Libya's future hangs in the balance, but Gaddafi is not losing his equilibrium just yet, and NATO has failed miserably to tip the scales in the NTC's favour, deliberates Gamal Nkrumah Despite mostly pessimistic expectations about what took place in Sudan after the independence of the South, swiftly deteriorating conditions have even surpassed the expectations of the worst doomsayers. Instead of both Sudans in the North and South working on establishing a foundation for cooperation -- which is unavoidable for either of them, if not for historic, geographic and human bonds then at least for joint economic interests -- the two neighbours continue to use threats, incitement, blockades, siege and proxy wars that were prevalent even before the independence of South Sudan. No one trigger has caused this condition. Perhaps it was the shots fired by Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) soldiers in Abyei at members of the North's army, who then responded by occupying the region, resulting in the arrival of international forces there based on Chapter 7. Or it could have been threats by Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir while campaigning for leading party figure Ahmed Haroun, who was contesting the seat of governor of South Kordofan, that he is willing to return to the ammunition box and putting on military garb instead of civilian clothes. Or maybe it was when SPLM leader and Governor of the Blue Nile region Malik Agar threatened to go to the doorstep of the presidential palace if government forces did not stop attacking South Kordofan. Or was it when Khartoum representatives declared in Doha, after three months of negotiations, that they have reached a final peace deal with the rebel movement, giving the remaining armed groups in Darfur a period of three months to sign the agreement? What is certain is that conditions in Sudan are now at the precipice, and the lives of the majority of the populations in North and South Sudan are becoming more unbearable, as prices continue to rise sharply, since the economies of both states were affected by secession. Separation was followed by foolish policies that harmed the lives and relations of the two Sudanese peoples. The simple people in South Sudan wonder why they are being punished, as medical supplies and food supplies are blocked at the closed border and oil shipments are impeded by the unreasonable price of $33 per barrel to transport the oil (a third of the price of a barrel, while in other countries it only costs a few cents), as well as other measures that are forcing them to seek other routes in neighbouring states. Many people in the North view this as aggravating relations and breaking bonds with their brethren in South Sudan, which forces the nascent state in the South to take hostile positions towards North Sudan. In the North, there are those who believe that South Sudan and foreign parties hostile to the North had a premeditated intention, even before independence, to destabilise conditions in the North. They claim that the South urged Abdel-Aziz Al-Helw, deputy governor of Kordofan and deputy leader of the SPLM in North Sudan, to rebel and destabilise the region. Also, that South Sudan incited Agar and his deputy Yasser Orman to support Al-Helw, and that it supports and endorses the rebels in Darfur. They also blame it for the precarious Kauda agreement between SPLM in the North and two movements for the liberation of Sudan; the first led by Abdel-Wahed Mohamed Nour, and the second by Mini Arko Minawi, Al-Bashir's former special adviser. They claim the three parties agreed to topple the ruling regime in Khartoum by all means and carried out joint operations. Meanwhile, SPLM is coordinating with a third rebel group that has previously invaded Khartoum, namely the Justice and Equality Movement. Khartoum should be worried about this alliance, as well as other lurking dangers, such as the issue of South Kordofan which is being debated by the Security Council, like Darfur, on charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. While the conviction submitted by Washington has not yet been passed, the UN issued a resolution to investigate these crimes. There are other dangers, such as Washington's intention to start new talks on Darfur that are likely futile, since the government failed to learn from its mistakes in the Abuja Agreement. At first Khartoum thought the world supported it but later complained that Washington and other Western countries rescinded on their promises. The 30-month long negotiations in Doha wasted valuable time and in the end resulted in a weak agreement with one faction that did not resolve the issue by any means. The gravest danger looming over North Sudan now, which is already susceptible to domestic and foreign threats, is the situation that will result from a new power structure there. If the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) headed by Al-Bashir (who has been in power in Sudan for 22 years in a variety of roles) remains in power and continues its old ways and policies -- that propelled Sudan into one crisis after another -- it is certain to have catastrophic results on the sensitive and fragile situation in North Sudan, and its complicated relationship with its new southern neighbour. Sudan's problems in the past were rooted in the insistence of the NCP and its leadership on monopolising power, and marginalising any force that wanted to participate in governing -- whether from the North or South. These forces lost confidence in the regime, which caused many problems on the domestic and international front. These could have been avoided if Khartoum hadn't monopolised power and allowed others to genuinely participate with them in ruling the country, and not just superficially where partners held senior posts in name only as the NCP kept a firm grip on power. Ministers from the South complained about the ruse, withdrew from the government and voiced their objections, as well as Minawi, the leader of the SPLM faction leader in Darfur, who signed the Abuja peace agreement with Khartoum and was appointed special adviser to Al-Bashir. He recently protested and left Khartoum, saying that while he was an aide to the president he did not have the authority to be a driver's assistant. After the independence of South Sudan, the ruling NCP has announced that it will soon establish the second Republic, as stated by Vice President Ali Othman Taha. Al-Bashir described the new republic as Arab and Muslim, ignoring the ethnic diversity that remains in North Sudan even after the secession of the South. Such extremist statements and similar ones by NCP leaders have raised the fears of large sectors in North Sudan about the second republic, which they believe will be another totalitarian regime. This has triggered much resistance against it. The NCP is attempting to create a new reality and is facing very difficult choices. Political parties and honest forces will not accept anything less than change and genuine participation. The regime would have two choices: either submit to these demands, become part of the transformation process to create a realistic agreement to resolve Sudan's internal problems and offset foreign pressure and blackmail to help it exit this dark tunnel. Alternatively, the NCP could continue its monopoly over power out of fear of losing influence or being overthrown, which means that Sudan will remain alone in facing enormous catastrophes in Darfur, Kordofan, Blue Nile, other areas, and with a now hostile neighbour in the South. Any attempt to impose partial solutions will further complicate matters and result in more foreign intervention. There will be neither peace nor stability.
