The first ever UNDP report on human development in the Arab region lamented the lack of freedom and scientific research in this part of the world. Galal Amin* questions the findings The recent report published by the United Nations Development Programme, UNDP, under the title: Arab Human Development Report 2002, drew considerable media reaction. The Economist (6-12 July 2002) reviewed the report on three pages, generally praising it. The report is worth the interest it generated. So is The Economist's review, for the latter is indicative of a trend in Western political and cultural life. And, it tells us much about the Western view of the Arabs. This is at least as important as the Arab economic performance, which the report addresses. It is not hard to draw a grim image of the Arab economic performance over the past 20 years, particularly since the slump in the oil market in the mid-1980s. The same, however, is not true if we look back at the preceding 20 or 40 years. In the 20 years following World War II (1945-65), Arab economic performance was not all bad, considering how Arab economy fared earlier, or how other parts of the Third World fared at the time. In the two decades that followed World War II, the world economy flourished, the West grew at unprecedented rates, world trade boomed, foreign economic aid was high, five-year plans were executed, formulated and implemented with varying degrees of success (mostly satisfactorily), and industrialisation policies (performed under tariff protection) achieved reasonable success and had the stamp of approval from East and West alike (including international financial institutions). Oil production and revenues were boosted by the high growth rates in the West, particularly in Europe and Japan, which coincided with the post-war reconstruction efforts. The following decade, 1965-74, was less sanguine, both politically and economically. The main reason for the political and economic problems of that decade is the Israeli aggression of 1967, with its known consequences. The decade that followed, 1975-1985, was not too bad, if we look at the economic performance of the Arab region as a whole, rather than focus on one country or one sector. The general picture was a positive one with regards to GDP growth, employment, and the standards of living of the poorest sections of the population. The latter benefited considerably from the movement of labour among Arab countries as a result to the considerable rise in oil prices and revenues following the October 1973 War, and also following the Iranian revolution in 1979. The period that followed, up to this day, was more troubled. From 1985 to 2002, growth rates plummeted, unemployment surged, and income distribution worsened. During the same period, Southeast Asia achieved what was widely called an economic miracle. True, Latin America and Africa did not fare better than the Arab world, but the relative position of the Arab world within the Third World in general has deteriorated over the past 20 years. This makes it easy to take a dim view of Arab economy right now. This is what the British magazine, The Economist, did in its review of the UNDP report. The report had only just been released, but bad news travel fast. This was the first time the United Nations publishes a report on human development in a specific region. The facts and figures mentioned in the report about Arab economic performance (how poorly it is compared to other parts of the world, and how far it deteriorated over the past 20 years) reveal little that is not already known to anyone who is interested in Arab economic growth. The only new thing, perhaps, is the stylish language used in depicting the deterioration. The report, for example, notes that the per capita income has grown at a mere 0.5 per cent annually over the past 20 years; that about 20 per cent of the population live at less than two dollars a day; and that employment is about 15 per cent of the total labour force. These figures had been published earlier (and repeatedly) in various UN reports. This report, however, describes these facts with exceptional eloquence, which can be quite moving to the reader. We know, for example, that a slight difference in growth rates, over a long period of time, would make a big change (due to the compound rate of growth). The report, rightly, concludes that if the Arab rate of growth continues at the current low levels, the Arab citizen would need to wait for 140 years before his income doubles, whereas people in other parts of the world need less than 10 years for that to happen. The report pointedly remarks that Arab states (that is, the 22 member states of the Arab League) combined have a population of 280 million, which is close to that of the United States, but their collective national income of $531 billion a year, is close to that of Spain. This and similar statements are nothing but a flamboyant reiteration of well-known facts. What is astounding, and truly new, are the reasons for this dismal Arab performance, as noted in the report. These reasons, by the way, have been entirely endorsed by The Economist. Two schools of thought influence the usual assessments of Arab economic performance. The first blames Arab countries for reluctance to liberalise the economy. Arab countries, we are told, should liberalise trade, deregulate the economy, remove obstacles to private foreign investment, privatise the public sector, limit state intervention in economic activities, eliminate red tape, etc. The second school of thought tells us exactly the opposite. The reason the Arabs are falling behind is that they opened their economies too fast for imports and foreign investment, and their governments are not doing enough to guide investment, stimulate employment, and redistribute income, etc. Click to view images