Obama, McCain and Palestine

The exit of Bush from the White House is already anticipated in the Arab region with sighs of relief. But what is ahead under the next US president; more of the same, regardless of who wins, or change?
Obama, McCain and Palestine
As Palestinians wonder what the next US presidency will hold for them, they would do well to eschew pessimism but embrace realism, writes Samir Ghattas
Barack Obama made a reconnaissance trip to several Middle Eastern countries, in the course of which he took in Jerusalem and Ramallah as well. As expected, the US Democratic Party candidate expressed great sympathy and support for Israeli positions. After all, he had to keep his eye on voters in the US in the run up to the November elections. Nevertheless, an initial reading of Obama's visit suggests that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will probably be high on his foreign policy agenda if elected president. Contrary to all his predecessors, he declared from Amman and Ramallah that he would try to boost the Middle East peace process from his first day in office. His visit further suggests that he is inclined to deal with the conflicting parties in a less biased manner than his predecessors, albeit, of course, within the framework of the US's well-known pro-Israeli stances on the conflict and how to resolve it. Indeed, this may be the message that he wanted to send out from Ramallah to a broader audience of Arab countries that Bush's Middle Eastern policies have driven into separate, if not opposing, camps.
The Obama tour also offers an opportunity to probe and assess some of the darker corners of the ways Arab media and political mentalities read the US electoral campaign. Ideological biases are thinly concealed in most of these analyses, which hastily pass premature judgements. Not that this is uncommon in the formulaic ways that Arab commentators tend to handle political phenomena. With respect to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, most readings attempted to predict how each of the presidential candidates would think and act with respect to the conflict. In addition to the obvious ideological blinkers that surrounded them, these attempts also reflected a tendency to generalise on matters that require from the discerning analyst not only the ability to distinguish different colours but also the ability to differentiate between different shades of the same colour.
The tendency to generalise is clearly evident in Arab and Palestinian public opinion on the presidential contender in whom they have the greatest confidence. One survey of public opinion in Europe and the Middle East on Obama versus McCain found that 65 per cent of Europeans felt that Obama would rectify US foreign policy as opposed to 35 per cent in favour of McCain on this question. In the Middle East, opinion was divided between the two. In Jordan, both candidates received a 23 per cent vote of confidence. In Egypt, Obama at 31 per cent came out slightly ahead of McCain at 23 per cent. These results tell us that about half of the respondents believed that US policy was unlikely to change at all. Of those that felt there could be change, there was a slight if understandable bias in favour of Obama. There may be some obvious ready-to-hand explanations for these results. Nevertheless, from the political and even pragmatic standpoints they should be given closer inspection, bringing to bear a different approach and mentality. As important as such an endeavour is, I suggest that we wade through some of prevalent Arab attitudes on the US elections and make our way to an assessment of Palestinian expectations from these elections, as risky as such an attempt may be.
AST US PRESIDENTS AND PALESTINE: A general stocktaking of the attitudes of previous US presidents towards the Palestinian question is important in this context, given how strongly Palestinian expectations are influenced by the widespread attitude that it is pointless for them to have any expectations at all since the position of the US government and its presidents is firmly and immutably staunchly pro-Israeli and anti- Palestinian. Such an opinion tends blind those that hold it to any possible positive development, even if only relative, in the positions of American presidents as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict unfolds. Furthermore, in political climates saturated with mounting hatred towards the US, very few of those who have observed such relatively positive shifts dare point these out in public.
Yet it is my belief that a retrospective of the positions of US presidents from 1947 to the present on the Palestinian question may contribute significantly to the formulation of rational and coherent Palestinian expectations with regard to the orientations and policies of the next US president. Interestingly, President Woodrow Wilson, who occupied the White House at the time of the Balfour Declaration, supported the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine but had serious doubts over whether Washington should actively assist the project. Moving closer to the critical juncture, Franklin Roosevelt continued support for the Jewish homeland in Palestine, but his position was strongly influenced by sensitivity to Arab governments in the view of the need to keep them calm following the outbreak of World War II. He voiced his opinion in a letter to the Saudi king on 17 July 1943 in which he wrote: "Your Majesty will recall that on previous occasions I communicated to you the attitude of the American Government toward Palestine and made clear our desire that no decision be taken with respect to the basic situation in that country without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews."
