No one knows when, exactly, president Sadat took the decision to wage the October 1973 War or the extent to which this decision was part of the extended conflict with Israel or a response to the defeat in June 1967. What is certain, however, is that the Soviet-US declaration in May 1972 calling for “military de-escalation” in the Middle East conflict was a crucial determinant in the decision to expel Russian experts from Egypt followed by the decision to go to war against Israel in order to liberate the occupied territories. There were two aspects to the latter decision. The first involved the military engagement on which Egypt embarked with the support of other Arab armies, most notably that of Syria. The second was the use of the “oil weapon” which was spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and supported by the other Arab oil-producing countries. The hero of the first battle was president Sadat. The hero of the second was King Faisal. History has recorded how these two leaders, together, shaped some of the finest moments in modern Arab history, moments that would change not only realities on the ground in Sinai and Golan, but also the contemporary world order. Henceforward, the Arabs would have a status and influence that could not be ignored. The foregoing introduction was necessary in order to help us better understand our current realities today. Just as the defeat in 1967 was a defeat for all Arabs, so too was the victory in October 1973 a victory for all Arabs. The instruments in the latter were Egypt and Saudi Arabia, each according to its own capacities. The current historical moment is no less violent and bitter than that period in the early 1970s. In fact, the situation today is probably more gruelling. To appreciate this, we need only to look at the civil warfare that is raging in five Arab countries, the terrorism that plagues all Arab nations, the Iranian threat that looms over four Arab capitals and the economic straits stemming from the plunge in oil prices that is affecting oil producing and non-oil producing nations alike. To compound the pain, the Islamic faith is imperilled by the threat of extremist and terrorist groups and movements that are not only tearing the Arab and Islamic peoples apart but also turning world opinion against the Arabs and Muslims. All these challenges and more place weighty historical responsibilities on the shoulders of Cairo and Riyadh and compel them to work together towards the realisation of a common strategy to restore stability in the region, safeguard the Arab state and rescue Islam from its abductors. In addition to the foregoing, the world around us is changing and mutating. Some of these changes may present dangers which may sometimes be more acute because they took us by surprise or we were not prepared from them. An example is the electoral victory of Donald Trump who will assume the reins of power as US president 20 January. The new president will not be an ordinary president. He is a manifestation of a phenomenon that encompasses the whole Western world. It has reared its head in Britain, France, Germany, Holland, Hungary, Greece and elsewhere where ultra right parties are on the rise. These parties are ultra-nationalistic, isolationist and they are not only opposed to globalisation in a way I have previously discussed in this column but also in a way that is hostile to an important part of globalisation: The relationship with Islam and the Islamic world, and especially the Arabs and Arab countries in the heart of the Islamic world. During the past weeks and months, the Arab world followed the US elections as never before. It familiarised itself more closely with the American political system and the electoral process there, and it acquainted itself with the candidates and their various outlooks and intentions. Donald Trump, the rising star in the scene, received special attention. However, an important part of his outlooks have not been accorded sufficient attention: How he plans to work with the Russian Federation (the former Soviet Union), an indication of which could be seen in Trump's early flirtation with Russia's Vladimir Putin whom Trump described as a strong president who merits respect and who the US should try to come to terms with. Perhaps this admiration stems from Trump's pride in his own negotiating skills or maybe it has to do with the financial networks that the president-elect and former businessman has in Russia. In all events, the question is far deeper than what appears on the surface. What Trump and Putin have in common is that they both harbour an intense animosity for Western liberalism in general, and its perpetual attempts to impose its values and systems on states that threaten Western states. They also share a hatred for Islamist radicalism, a hatred that often extends, whether consciously or not, to Muslims and Islam in general. Accordingly, Trump believes that Russian behaviour, whether in Georgia, Ukraine or Syria, has a certain validity. In his view, it is the product not of Russian belligerent tendencies, but of an unwarranted provocation by Western liberalism as manifested in the expansion of NATO, the deployment of an antiballistic missile shield in the countries bordering Russia, and the problem of Islamist terrorism as it relates to Muslim minorities within Russia itself. Most likely, therefore, the US-Russian agenda will gradually change. Perhaps we should not be surprised to see the US begin to lift its sanctions on Russia and then accept the annexation of Crimea to Russia and work out an understanding on Ukraine. Simultaneously, Syria will move up in priority on that agenda as the main arena for the conflict against radical Islamism as epitomised by Daesh (the Islamic State group). In the interests of the defeat of that phenomenon Trump already offered his first concession when he said that the presence of Bashar Al-Assad in power may be a bad option but it was not the only bad option. In short, Trump's election clears the way for a strategic understanding between Washington and Moscow. Perhaps this could have some beneficial repercussions, such as the withdrawal of the liberalist drive for regime change from this region. On the other hand, there will be the hatred and animosity towards the countries and peoples of the Arab region. Perhaps it would have been difficult to imagine this magnitude of fanaticism in the US and other Western societies had it not been for the terrorist attacks that provoked them so powerfully when the victims of this phenomenon were in Paris and New York. In 1972, the US-Soviet entente was based on depriving the Arabs of their right to fight for the recuperation of their occupied land and usurped wealth. Now it is based on domesticating the entire region and putting it under kinds of mandates, using regional parties to attain this end. There is only one way to rise to that challenge. It requires a collective Arab stance led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, similar to that which occurred in 1973 while taking all historical changes into account. Therefore, it is essential for relations between Cairo and Riyadh to be as solid and trouble-free as possible. We must always bear in mind that whatever might drive us apart in our bilateral relationship, the factors that drive us closer are much greater and richer. We have enumerated these factors in detail in previous articles, but perhaps it would be useful to reiterate them again for those who are interested in dividing us since we know that their aim is not just to harm those relations but also and more essentially to undermine the foundations of the state in both Egypt and Saudi Arabia which are linked by powerful bonds that stretch across the Red Sea and Sinai and the land of the Two Holy Mosques. The writer is chairman of the board, CEO and director of the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies.