The two schools, in my opinion, overlook the effect of external factors on Arab economic performance. Yes, there is a lot that can be done to increase the volume of transactions with the outside world, or, alternatively, to regulate these transactions. Yes, there is excess of government control in some aspects of the economy, and lack of guidance in other aspects. Yes, there is much that the state should have provided in terms of education, training, income distribution, and infrastructure. And, there is a lot that the state should have refrained from doing. The state, for example, should not own small projects that are better run by individuals. And, it should not have pampered a certain class of businessmen to the point where they take loans without collateral, evade taxes, make poor investment decisions, and then begin to write bouncing checks. Yes, all the above is true and should have been avoided. It is also true that there are outside factors that dealt well-aimed blows to the economies of most Arab countries, regardless of what these countries did or failed to do. There is, for example, the Israeli aggression in 1967, the excessive slump in oil prices and revenues, the severe fluctuations in the revenues of tourism as a result of terrorist attacks that many (including myself) blame on foreign, not just local, schemes. There is also the reluctance of foreign private investment to come to the Arab region as smoothly as it flows into Southeast Asia or Latin America. Many (including myself) see political, and not just economic reasons for this reluctance. Some of these reasons, I believe, have nothing to do with our willingness to pamper foreign investors or satisfy their wishes. All of the above factors have, to varying extents, contributed to the inadequacy of Arab economic performance: the liberalisation either went too far or too little, state intervention was too excessive or too timid, and external influences were largely negative over the past two decades. To what school of thought does this recent Arab Human Development Report 2002, belong? It does not belong to either of the schools mentioned above. The report offers three new, and fascinating, interpretations to the poor Arab performance of the past 20 years: The lack of political (and individual) freedoms, the neglect of scientific research and knowledge, and discrimination against women. As for freedoms, the report speaks emotionally (and The Economist empathises full-heartedly) about the lack of freedom of expression, the constraints on the media, and rigged elections. These are all matters that deserve the full attention of any concerned Arab citizen. But neither the report nor The Economist seem to have noticed that the above matters -- none of which are good -- have no clear relation with the inadequacy of Arab economic performance. Both the report and the British magazine seem to assume that all good things should come together. This is not true. History has many examples of dictatorial regimes that performed well economically, at least by the standards set by the report (the rate of GNP growth, saving and investment ratios, employment levels, and GNP size compared to Spain, etc). Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Stalinist Russia all performed well, according to these indices. Also, the general picture of freedom and democracy worldwide is not all that rosy as The Economist suggests, when it sheds tears over the state of democracy and freedom in the Arab world. I, for one, have profound doubts about The Economist's claim that, over the past 15 years, the world saw "the great wave of democratisation that has opened up so much of the world", which, the magazine claims "seems to have left the Arabs untouched". This claim has been made before, and it is wrong. What happened in the world was simply that communism collapsed in several states, which restored some types of freedoms, and led to the loss of others. In the rest of the world, including the so-called major Western democracies, there is every indication that the public is getting more apathetic about political life, more despairing of a real change, and more aware of the lack of real difference among the rival parties. As for the alleged freedom of the press and of opinion (in the sense of challenging the views of the ruling institutions) enough has been written on the topic since matters changed in the United States, following 11 September, to become quite reminiscent of McCarthyism. The Economist, of course, would not want to get into that. Concerning "scientific knowledge and research", the report (The Economist concurring) deplores the deterioration in education, the widespread illiteracy, and the slow progress concerning scientific research and the information technology. The Arab expenditure on research and development is less than one-seventh of the world average, we are reminded. Only 0.6 per cent of the entire Arab population use the Internet, and a mere 1.2 per cent use the computer, we are told. The number of foreign books translated over the past 1,000 years (or since the time of Caliph Al-Ma'mun, in whose reign translation flourished) is less than what Spain translates in one year. Admittedly, there is widespread illiteracy in the Arab world, and this is a quite shameful fact. But Arab countries differ significantly on that account. Besides, the relation between illiteracy and economic performance indices used by the report (and the magazine) is not very clear. Illiteracy is a terrible thing for human and cultural, rather than economic, reasons. The causality may actually be reversed, for it is quite plausible that economic success brings about educational achievement rather than the other way round. As for the other indices mentioned in the report (and the magazine) with regard to knowledge and