Gihan Shahine digs into the tough question of whether Egypt will ultimately convert to genuine democracy, limited freedom or retreat to autocracy Despite the huge sense of relief the majority of Egyptians felt after the first TV screening of the historic trial of former president Hosni Mubarak, many remain worried about the future of the country. The trial is, no doubt, proof of the rule of law and that no one is above it. But in the meantime, it does not actually solve many of the recent serious post-revolutionary problems affecting this critical transitional period. Cairo University professor Nabil Hassan is one of many holding a pessimistic view about the future of Egypt. "I'm depressed," Hassan snapped. "We are in a state of chaos and there seems to be no early end." Hassan is not the only one with such a gloomy outlook. One recent short tweet titled 'The campaign to divide Egypt has succeeded' may indicate a general public state of ire and disappointment. Whereas during the 25 January Revolution Egyptians were divided into black and white protesters versus the old regime and its supporters, the current poignant state of polarisation and divisions in the Egyptian political scene are much more complex and can lead to nothing but chaos. This divergence has depressed the tweeter to the extent that he/she professed that the country would end up in a kind of "civil war". Although this outlook is extreme and may be too gloomy to be true, there is little doubt that almost everybody seems worried about what Egypt is going through. Today we have protesters divided into secularists and leftists versus Islamists; Copts struggling to get part of the cake after so many years of oppression; and some political groups getting bogged down in conflict with the military council and the interim government over the slow pace of change, which, however, seems to have temporarily come to a halt after last week's trial of Mubarak and his sons. In the meantime, remnants of Mubarak's corrupt rule are trying to spread chaos everywhere and thugs are taking advantage of the absence of security. The Friday protests which took place on 29 July calling for the unity of all political powers in conflict further ended up with a deeper split in the political scene when Islamists made a strong showing, with an estimated three million protesters flocking to Tahrir Square and Alexandria chanting Islamic slogans. Close to 30 liberal and secular coalitions of protesters were angered by the slogans and decided to leave the squares. The squares, however, remained full, which was interpreted as evidence of the massive popularity of Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, that remains the most organised group in the political scene. Meanwhile, the silent majority of Egyptians, albeit supporting the revolution, are yearning for tangible change, stability and a normal life which includes returning home with bread for their children. But as much as Egyptians want "bread", they crave for a democratic government which allows them to have a say in forming their future and their lives. Whether that dream will ultimately turn into reality remains largely unknown. Strong public sentiments in Egypt and the rest of the Arab world in general, noted prominent political analyst Fahmy Howeidy, cannot become a reality except with the help of "free will, and the attainment of genuine democracy and a development project that targets everybody." Which, according to Howeidy, "will not be smooth sailing, especially in Egypt, where the path may prove too thorny." In fact, where Egypt is heading remains one of the most frequently asked questions stumping analysts across the board. One recent report by the Economist suggests three possible scenarios for the "Arab Spring". A limited democratic change, according to the report, is the most probable scenario (60 per cent), while possibilities that Arab states would turn back to autocratic rule, or move forward to embrace genuine democracy, remain equally slim (each ranked at 20 per cent). Howeidy speculates that the Economist outlook is perhaps a reflection of how the West wants the Arab world to look like in the coming future, insisting, however, that it remains in the hands of the nations concerned to change that reality rather than just accept it as their destiny or fate. The Arab world, explained Howeidy, is different from any other part of the world for it has a rare combination of Islam [a source of worry], oil [a major temptation] together with Israel lying at the heart of the Middle East, guarding Western interests and clamping down on Arab states. "That special nature of the region makes the Arab Spring a detriment to Western interests because genuine democracy and free will stand in the way of Western plans and strategies in the region," Howeidy wrote in an article published in al-jazeera.net. Those strategies, according to Howeidy, would only allow limited democracy in Arab states, a democracy which focuses solely on internal affairs, while keeping Western interests as a red line that cannot be crossed. "And that applies to Egypt more than any other country for being the centre of the Arab world," Howeidy suggested. Everybody seems to agree that challenges facing the Arab world are now larger than just the chaos that thugs and remnants of old regimes are trying to spread. "A state of polarisation, among protesters themselves on the one hand and between the military council and the government on the other, has become the main character of the Arab Spring," Howeidy added. Protesters are now divided into so many subgroups, each forming a coalition, and this lack of unity, Howeidy wrote, has made it almost impossible for the interim government to satisfy them. The picture has become too eclectic to be anything near promising. "Divisions split the different coalition of protesters, then old and new parties, between secularists and Islamists, between the old and new regimes and between those who want to avenge