More significantly, Roosevelt was the first president to suggest the establishment of a protectorate over Palestine, a fact that, as we will see further on, will have considerable bearing on the matter of Palestinian expectations of the next US president.
President Harry Truman's positions had such an influence on the Palestinian question that they should probably be accorded a separate in-depth study. Truman was the president who supported UN Resolution 181 of 29 November 1947 calling for the partition of Palestine. At the time he admitted that he had come under heavy pressure to support this resolution and that the White House, in turn, exerted such pressure on other governments towards the same end. It is important, here, to note that Truman had initially turned against the partition resolution when he realised its potential repercussions on US-Soviet relations. Moreover, he gave priority to this fear over the effect his position on partition was having on the popularity of the Democratic Party with respect to his Republican contender. Truman was reported to have said, "It is time we turn our thought to the fact that we could lose the United States while holding on to the Democratic Party." Truman asked for a special General Assembly meeting during which he asked Palestine to halt its partition drive. However, the US failed to obtain a resolution towards this end in view of Soviet opposition. On the other hand, Truman was the first head of state to recognise Israel and the first US president to commit the US to guaranteeing the security of Israel, a pledge renewed by every one of his successors.
In the next phase, which lasted from 1948 to about 1970, US presidents dealt with the Palestinian question as though it were purely a humanitarian refugee issue. The first signs of change occurred under President Nixon and were expressed in the Rogers Peace Initiative. As he embarked on this drive, Secretary of State William Rogers declared, "The US will not help Israel to make any major changes to the pre-1967 borders. There can be no lasting peace without a just settlement of the problem of those Palestinians whom the wars of 1947 and 1967 made homeless." Soon some appeals in support of Palestinian rights could be heard in Congress. Senator McGovern urged allowing the Palestinians to take part in negotiations and Representative Lee Hamilton called for the recognition of the Palestinians' right to self- determination. Then, Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco suggested giving the Palestinian national movement the possibility of expressing itself as an entity on the ground. This was followed by the first official US recognition of the existence of the Palestinian people. In his speech before the General Assembly on 25 April 1972, Secretary of State Rogers said: "A comprehensive solution that complies with Security Council Resolution 242 must respect the legitimate aspirations of the governments of both sides as well as the aspirations of the Palestinian people."
Eventually American resistance in principle to Palestinian participation in negotiations crumbled. In a conference in Geneva, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger proposed that this be accomplished through a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Developments quickly followed in the Gerald Ford era. On 12 November 1975, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders delivered a speech stating that the Palestinian dimension of the Arab- Israeli conflict was the heart of that conflict and that the Palestinians were a people with a distinct identity and a desire to have a voice in the determination of their political status.
Under President Jimmy Carter another considerably important document emerged. This was the Brookings Institution report that stated that any solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict must provide for the Palestinian right to self-determination after the Palestinians agree to recognise Israel, and that this right could take the form of an independent Palestinian state or an entity voluntarily federated with Jordan. Carter, himself, stated in March 1977 that Palestinian refugees had to have a homeland. In May that year he said that a homeland for the Palestinians and a solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees were extremely important and that the degree of autonomy of the Palestinian entity and its relationship with Jordan, Syria or other countries, and its geographical boundaries, had to be clarified by the parties concerned. He further spoke of a nation as a homeland for that people. These developments, especially after the inclusion of a reference to the need to "include representatives of the Palestinian people" in Middle East peace negotiations in the joint US-Soviet statement issued 1 October 1977, triggered sharp tensions between Washington and Israel. Carter was therefore compelled to clarify his position. On 28 November that year he said, "What I prefer is not for them not to form an independent state but to be connected in some way to the neighbouring countries and to choose, for example, between Israel and Jordan ... However, if Israel negotiates another type of settlement with its neighbouring countries we would obviously support that." He then took another step backward and said that safeguarding a lasting peace would be easier without the rise of a new independent radical state in the heart of the Middle East. Ambassador Alfred Atherton, who was closely involved in Middle East policy during the Carter administration, also took a softer line, saying that the Palestinians had an identity that had to be taken into consideration. That is as far the official position dared to go.
