Corruption is not only morally contemptible, but economically and politically disastrous. Antonio Vigilante* sizoutlines what it is and what to do about it Corruption is not only a moral evil. The total effect of corruption is reduced economic efficiency and distorted resource distribution. By introducing personal gain and interest criteria in decision making, corruption leads to lower cost effectiveness of public expenditures -- for instance when procurement processes or awards are altered in favor of a particular person or firm in exchange for personal economic benefits -- or may produce public losses, such as fraudulent credit operations or tax evasion. Corruption reduces transparency of market operations and increases transaction costs, thereby decreasing investor confidence and investment inclinations. The psychological effects of corruption are equally detrimental. It decreases the confidence of citizens in public policies and frequently prompts generic feelings of cynicism and scepticism, while also discouraging individual motivation and work ethics. In other words, corruption may alienate citizens from public management and destroy social capital, which rests normally on values of trust and transparency in the relations between citizens and groups and citizens and the state. Finally, a climate of opportunistic corruption creates uncertainties about the outcome of individual initiatives, increases vulnerability to abuse and facilitates criminal associations, such as when the judiciary or the police are significantly affected. The result is lower human security for all citizens. Indeed, corruption can also be presented as a violation of human rights. It perpetuates discrimination for those who lack access to the "right people", or who cannot afford the economic overhead that corruption always implies. A bribe to a public servant achieves unjustified preferential treatment for the bribe giver, and alters the priority of administrative or judicial actions, or attributes rights and permits when they should not be attributed. The unwillingness to bribe may delay or make ineffective the enjoyment of a legal or economic right. By distorting the optimal and most efficient allocation of public resources, it prevents or delays the full realisation of economic, social and cultural rights. A corrupted tax collector may nullify the progressive principle of taxation, which should achieve a more equitable national distribution of wealth and services and public goods. Corruption may also affect political and civil rights. It is sufficient to think of the direct or indirect bribing of a number of voters. It is widely thought that all countries suffer from corruption, but the extent and level of corruption practices are variable. It is also thought that democracies tend to decrease corruption practices through transparent accountability, checks and balances in public management and an alert media. But it is evident that democracy alone cannot stem corruption. Several huge corruption scandals continue to affect democracies around the world. However, one could say that in democracy the "culture of corruption" may be fought and contained more easily, that petty corruption tends to be less frequent, and that enforcement and judicial means to fight corruption are more effective. Similar observations have been made with respect to the level of economic development of a given country. It is thought that the higher the economic development and the lower the poverty incidence, the lower will be the diffusion of corruption in society. According to many, predominant historic and cultural factors may also determine different average levels of integrity or greed. In some societies, corruption has come to be considered as almost normal, in any case inevitable. One of the most convincing analyses of the phenomena of corruption has been provided by Robert Klitgaard, who in several works ( Controlling corruption; Tropical gangsters; Corrupt cities, etc) has analysed corruption from an angle that can be defined as the micro-economy of corruption. He has introduced several intriguing definitions and measures, such as "the optimal grade of corruption", the "social marginal cost of reducing corruption", the "economic utility function of corruption", and more. Critical for understanding the micro- economy of corruption, but also its macro treatment, is his equation formula of corruption: C= M+D-A, where C is corruption, M is monopoly (or the extent of control over the "client"), D is discretionality (the degree of absolute, arbitrary power in decision- making) and A is accountability (the degree of responsibility by the decision-maker). If we focus on corruption from this angle, which concentrates especially on the solicitor , who is frequently a public servant or institution, and excludes other elements characterising the "client", it becomes clear that the fight against corruption must start in reducing its economic and social utility. First, the degree of moral satisfaction of not being corrupt must be enhanced. Second, the quantity of economic reward borne of corruption must be undermined. Third, the probability of being discovered must be heightened. Fourth, the probability of being sanctioned, if discovered, as well as assurances of appropriate levels, in terms of quantity and quality, of sanction, should be improved. Finally, increasing the difficulties involved in, as well as the effort necessary to, corruption operations would reduce the number of favorable opportunities for corruption. Klitgaard's formula gives us very good hints of which variables need to be included when preparing an anti-corruption plan. According to the Arab Human Development Report 2005, in five MENA (Middle- East and North Africa) countries surveyed, 90 per cent of people believe that combating corruption is one of the most important components of the concept of freedom; as important as choosing authorities through free and fair elections. They also believe that freedom from corruption is the least enjoyed component of freedom in their countries, and the one that has been deteriorating the most. In Egypt, it is commonly recognised that significant levels of corruption persist, despite efforts to limit such phenomena. Like in many other countries, if the fight against corruption is to be intensified it would be necessary to start with a vulnerability analysis , which should be commissioned to an autonomous group of individuals nominated on grounds of their integrity and reputation and drawn from the public service, civil society and private sectors. This commission, with the elements influencing corruption in mind, should systematically review the status of affairs in the country, devise measures to undermine the value of corruption, and, most importantly, make their conclusions public. In other words, this body would identify measures to ensure that the monopoly on decisions enjoyed by some institutions or individuals is broken, entailing the participation of more individuals and institutions in those decisional processes more prone to corrupt practices (tax, customs, procurement, law enforcement, etc), the establishment of appropriate checks and balances and reforms increasing transparency, such as publicity of proceedings and of decision making motivations, automation of operations, introduction of the principle of tacit consent (by which a request is approved or an action allowed if the authority has not expressed a decision or acted within a certain timeframe). The same independent commission should identify how to reduce discretional decision-making by individuals; in other words how to strengthen the rule of law and establish clear norms and procedures that leave little space to arbitrary interpretation and codify allowed exceptions to the rules. The commission could also recommend how to increase the level of individual or institutional political accountability. This is the element more closely linked to the prevalence of democratic practices and of political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation. Clearly if decisions and power are vested more at a local level this will make easier and more effective the control of citizens over local authorities and the political accountability of decision makers. The vulnerability assessment should be followed by relevant normative and administrative reforms and simplification -- as bureaucracy creates opportunities for corruption at every corner -- and by the design of a system that uses intelligently integrity incentives and corruption disincentives. Full-scale gradual civil service reform may be necessary, in order to reduce the size of the bloated public bureaucracy and allow a new career system based on transparent recruitment and career progression, on fewer but much better trained, motivated and paid civil servants. Further strengthened freedom and independence of the media must also accompany the implementation of an anti- corruption plan. The implementation of such a plan, based on the vulnerability assessment, has to be monitored by public authorities as well as by civil society, and it may require the appointment of an "anti-corruption czar"; a respected and dynamic personality to become the integrity champion and to be endowed with significant authority for combating corruption in all its forms. But it is also clear that the technical approach to fighting corruption will be successful only if civil society takes up a different role, as international experience suggests. In the case of some countries, it has been the judicial power that has started and championed a vigorous campaign against corruption. In some other cases it has been a deliberate government effort. In still others, an anti-corruption movement has originated in municipal authorities. But endemic and deeply rooted corruption can only be successfully confronted with the support of societal mobilisation. By forming coalitions, civil society organisations can stimulate the necessary awareness, publicity and monitoring of those areas most subject to corruption, exposing corrupt practices. In other words, civil society is essential to foster a culture of accountability and transparency and can make sure that the threshold of societal tolerance for corruption practices is raised, while resigned and fatalistic attitudes no longer predominate in the community. If corruption is to be faced resolutely, the citizen and the state have both a role to play. * The author is a UN Resident Coordinator. The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the position of the United Nations or of any of its bodies and agencies.