science, there are some that are quite amusing. I, for one, do not know what is the optimum ratio among the population that should use the Internet or own a computer. To what extent are such acts conducive to appropriate economic performance, and how can mental growth, cultural welfare, and political freedom be advanced through the ownership of a computer or access to the Internet? How would a person's ownership of a computer get him to be more involved in public matters or entice him to form an independent political opinion? And, what is the right number of translated works that can guarantee the continued economic prosperity of a nation? Are there types of books that are particularly helpful to development? Are there other types that should not be translated at all? Also, how did Europe and the United States manage to develop so well during the 19th century and the first part of the 20th century without the benefit of Internet and PCs? To what extent did this European and US economic progress depend on translation? Or is it the other way round? Is it, perhaps, that translation increases because of economic progress? And, what type of translation is needed? Is it from English and French to Arabic, or the other way round? The report is very adamant, when the question of women is brought up. Has not the entire world agreed on this issue? Has not there been a broad consensus, over the past 20 years and since feminism became a driving force in the West, that Arab women are neglected and mistreated by Arab men? The peculiar thing about this matter is that the debate about it is getting louder at a time when Arab and Muslim women are making progress at an unprecedented rate. The report and the magazine mention no figures concerning the increase of participation by Arab and Muslim women in public life. Forget about women's participation in politics, for Arab men hardly participate in politics. Why has not the report mentioned anything about the rise of employment among Arab and Muslim women, the rise of their enrolment in schools and universities, of their participation in the media; in the film industry? Yes, Arab and Muslim women are more likely now to cover up their heads than was the case 20 years ago, but how can this raise concern over the level of Arab economic performance? Why can't the report and the magazine notice that the veil, the headscarf, has spread in tandem with the increasing participation by women in public life (perhaps as a result of this participation, not as a barrier of any sort). The report says, "One out of every two Arab women cannot read and write." It does not mention that the illiteracy rate does not differ much in the case of men. Why does not the report mention that the ratio of educated Arab women has tripled over the past 30 years? This is mentioned only in passing, as if it is a minor detail. And, how does this relate to Arab economic performance over the past 20 years? Were Arab women better off in the 1950s and 1960s, when Arab economic performance was better? Or is it that Western feminism was not strong enough back then, so no one wondered why the Arab world did so well despite the sorry state of its women? We all know that women in the West did not gain their political, and much of their social, rights until the 20th century. So, how is it that the West did so well in the 19th century? Enough of these questions. The answers are, sadly, clear. We live at a time where Western media, including The Economist, are only interested in finding fault with Arabs and Muslims. The Western media picks whatever facts it finds to show that the Arab failure is complete, in the economic as well as in other fields. The Arabs are ubiquitously backward. And their failure, ineptitude and backwardness must lead to terror, particularly the sort that hit the United States on 11 September. This, of course, gives Israel ample excuse to do as it pleases with the Palestinians. And it gives the United States and Israel a pretext to rearrange the region at will. Since I have mentioned Israel, I should note that The Economist did not mention it, except once, in its review of the said report. It said, in a tone not devoid of admiration: "The Arab authors of the survey avoid making the Arab-Israeli conflict either a cause of, or an excuse for, the region's failings." Actually, the report did note, in a general and mixed-up fashion, that one of the side effects of the Israeli occupation was that it "was used as a pretext to distort development programmes, confuse national priorities, and obstruct political development". Sometimes, the report noted, "the need to mobilise the nation against the external aggressor was used to repress any attempt to break ranks, whereas democratic transition required more pluralism and more public debate on the policies of national development." These remarks convey the sense that Israel's role in hampering Arab economic performance had nothing to do with the specific threats, attacks and/or pressures by major countries that support Israel. Instead, Israel's obstructive role had to do with deterring "political pluralism" and giving Arab governments an excuse to engage in their favourite form of government; dictatorship. This is an error that The Economist did not, obviously, care to contest. The current climate in Western media does not allow for this type of criticism. The only thing the West cares to stress, about the Arabs, is their lack of political and individual freedoms, their scientific research problems, their low level of PC and Internet users, and the sorry state of their women. This would allow The Economist to run its article under the catchy headline "Self-doomed to failure", for this is the message the magazine wants to convey to its readers. * The writer is professor of economics at the American University in Cairo.