the past and those seeking to build the future," Howeidy said. Even more disturbing is the tendency among all those conflicting powers to accuse their opponents of either supporting a counter-revolution spearheaded by remnants of the old regime, or serving personal or Western interests and receiving funds from Western countries. "Such ongoing political feuds between political elites along with a lax, irresponsive military council and corrupt old regime beneficiaries hanging on to their interests are taking the Egyptian revolution off track," deplored Cairo-based journalist Tamim Elyan in an article published in the Daily News Egypt. Prominent political analyst and writer Salama Ahmed Salama concurred. "The absence of any strong leadership or a charismatic figure who believes in democracy and is respected by all political powers to lead this difficult transitional period is further compounding the problem." Egypt is not the only Arab country suffering such schisms. A similar state of polarity among parties is plaguing the Arab Spring. Tunisia is witnessing perhaps more serious divisions between Islamists and secularists while in Libya supporters of the current corrupt regime are waging a fierce war against the opposition, endangering the unity of the country. Yemen may be dragged into a civil war while massacres of protesters are ongoing in Syria at a time when the opposition is bogged down in conflict. In Bahrain, the Sunna vis-à-vis Shia conflict is causing tension; Sudan has been divided into two countries; the unity of Iraq is in danger; while in Palestine, Israelis have seized the opportunity that Arabs are busy with their internal conflicts and are tightening their grip on Gaza, according to Howeidy. Egypt, however, plays a central role in the Arab Spring, and there is near consensus among analysts that the success or failure of Egypt's transition to democracy will decide whether the whole region will move ahead towards genuine reform or encourage anti-democratic opposition and retreat to autocratic rule. The main problem now is that the political elite in Egypt is bogged down in an escalating conflict over the identity of the coming government, whether it will be secular or Islamic, rather than focussing efforts on how to achieve a genuine democratic system. That schism started in the recent referendum on constitutional amendments when only 22.8 per cent of the population embraced secular and liberal activists' support for a "no" vote, all despite the powerful media campaign they launched, while an overwhelming 77.2 per cent majority approved the amendments. Although many of those who voted yes were seeking stability, the result of the referendum was largely interpreted in a religious context on the grounds that the Brotherhood and Salafis had also been mobilising for a yes vote vis-à-vis other political powers. A state of anxiety among liberal and secular political powers then prevailed, sometimes pushing some of those powers into undemocratic practices such as calling for a "constitution first campaign" that would simply go against the result of the referendum, and thus the wish of the majority. Secularists, worried that Islamists would make a strong showing in the coming parliament, are seeking guarantees for a constitution that will not lead the country to Islamic rule while Islamists want speedy elections and an Egyptian state recognising Sharia and the Quran. Albeit worried about the current political scene Egypt is witnessing, Salama, who is also the chief- editor of the daily independent daily Al-Shorouk, insists this is a normal outcome of any revolution. "We cannot determine whether the revolution will prove a success or a failure before four or five years have passed," Salama told Al-Ahram Weekly. "Democracy cannot be easily reached in two or three years as some people think just by having a stable government. ." That said, Salama does not expect Egypt to fully convert to genuine democracy. But, unlike Howeidy, Salama does not dwell much on the external challenges impeding democratisation. For Salama, the real challenge remains in the fact that people are not used to democratic practices after 30 years of repression. "Even in countries in Eastern Europe that enjoy far better standards of living and education and have the support of the European Union, the transition to democratic systems remains largely unstable," Salama said. "In Egypt, where the standard of living, education and income are far worse, we cannot expect to fare better." Many observers predict that the current lag in economy will impede the radical political changes aimed at in the region. In Egypt, some pessimists go as far as to expect that a second revolution, this time protesting against the economy and hunger, is perhaps round the corner. Mohamed Fadel, associate professor of law at the University of Toronto, insists that the political elite are miscalculating by focussing on debates which do not address the teething problems of the vast majority of Egyptians to find food, shelter, and a better standard of education and health services. For Fadel, any current debate of the character of the state may thus seem besides the point at the moment since "no system of law, whether Islamic or liberal [or pick your other 'ideal'], can function if it is effectively undermined by a bureaucracy which is demoralised by low pay, for example." "The only way to move the revolution forward, and avoid the risk of a return to de facto or perhaps de jure military rule, is progress on a new social contract that makes credible commitments to improving, in the short term, the living conditions of the mass of the Egyptian people, and in the long term, their productive capacity," Fadel wrote in "Why Egyptian progressives should be chanting 'economy first'" published in foreignpolicy.com. Only when urgent economic needs are satisfied, Fadel argued, can the political elite discuss the more philosophical and thorny issues pertaining to the relation of