The conundrum at the heart of Egypt's Islamist movement is what to do with the theory of democratic values, writes Khalil El-Anani* The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is no exception to the rule when it comes to the relationship between Islamists and democracy. It is an awkward and ambivalent relationship, judging by both the literary heritage and contemporary outpourings of Islamist political thought. The main difference between the "mother" organisation in Egypt and its offshoots in some 70 Muslim countries, including those that still adhere to the Brotherhood's school of political centrism and moderation, is that the Egyptian Brotherhood is still at the very beginning of the road in handling issues related to democracy. The others, meanwhile, have shot miles ahead to reach relatively progressive solutions for the problems of democratisation. Some will be quick to take exception to this statement and counter that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is preoccupied with the difficulties and complexities of the situation it is currently experiencing in Egypt and that it is incapable of devoting sufficient creative resources to the question of democracy. The argument, however, is inherently flawed. Certainly, the Brotherhood, which boasts strong roots in Egyptian society, cannot present itself as an alternative to the status quo if it remains intellectually and emotionally incalcitrant in light of the onrush of new and constantly changing issues and realities. Rather than exonerating the Brotherhood, the argument inadvertently conveys its rigidity and closed-mindedness. In fact, it would seem more appropriate for an organisation that was the object of political persecution and official contempt to work even harder to prove its right to occupy a prominent place in the political arena on the basis of a progressive vision of the relationship between religion and the state. Such a vision, moreover, would have elevated it to a model to be emulated by other groups revolving in the Islamist orbit, as opposed to the intellectually laggard entity we see at present. In all events, political repression did not keep the Muslim Brothers in Syria, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan or the Tunisian Revivalist Movement from exercising no end of ingenuity and innovation in coming to terms with the problematic of religion and state. And their trials and tribulations were no less severe than those encountered by the Egyptian Brotherhood. In fact, if there was a time when political persecution could legitimately be said to have inhibited the Egyptian Brotherhood's ability to evolve, it was under the former president, Gamal Abdel-Nasser. At that time, the organisation had truly come to the brink of extinction as the result of the government's security clampdown and the arrest of a large segment of its rank and file. But this has been far from the case over the past three decades, during which Muslim Brotherhood members have engaged, with relative freedom, in various levels of political life. This is not to say that the Muslim Brotherhood has not shed many of the blemishes of its past. It is no longer averse to political party plurality, as was the movement's founder, Hassan El-Banna, for some not inconsiderable reasons pertaining to the monarchical order that then prevailed. It has also renounced violence and its opposition to participating in the political process. Nor can one deny the remarkable progress in its political rhetoric over recent years. However, it is still not possible to maintain that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has developed a "political" platform (as opposed to a religious agenda) that espouses democratic principles and reforms, which leads many to doubt the sincerity of the group's faith in democratic values. The fact is it is not so much that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood came around to democracy as democracy forced itself on them. For various reasons, the external climate was highly instrumental in driving them to acclimatise to international trends and, specifically, the trend towards democratisation. Yet, until now, the Brotherhood's literature conspicuously lacks a clear concept of democracy. Instead, considerable emphasis is given to the notion of shura, or consultation, a concept that is fraught with theoretical and practical difficulties. But whereas many other Islamist movements transcended this conundrum long ago, the Muslim Brothers in Egypt seem to have thrown up their hands at the philosophical challenge and, instead, opted for a pragmatic approach. Now they regard democracy in terms of the "services" it offers to advance their political position and leverage and to further the realisation of their political aims. The crux of the Egyptian Brotherhood's problem with democracy is that it was an exogenous demand; it did not arise from within as a perceived need or attitude that had to be taken seriously and inculcated in the minds of its membership. If only its stance on democracy had the clarity and resolve of its commitment to renounce violence as a means of achieving its political objectives. When its internal structures and modes of interaction remain at such a far remove from any notion of democracy, it is little wonder that it should come under fire for, at best, its ambivalence towards democracy as a means for promoting change and the importance of the rotation of power. It is important not to confuse democracy as an ideal and its concomitant ideal of full equality and freedom of all citizens to participate in decision-making processes with such manifestations as political parties and elections. But all too frequently, Egyptian Brotherhood leaders assume that their participation in the means is sufficient to prove their commitment to democratic values -- that a political platform emanating from intrinsically cherished democratic principles is superfluous. Sadly, others appear to reason the same, taking Brotherhood member participation in public and syndicate elections as evidence of the Egyptian Brotherhood's dedication to democracy as a humanitarian value that might demand certain political and ideological sacrifices. But one should ask how a group that is earnestly seeking to restructure society on sound religious foundations is so conspicuously dragging its feet on declaring an unequivocal position on democracy. Although some Egyptian Brotherhood leaders have