolution itself. Many Egyptians still consider the 25 January Revolution as a genuine public uprising that has shaken authoritarianism and paved the way for democracy. Others, who are basically seen as Mubarak regime beneficiaries, have been trying — overtly and covertly — to credit 30 June as the only pro-democracy revolution. Their argument is simple: 25 January legitimised Muslim Brotherhood rule, and afterwards people took to street against them on 30 June. As such, the genuine revolution is the one that overthrew the Brotherhood, not the one that brought them into the political system. The counter-argument is also plausible. No matter how many times Egyptians demonstrate in millions against their government, the slogans adopted and dreams expressed in 25 January (freedom, social justice and democracy) are obviously against the rule of both Mubarak and the Brotherhood. It seems that Egyptian politics has three wings: revolutionary forces, the old guard and Islamists. The first group consists of the newly emerged political parties, youth movements and social movements in the areas of women rights, religious freedoms and social justice. The second group, the old guard, refers to deep-rooted families in Upper Egypt and the Delta, the traditional business class, and the state apparatus. The third group includes Salafis, the Muslim Brothers, and others. In the 25 January popular revolution, revolutionaries along with Islamists tried to ban the old guard from political life. They eventually failed and the old guard vividly returned in less than three years. Now the old guard, whose negative response towards the 25 January Revolution is clear, try along with revolutionary forces to knock out the Islamists. I think Egyptian politics can only maintain a balance if the three wings are present in the political equation. For this reason, I was personally against all actions taken to indiscriminately exclude Mubarak's proponents after his ouster, and now I have the same attitude towards excluding Islamists whose roots in society are undeniable. Egyptian democracy should accommodate all factions and powers. This is a main source of equilibrium, checks and balances, and stability. Exclusion of any political force has proven ineffective, and risky. This doesn't mean unconditional amnesty for those who incited or committed violence, ruined properties, burned down churches and killed innocent people. They should be held accountable, while the door stays open for those who want to participate in politics and respect democratic values. Egypt is now at crossroads. Inclusion versus exclusion is the main question and political forces have to answer it clearly and bear responsibility for their choice in the future. I know that in these difficult times reconciliatory tones have been taken negatively, deemed publicly unacceptable and conspiracy-driven. However, this is a temporary moment in Egyptian history and will not persist for long. Society will restore its balance and make choices that sustain its stability and diversity.
