Ultimately, it could as well be Israeli intransigence that brings Fatah and Hamas together, writes Saleh Al-Naami Despite the sharpening pitch of statements made by Fatah and Hamas, Palestinian and Arab efforts to push the two sides towards dialogue are continuing. Mediators appear optimistic about their efforts given that the conflicting parties know they are in the midst of a major crisis and that maintaining their rift could seriously damage both of them and the Palestinian national cause. Thus a number of committees have recently become active in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with the goal of convincing the two sides to sit down and dialogue. One of these committees formed in Gaza calls itself the Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee and is composed of political leaders and independent national figures as well as the directors of numerous civil society organisations. It seeks to develop formulas that could serve as a basis for resolving differences between Fatah and Hamas. The diversity of the committee's members and their intellectual orientations reflects the hard- won consensus by which the committee functions. It includes the mufti of Gaza, Sheikh Abdul-Karim Al-Kahlut, the head of the Orthodox Church in Gaza, Father Manuel Musallam, the heads of all human rights organisations, and the heads of universities and even some writers for the Palestinian press. Noteworthy is that one of the most prominent active figures in this committee is Ghazi Hamad, coordinator for relations with the Palestinian factions in the cabinet of dismissed premier Ismail Haniyeh. Hamad told Al-Ahram Weekly that committee members recommended to Haniyeh and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas that a national unity government be formed that would gain international acceptance and be able to lift the siege on Gaza. The committee also recommended that a national council, including representatives from the Palestinian Legislative Council, and other national figures formulate solutions to the points of difference between Fatah and Hamas, including reforming the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and restructuring security agencies on new, professional, national bases. Hamad says that Hamas has informed the committee that it accepts the formation of a national unity government and is prepared to concede its premiership. Hamad underlines that the leaders of Hamas know that they cannot lift the siege on Gaza as long as the movement continues to head the Palestinian government. Hamad also says that committee members are convinced that the problem lies in the two sides' unwillingness to sit down together, and that to get out of the current "bottleneck" general Palestinian efforts must increase to limit existing differences until leaders are able to do so. Hamad also says that there is a dire need to overcome Abbas's refusal of bilateral dialogue with Hamas and his insistence on a "comprehensive" dialogue. Hamad points out that committee members are convinced that commencing a dialogue with the participation of all factions would lead to its failure, for the primary points of difference are between Hamas and Fatah only. Hamad further notes that committee members are trying to convince Hamas to accept Abbas's invitation to dialogue and to convince Abbas to reassure Hamas that the dialogue will not merely address ways of implementing the Yemeni initiative, but rather will go beyond it to other issues and take into consideration Hamas's reservations over this initiative. He further stresses that committee members will try to convince Abbas to "forget" the letter that Hamas politburo head Khaled Meshaal allegedly sent to several heads of Arab states and that is reported to have said that Abbas's call for dialogue is merely cover for Israel waging a full-scale attack on the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, member factions of the PLO are continuing communication with each other to produce a draft agenda for national dialogue. Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the People's Party are all participating in this endeavour. Democratic Front politburo member Saleh Zidan says that this document will include all the primary issues, including measures aiming to create an appropriate atmosphere for dialogue, such as halting the media war, freeing political detainees in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, agreeing to halt violence and the resort to arms to solve domestic issues and replacing these means with dialogue and the application of law. "We will discuss the means of forming a transitional government whose primary goal would be to unify institutions in the West Bank and Gaza and prepare the people for concurrent presidential and legislative elections on the basis of proportional representation," Zidan said. He added that the document will take into consideration the necessity of forming a mutually agreed upon committee to restructure Palestinian security agencies on a national basis. According to such a vision, entities would be formed to maintain security in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and would possess limited authorities to that end. Zidan also stressed that the document will include a vision for reconstructing the PLO through National Council elections held on the basis of proportional representation and making the body formed in Cairo to activate the PLO functional. These Palestinian efforts are shadowed by increasing evidence that Syria desires a role in efforts to bring the views of Fatah and Hamas closer to each other so as to be able to hold a national dialogue. An informed Palestinian source told the Weekly that Damascus would host delegations from Fatah and Hamas in the near future to discuss holding a national dialogue in Cairo. This source pointed out that Damascus, which Cairo has briefed on the complicated problems between the two movements, is interested in convincing both to agree to a list of issues that Palestinian national dialogue can address so as to avoid ultimate failure. This source further added that it has been agreed that Abbas will send a delegation of Fatah leaders, headed by former Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei, and that Hamas will likewise send a delegation representing domestic and Diaspora-based leaders to communicate with the Syrians. This source further clarified that Hamas representatives have informed the Syrian government of its vision for solving the domestic rift. This vision includes securing unity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; unifying the Palestinian political system; applying the national accord document, the Cairo agreement, and the Mecca agreement; and rebuilding the PLO on new bases that guarantee representation that reflects Palestinian political power balances both domestically and in the Diaspora. Hamas's vision also stresses the necessity of restructuring Palestinian security agencies on national and professional bases that do away with their factional orientation. This source expects that Qurei will convey Hamas's vision to Damascus, and says that Hamas has clarified to the Syrians that dialogue cannot commence if either side predetermines its outcome, underlining that it is best to begin dialogue without imposing prior conditions. Palestinian and Arab efforts towards Palestinian reconciliation dialogue have not made a strong impression on Walid Al-Mudalil, professor of political science at the Islamic University in Gaza. He is pessimistic about the likelihood of such efforts succeeding and points to the great distance separating the positions of Hamas and Fatah, despite all efforts exerted. "The two sides' confirmation of their commitment to dialogue is a mere statement that doesn't reflect sincere intentions," he told the Weekly. "It's a response to pressures placed by the public and the Palestinian elite upon each movement's leadership that prevent either from announcing its rejection of dialogue for fear of clashing with the will of the Palestinian public." Al-Mudalil views the obstacles preventing agreement as being the two movements' commitment to incompatible programmes, the inheritance of a long-established and bloody conflict between them, and the presence of US and Israeli pressure on Abbas to eschew dialogue with Hamas. Al-Mudalil points to the refusal of the Fatah delegation that visited Gaza recently to meet with representatives of Hamas and the dismissed government as evidence of insincerity relative to calls for dialogue. Another example is Abbas's insistence on not meeting with Meshaal, not to mention his security agencies' ongoing campaign against Hamas activists. Further, Al-Mudalil criticises Abbas's insistence on meeting Hamas only under conditions for dialogue set by the International Quartet, which include recognising Israel, committing to agreements it signed with the Palestinian Authority, and halting resistance on the basis of it being "terrorism". Al-Mudalil also points out the negative role of regional powers, suggesting that some see the success of national dialogue as strengthening Hamas's position and granting it additional legitimacy. Such powers fear this kind of development as constituting indirect support for the position of Islamic movements in the region. Yet despite the pessimistic outlook of Al-Mudalil, the factors he identifies as obstacles are also liable to change. For although all indications show that Israel won't grant Abbas any political achievements through negotiations, that reality will lead to narrowing the gap between the programmes of Hamas and Fatah, thus widening the arena for dialogue.
