When we needed action and principle, circuses and spectacles marked the first half of the year in Arab diplomatic circles, writes Gamil Mattar* Several weeks ago I cautioned that Arab officials should postpone the Arab summit again. The arguments I cited remained valid until the summit convened. The US was getting too voracious in its demands, I said, not to say dictates. It was not so much its greed that was new but rather the lengths Washington was prepared to go to satisfy it. I also suggested that Arab governments, perhaps more than any other time in modern Arab history, appeared too ready to give; indeed, almost as willing to bend over backwards as the US was prepared to reach out and grab. As long as the US occupies such an unprecedented position of dominance and as long as the Arabs are so remarkably weak it seemed logical for Arabs to postpone a summit that would almost certainly, unhesitatingly comply with Washington's unreasonable demands, or -- at the very least -- scramble to grovel to the US or other such evasion tactics under various guises. The summit went ahead as scheduled. It went ahead because certain parties were desperate for it to meet, and that desperation confirmed my apprehensions and my arguments for postponing it. The US was keen for it to meet because it wanted it to produce a resolution that would confirm to Israel that the Arabs were outdoing themselves to be as moderate as could be on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and on the Palestinian track in particular, more moderate than anything they produced individually or collectively over the past two decades, including the Arab initiative adopted at their summit in Beirut. The Americans wanted the Arabs to declare, collectively and for the first time, a blanket condemnation of all military acts against civilians without any of the qualifications that have customarily been attached to such Arab statements, especially the codicil regarding the Palestinians' right to self-defence. Only the US could reserve for itself the right to say which civilians can defend themselves, that these civilians would not be Palestinians or Arabs in general because when Israel perpetrates outrages against Palestinians it is legitimate self-defence. Nor did US officials make it a secret in their statements and leaks to the press that they expected the Arabs to issue a collective recognition of the legitimacy of the occupation of Iraq; to condemn acts of violence committed against coalition forces and to back US and British arguments in favour of their draft Security Council resolution for the transfer of sovereignty in the country. The Americans wanted to be able to tell the G-8 summit, which met last weekend, that the Arabs support the US position on Iraq in general. In the two-month interval between the breakup and re-assembly of the summit, many Arab countries developed a growing need for a major Arab forum in which to trumpet out their pledge to institute domestic reforms. In complying with the superpower's appeal -- or demand -- they could then hope for special treatment by the West and respect for their "specificity". None of these governments felt it appropriate to issue such a pledge separately through an exchange of diplomatic letters or in secret meetings, nor did they want to risk appearing before their people as though they had bowed to US pressure and foreign intervention in domestic affairs. It is different, however, when a general forum issues such a commitment, because then the commitment becomes part of a broader Arab concession. In the run up to the summit it was clear that it would be exceptional, like all other summits before it. News leaked that no small number of heads of state had excused themselves, a familiar phenomenon and one that contributed to the failure of the summit to meet in March. Then, hardly had the summit begun than the expected happened. Out walks one of the Arab leaders, shrugging off his responsibility towards his nation and the Arab world and thumbing his nose at his fellow Arab leaders. More importantly, he was heedless of the feelings of the millions of Arabs who are paying a heavy price for the current state of Arab impotence and the lack of the necessary resolve and sincerity to overcome it. Perhaps what most angered those millions is that malicious superciliousness towards the plight of inter-Arab politics, which only confirmed the widespread popular impression that some of our Arab leaders refuse to admit failure, evade their responsibilities and deny the need for reform. As the US, as well as many Arab political analysts, expected, the question of domestic political reform was a minefield ready to explode. No one disputes that democracy, broadening participation in the political process, fighting corruption and improving the conditions and powers of civil society are the subjects on everyone's tongues these days throughout the Arab world. Furthermore, few remain convinced that it is necessary to link reform with other Arab causes such as Palestine and Iraq, which did not prevent some of the summit participants from once again attempting to do so. There is no question that anti- American hatred is on the rise in the Arab world because of Washington's policies on Palestine and Iraq, and that the Arab people desperately want their governments to adopt an effective collective policy that will help put an end to the suffering and injustices being inflicted upon the Palestinian and Iraqi people. However, they see reform, which the US claims to champion, as a purely domestic issue, and purely domestic it should remain. How can Arab governments claim the right, or even bring themselves to use the rights of their own people as bartering chips and tell the US we won't grant our people their rights until the Palestinians get theirs? In all events, the summit discussed reform in deference to the US demand, in spite of the fact that if it should have been discussed at all it should have been in response to the demand of Arab popular opinion rather than foreign parties. For this reason alone I would wager that the summit participants' discussion of this issue contributed to broadening the gap between Arab governments and their peoples. The summit convened and eventually adjourned. It generated piles of paper containing thousands of words and slogans, much of which was not worth the many hours spent in writing and discussing them. Indeed, what was left unsaid was far more significant than any substance the documents contained. No mention was made of the fact that Bush had broken his promise to create a Palestinian state by 2005. There was no reference whatsoever to the responsibility of the US and its coalition partners for the disasters inflicted upon the Iraqi people over a year that should have been called the year of liberation. The summit documents made no attempt to hold the US and Israel responsible for aggravating the instability of this region and for inciting armed resistance against them. In defiance of Arab public opinion, the summit failed to distinguish between the victims of US and Zionist aggression and the victims of legitimate armed resistance for independence and sovereignty. It ignored the bulldozers in Rafah, the desecration of holy shrines and signs of the rise of renewed sectarian strife in the Arab and Islamic world, for which all, including the Americans and Israelis, will pay a heavy human, material and moral price. * The writer is director of the Arab Centre for Development and Futuristic Research.