religion to the state. Oliver Walton, a research fellow in the International Development Department's Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, similarly insists that "new governments in Egypt and Tunisia will need to pursue a delicate balance between tackling vested interests and corruption on the one hand, and the need to avoid capital flight and to ensure some degree of political stability on the other." Walton also advised that new programmes be designed that can efficiently reach targeted groups. But in the absence of any strong leadership or elected government, chaos remains the only alternative. Many agree with Salama that there is an urgent need for getting on with free and fair elections. "An elected government will then be responsible for achieving the main targets of the revolution," Salama told the Weekly. "This will put an end to sit-ins and the current farce of having the country run by sporadic demands from Tahrir and having more than 100 coalition groups competing to hijack the revolution, sometimes even running into stupid confrontations with the military council, as was the case when they marched to the Ministry of Defence a few weeks ago." Political science professor at the American University in Cairo Mustafa Kamel El-Sayed is one of Egypt's leftist political elite who insists that the future of Egypt will greatly depend on how the upcoming elections will be run. El-Sayed speculates one of two scenarios. If the elections take place on the basis of the electoral law adopted by the military council, El-Sayed expects that it is likely that Islamists would emerge as the largest group in the two assemblies [the People's Assembly and Shura Council], particularly in the People's Assembly, together with individual candidates who rely on their wealth and family connections and who were part of the former National Democratic Party (NDP). "In this case, these two groups will form the government which is not likely to introduce major changes in domestic and foreign policies -- except to show more support for the Palestinians -- and perhaps restrain freedom of expression on matters that seem to be affecting religion," El-Sayed said. The second scenario, according to El-Sayed, is that "elections take place on the basis of the new electoral system which allows only party-list candidates." In this case, El-Sayed went on, "the government would be made up of members of the parties who could get among themselves a two-thirds majority in the assembly." Islamists, according to El-Sayed, will still be the largest group in the assembly, but will have to enter in coalition with other parties who may not share their views on Islamic Sharia. "This will not be a stable coalition and will not continue for long," El-Sayed said. In both cases, El-Sayed went on, the elected parliament will choose the constituent assembly which will draft the constitution, and unless Islamists get the absolute majority in the two houses of parliament, the new constitution will not completely reflect their aspirations to be an Islamic constitution and it will be different from the constitution of 1971 in important areas such as strengthening the role of parliament and limiting the powers of the president. But much will also depend, according to El-Sayed, on the personality of the coming president. El-Sayed guesses that the new president will, most probably, "be a consensus figure in the sense that he will not belong to any major political party, especially that formed by the Brotherhood." That figure, El-Sayed went on, "will play a key role in reaching compromises and reconciliation among the various groups in parliament and will seek to avoid the excesses of the group that may have the largest number of seats in the parliament and cabinet." But unless the coming president succeeds in conducting smooth relations with the parliament and cabinet, El-Sayed speculates that "the next few years will be marked by a high degree of political instability that could lead to either new elections of the parliament or the president depending on the relative power of each." Walton also expects that "Islamist movements formed under authoritarian regimes will face internal challenges, and tension may emerge from younger activists, some of whom may support greater pluralism and openness." "Although social media savvy youth played an important role in driving the protests in most countries, their role is likely to diminish as political transitions play out in the region," according to Walton. "Youth movements generally lack the organisation, leadership and policy platforms to continue to press their agenda." But if such Islamist-secular feuds over the ticklish issue of the relationship between state and religion persist, giving less attention to the core economic and social demands of the majority of Egyptians, Fadel warns that Egypt's political elite "would be placing the cart before the horse and substantially increasing the risk of creating a constitutional military dictatorship." Many, anyway, agree that it remains unlikely that Egyptians and Arabs in general will fully convert to genuine democracy in the near future, but there is no denying that the ultimate hope remains in the fact that Egyptians, and Arabs in general, have changed irrevocably. They have broken the barrier of fear, they are no longer stagnant and it is clear they want to have a say in forming their future. "Whether it takes a year or decades, it is plain that Arabs, like people everywhere, want a say in choosing who should run their lives," the Economist wrote, adding that such a change would have been considered a miracle only six months ago. And Egyptians already proved they can make it. For the optimist Howeidy, it is always possible that the same people who managed to topple Egypt's tyrant will employ the same resilience and willpower to face the tyrants of the world and prove the independence of their will. Concludes Howeidy: "Only then will the Arab Spring materialise."
