The failure of popular revolutions does not give way to stability; on the contrary, unmet aspirations seethe below the surface, heightening instability, writes Eman Ragab* The Arab revolutions that have succeeded in toppling longstanding regimes have so far furnished two models of transitional government, one is the interim ruling civilian council as exemplified by Tunisia and Libya, the other is military rule, as is currently the case in Egypt. Developments in the Arab Spring have also informed us that a popular uprising in an Arab country may not necessarily culminate in the way the revolutions did in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. There are still cases where the battle between the opposition and the regime continues to flare with no resolution in sight, as is the case in Syria, Yemen and to some extent or another in Bahrain. So there remains a possibility of failure, whether because the revolutionaries proved unable to attain their goals, or because their revolution was otherwise aborted. In the case of failed revolution, governments may pursue any number of strategies or tactics, all essentially aimed at liquidating the opposition after its defeat. It may, for example, proclaim an unqualified victory, manufacture an air of triumphalism and translate this onto the ground by razing the squares where opposition forces had rallied and fought, and rewriting the official histories of these squares and any other national symbols that had served to unify the opposition. This tactic may not necessary guarantee a complete government victory over the opposition, whether in its official or grassroots form. The opposition may not that readily admit defeat and instead of mass sit-ins in public squares it may turn to subtler and less predictable tactics or it may intensify its campaign in international forums and develop closer ties with international organisations with the aim of augmenting outside pressures on the regime. In such a case, the conflict could drag on without either side being able to claim a definitive victory or relinquishing its demands. This would apply particularly to cases where demonstrations gathered protesters in the thousands, as opposed to the mere hundreds, for the government would hardly be able to round up the entire opposition while the revolution would quite likely be able to sustain a certain momentum. Another strategy would be to cast the revolutionaries as "delinquents and troublemakers" and to mete out punishments against all who participated in protest actions on the grounds that they paralysed the economy and posed a threat to national security. Here the government may target elements that it accuses of misleading the masses, having them fired or temporarily suspended from their jobs or arresting and imprisoning opposition leaders on charges of committing acts of violence. Simultaneously, the government and its propaganda machine would launch an intensive campaign to cast aspersions on the patriotism of the revolutionaries and to otherwise sully their reputation, towards which end it would use some of the same communications tools that the revolutionaries, themselves, had used, such as satellite television stations, the press and Facebook and Twitter. The method is not dissimilar to that used against the Baathists in Iraq and against the "remnants of the former regime" in Egypt, but in this case it is turned against the forces that had spearheaded the revolution. Both tactics above could alter the balance of power between revolutionaries and the regime, making it possible for the latter to pursue a third strategy, which is to initiate a "national dialogue". The step, in fact, is more in the nature of a manoeuvre aimed at imposing the government's conditions to the greatest possible extent and to minimise the concessions it would have to grant the opposition. It follows that such a dialogue would be unlikely to allow for a true representation of opposition forces. There might be some token opposition element, but the actual participants in the dialogue would include everyone but the parties that actually drove the revolution and brought the masses into the streets. The ruse is not new in the politics of Arab regimes. For example, in Bahrain the government has been treating the Jamiat Al-Wifaq (the Islamic National Accord Association) as though it represented the opposition, deliberately overlooking the fact that this society was unable to control the street, unlike Hassan Mushaima, leader of Al-Haqq opposition movement. In other words, the government was "negotiating" with the least influence among the people. Nor did the dialogue that the Bahrain initiated in July provide for any representation of the 14 February Youth Group, Al-Haqq, or the Higher Coordinating Committee of the Youth for Change and Freedom, all of which had a solid and sustained presence in the uprising and are still organising the opposition's ongoing "charge and retreat" operations. This strategy or course of action can have serious repercussions in the event of a failed revolution, especially in societies that are not ethnically or religiously homogeneous and where the dividing lines between the opposition and loyalist forces intersect with sectarian or ethnic affiliations. One of its almost certain effects will be to promote sectarian entrenchment which would then be bolstered by mutual boycotts of commercial establishments, the development of public services on the basis of sectarian/political allegiances and mounting mutual mistrust. This spiralling in sectarian tensions can affect the most ordinary details of day-to-day life. For example, following the breakup of the opposition demonstration in Pearl Square in Manama, Sunni patients stopped going to Shia doctors, who make up the majority and best trained of medical practitioners in Bahrain. The phenomenon compounded the growing isolation of Shia towns and villages. Furthermore, under such a situation an entire country can become geographically divided. The longer the opposition holds out, the greater the chances that the country fractures into "safe zones" where the regime succeeded in reasserting full control, unsafe or unstable zones where the regime only has partial control, and, thirdly, zones that have fallen under the control of opposition forces. This prospect places Arab regimes in countries where the revolution fails in a dilemma that may be more difficult than that faced by the opposition. One aspect of the problem is that its policies only confirm the mounting sectarianism in politics and society. Whereas previously the regime used this issue as a way to delegitimise anti-government demonstrations, now the main political forces are increasingly defining themselves and moulding their political behaviour in terms of their sectarian identity. This problem is connected with another aspect of the dilemma, which is that if the government were to try to make amends by offering moral or material compensation to those who had been harmed by its policies, this would not be sufficient to mend the sectarian rift. For one, the principle would probably be rejected by many affiliates of the other sect. In the case of Bahrain, this would be the Sunnis who were galvanised into political action to demand their share of power and who would strongly resent the government for its attempts to perpetuate its rule by granting what they would perceive as more rights to the Shia at the expense of their own interests. By no means does a failed revolution necessarily imply that an existing regime and its ruling elites will remain unchanged or be able to chart a return to stability. Indeed, it would be impossible to turn the clock back to the period before the unrest. Most likely, there would arise a kind of institutionalised instability, in which event the parties would not only be the government and opposition. There would also be a confrontation of a different sort between the opposition that actually mobilised and took part in the demonstrations and those that supported the regime and served to lend it legitimacy. One might also see tensions between ruling families and the political forces that the regime relied on if the regime offered the latter concessions at the expense of the former. Such tensions have unfolded in Bahrain since the breakup of the sit-in in Pearl Square and one can foresee a similar situation in Syria if Al-Assad succeeds in holding onto power. In sum, while countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Libya that have had successful or at least partially successful revolutions are experiencing some chaos and insecurity in their transitional phases, countries where revolutions are failing are not better off. Indeed, they may find it much more difficult to return to normality because of unresolved and aggravated tensions seething beneath the surface. * The writer is a researcher at the Al-Ahram Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.
