The negotiations between Fatah and Hamas regularly hosted by Cairo for the past four years have been stalled for 12 months now. Reconciliation between the rival Palestinian factions is no closer despite the optimism that followed the Egyptian revolution and other events of the Arab Spring. Hamas's hopes were raised yet further following the arrival of Mohamed Morsi to power last June. Morsi hails from the Muslim Brotherhood, the mother organisation of Hamas. A month after his inauguration Morsi received Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. A day later he met with Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal, signalling that the presidency intended to keep an equal distance from both sides. The president's office had clearly heeded the advice of Egyptian security agencies which have all along stressed that for Egypt to remain a key player in the Palestinian cause it must retain its image as an impartial mediator. Hamas and Fatah delegations arrived in Cairo for the latest round of talks three days ahead of the first meeting that took place on Tuesday 14 May at the General Intelligence Service (GIS) headquarters. According to sources from both sides, unofficial “friendly” communications had taken place between the delegations in the luxury hotel in Medinat Nasr where both sides are staying. Yet even as such exchanges were taking place accusations hurled back and forth between Gaza and the West Bank where Hamas and Fatah were engaged in tit-for-tat arrests of members of the opposing factions Such a charged climate, says Ibrahim Al-Darawi of the Centre for Palestinian Studies, “does not permit any new glimmers of hope”. Al-Darawi, who has been following the negotiating process closely,toldAl-Ahram Weekly that “the meetings produced nothing new because neither Fatah nor Hamas has a clear vision of how to settle outstanding issues.” “There is no timeframe for resolving pending reconciliation issues, the question of the Palestine Liberation Organisation [PLO] foremost among them. There was an understanding that legislative, presidential and National Assembly elections be held simultaneously but this began to unravel when it appeared that any elections would bring in members of the Palestinian resistance, particularly from the Hamas and Islamic Jihad factions, and oust all Fatah leaders and their allies in the PLO. Fatah cannot accept this.” Salam Fayyad's resignation as prime minister of the PA government in the West Bank might have held out the promise of some progress. Yet though Hamas has long regarded Fayyad as a major obstacle to reconciliation it did not take see his departure as a positive sign. President Abbas now has to form a new government, the composition of which was expected to reflect a national consensus and serve as a gesture of good will. Yet in the opinion of former PA minister Hassan Asfour, who arrived in Cairo at the same time as the Palestinian delegations, “the next government will not be formed on the principle of national consensus because the political will of the two sides falls far short of such an aim.” According to Asfour, progress remains less contingent on the positions of the two sides than on Cairo's own “resolve” with respect to new developments. Yet Cairo, maintains Asfour, has not declared a clear position on anything, fully realising that should it do so it would find itself at loggerheads with Doha, which hosted the reconciliation conference that produced the Doha Declaration in 2011, and with Washington. Some in Hamas, such as Mahmoud Al-Zahar, favour the idea of reaching an agreement over an “Egyptian roadmap” as the surest avenue to reconciliation. Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh prefers what Asfour refers to as the Qatari groundwork. Abbas, meanwhile, fears that reconciliation with Hamas will undermine attempts to return to the negotiating table with Israel. But does a feasible “Egyptian roadmap” even exist? No, says Mohamed Seif Al-Dawla, former Arab affairs advisor to the president. Seif Al-Dawla points out that the Palestinian reconciliation portfolio remains in the hands of the GIS. An informed Muslim Brotherhood source told the Weekly the portfolio “should have been handed in its entirety to the president so that he could lay out a roadmap and bring to bear a new vision”. “The GIS, which has been handling the dialogue between the Palestinian factions,” says Seif Al-Dawla, “approaches everything from the perspective of the Camp David Accords and relations with Cairo. The president, on the other hand, approaches the issues as two conflicting personalities, one inclined towards Hamas due to organic ideological connections, the other the incumbent of the presidential palace who must keep the Americans reassured.” The former presidential advisor said that he and Morsi had discussed this problem on numerous occasions and that their discussions generally ended in favour of the Americans. Seif Al-Dawla rules out the possibility that either Fatah or Hamas could win the other side to its own position. Hamas is as adamant about the boundaries of an independent Palestinian state as Fatah is on the need to negotiate with Israel. “It is very unlikely that the breakthrough Cairo seeks could involve Abbas renouncing the Oslo accord. It is equally unlikely that Hamas will compromise on its claim to legitimacy as a resistance faction.” One possible scenario is for the factions to agree a formula for the simultaneous handling of elections, restructuring of the PLO and the reunification of West Bank and Gaza security agencies. Cairo has tried to push such a scenario before, but its efforts invariably ran aground on the unyielding positions of both sides and Fatah's fears of Hamas making electoral gains. Asfour also believes that such efforts are hampered by vested interests that benefit from the conflict between the Palestinian factions. Many observers fear that the current impasse will result in the rival factions becoming even more entrenched in their positions: the government in Gaza will be more determined than ever to preserve control of its Palestinian Islamist “emirate” while the government in Ramallah increasingly fears the mounting influence of jihadist factions in Gaza, some of which have relations with Iran and others which are affiliated with Al-Qaeda. And what of the Egyptian army's decision to escalate the destruction of the tunnels beneath the border between Sinai and Gaza, long one of the Hamas government's chief policy concerns and an important lifeline? Minister of Defence General Abdel-Fattah Al-Sisi confirmed the decision last week, describing the destruction of the tunnels as a “national security matter of the highest order”. Plans to create a free trade zone in Rafah have collapsed. The army is now determined to create a 500 metre-wide buffer zone along the border with Gaza. This may cause Hamas to recalculate its position with regard to perpetuating the status quo, forcing it to enter into serious talks that could lead to an agreement that satisfies the PA and Israel and allows the reopening of the Gaza crossings. An Egyptian government source has expressed concern over growing EU interest in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. That interest, he says, has heightened alarm in Egypt over possible plans to push for a “regional solution” that seeks to incorporate the West Bank into Jordan and to expand the borders of Gaza into Egypt within the framework of a land-swap deal. Although the Muslim Brotherhood is not opposed to the idea, according to the government source, the Egyptian army is against it. The source added that the Muslim Brotherhood's failure to appreciate the importance of the boundaries of the Egyptian state is what led the army to commemorate Sinai Liberation Day in the Halayeb triangle. The point was to deliver an unequivocal message that the army will never allow Egyptian land to be handed to Sudan under Muslim Brotherhood rule, just as it will never allow the sacrifice of an inch of Sinai.