made great strides forward in clarifying their own stances on democracy-related issues, it is impossible to generalise the conclusion that the Brotherhood has transformed itself into a truly democratic body. Here is another problem with the Brotherhood. Whereas some of its leaders who won seats in the People's Assembly in the last legislative elections comport themselves in the manner of true and seasoned parliamentarians, other Brotherhood leaders remain ensconced in their ancient enclaves and show not the slightest inclination to emerge. It is only fair to add that the Egyptian Brotherhood is not alone in this. The political and cultural climate in Egypt over the past three decades has cast a shadow over all political forces in the country, hampering the growth of democratic ideas and practices within the organisational structures of these forces. The majority of political parties are still desperately lacking in terms of democracy in practice. Moreover, one of the foremost challenges to democratisation in Egypt is the fact that the very "seed" has yet to germinate in the structures of a despotic system of government that has fed on autocratic rule for more than half a century. While this may exonerate the Egyptian Brotherhood to a certain extent, the fact remains that beneath the surface it is a religious organisation that differs little in its frame of reference and outlook from a host of other religious movements that have arisen over time. In effect, the group subscribes to the principle of socio-religious engineering, towards which end it organises itself into a certain structure in accordance with a system of beliefs and directs its energies towards the realisation of its religious tenets through the transformation of society and the form of rule. This principle forms a continuous thread throughout the Brotherhood's handling of religious, ideological and political issues. Variously, the Brotherhood's religious, ideological and political rhetoric has been described as obscure, conflicting and ambivalent. Some regard such ambiguity as one of the Brotherhood's long-established deliberate ploys, which is why they give little credence to recent missives from the Brotherhood. Their suspicions are not groundless, for the Brotherhood has yet to make the qualitative shift from a mere religious protest movement to a progressive forward-looking political movement. It is far too convenient for the Brotherhood to attribute this to the trials and tribulations it has experienced since it was banned in 1954, especially when one of the fruits of such a moral and psychological test should have been an enhanced ability to develop its political rhetoric and restructure itself as a properly democratic opposition movement that derives its appeal from values and practices that contrast distinctly from those of the existing regime. I would suggest that three obstacles stand in the way of the Brotherhood's ability to transform itself into such a movement. The first is its rigid adherence to its theological heritage: the present-day religious rhetoric of the Brotherhood is almost indistinguishable from that of its founder three quarters of a century ago. Presented by El-Banna in a letter to the fifth Brotherhood conference in 1938, it centres on the principle that Islam presents a fully complete and comprehensive system and the ultimate order for all aspects of human life. It is founded upon two primary sources -- the Quran and the Sunna -- and applicable to all times and places. As El-Banna famously put it, Islam is "a religion and a world." Perhaps because of this rigidity, the Brotherhood has failed to tap the excellent jurisprudential contributions of even those of its own members who have risen to head Al-Azhar, such as Sheikh Mohamed El-Ghazali and Youssef El-Qardawi, let alone the theses of Muslim Brotherhood affiliates elsewhere in the Arab world, epitomised in the works of Hassan Al-Turabi, Rashed Al-Ghanoushi and Abdallah Al-Nafisi. Had the Brotherhood drawn on such sources, it may not have found itself in such an awkward position when fielding questions on such issues as women's rights, the status of Copts, and other areas connected to the principles of equality, freedom of belief and individual liberties. A second, related obstacle stems from what Gamal El-Banna referred to as "a paucity in theorising," by which he meant the virtual standstill in doctrinal development within the Brotherhood. Since the death of Hassan El-Banna, none of the Brotherhood's supreme guides attempted to develop and refine El-Banna's original tenets and develop them into a fully- fledged philosophy. The sole innovative addition to Muslim Brotherhood thought is Hassan El-Hodeibi's Proselytisers, not Judges, which treats the question of labelling others, or society, as heretical. Perhaps one of the significant results of the absence of a philosophical corpus is that it facilitated the emergence of Islamist theories that departed radically from the general Muslim Brotherhood approach, as was the case with Sayed Qotb's Signposts on the Road and Mohamed Abdel-Salam Farag's The Missing Duty. The third obstacle stems the Brotherhood hallmark of ambiguity. As much as the catchwords of the Brotherhood have changed over the past two decades, the movement is still very reluctant to declare its position on anything. Until now, the organisation has not set out a political party platform, though it is highly doubtful that this would differ significantly from its reform initiative of March 2004 or from the electoral campaign themes of Brotherhood candidates in the legislative elections of 2005. To some of the upper echelons of the organisation, a political party is not so much a democratic mechanism but a way to force its hand on those very issues that have long impeded its evolution of a democratic outlook, such as women, Copts, and freedoms of belief and expression. These it will handle piecemeal through "deals" with other parties -- at least that is the impression one gets from responses of Brotherhood leaders to the question of whether it is going to establish a democratic political platform. In short, if the Brotherhood wants to remain an authentic part of the Egyptian political process, it must restructure itself on the basis of a more modern outlook and cross the time gap from its ancient essence to contemporary democracy. * The writer is a political analyst with Al-Siyasa Al-Dawliya magazine published by Al-Ahram.