Ronald Reagan came to power in January 1981 and remained in office for two terms. His tenure coincided with a drift towards a more active and interventionist foreign policy as the pendulum of the American mood swung away from the moral tenor that had prevailed in the post-Vietnam era. On the Palestinian issue, the Reagan administration took strides backward from Carter's positions. Reagan was the first US president to maintain that Israeli settlements in the occupied territories were not illegal. He also stated in no uncertain terms that he did not sympathise with the Palestinians. His closest aides were proponents of the theory that Israel was a strategic asset for the US leading, in November 1981, to Washington signing a strategic memorandum of understanding with Israel. But not only did the Reagan administration set the quest for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict on a back burner, it gave the green light for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon that culminated in the departure of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) from Beirut in 1982.
Nevertheless, following that war Reagan launched a peace initiative of his own that was founded on the following positions: first, the US would not support the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza but it would also not support Israel's permanent annexation and control over those territories; second, Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza in cooperation with Jordan would offer the best opportunity to establish a just and lasting peace. Reagan also called for an immediate freeze on Israeli settlement expansion in the occupied territories and he said, "We still are convinced that Jerusalem should remain undivided, but its final status must be determined through negotiations."
Reagan's successor, George Bush Sr, became president against a totally different international and regional backdrop. The PLO had met US conditions for opening negotiations between them, which had begun in Tunisia on 16 December 1988. The PLO had also adopted the peace initiative founded on the two-state solution. Bush Sr's team of advisors, which consisted among others of James Baker, Dennis Ross and Richard Haas, espoused the principle that guarantees would lead to a settlement. In the aftermath of the first Gulf war, Bush Sr focused his efforts on the Madrid peace conference, held in October 1991. A Palestinian delegation took part in that conference as part of the Jordanian delegation. Most of the Palestinian delegates were well known members of the PLO leadership although this affiliation was deliberately downplayed. Eventually, after mediated negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis in Washington, the two sides agreed to hold secret direct negotiations in Oslo.
Bill Clinton, who served from 1993 to 2000, was the president who gave his blessing to the Oslo Accords. Clinton took a much more active role in supervising the peace process and pushing for the implementation of the provisions of Oslo. He had to intervene on numerous occasions in order to rescue the settlement process from collapse and he personally took part in the Wye River negotiations that led to an understanding between Palestinian Authority (PA) President Yasser Arafat and then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. When the interim period stipulated under Oslo lapsed without the Palestinians and Israelis having even begun final status negotiations, Clinton flew to Gaza in another attempt to salvage the Oslo process. He was the first US president to visit the occupied territories. Then, before leaving the White House, he struck another precedent as the first US president to take the risk of bringing the Palestinians and Israelis together in Camp David for direct negotiations, actively supervised by the US, over a comprehensive settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Although these negotiations failed they nevertheless produced a very important political document, known as the "Clinton paper", which set out the general framework for a Palestinian-Israeli accord. However, that document was shelved with the political about-face that occurred with the rise of Ariel Sharon to power in Israel and Bush Jr's ascendancy to the presidency in the US.
The Bush administration was strongly influenced by two highly significant phenomena: the overwhelming rise of neoconservative culture and its project for a "New American Century", and the events of 11 September with all their repercussions on US foreign policy and Middle East policy in particular. Initially, this administration adopted a hands-off policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, perhaps at Clinton's recommendation derived from his experience in Camp David. Following 11 September, however, Bush shifted tack. On 10 November 2001, he delivered a speech to the UN General Assembly in which he supported the creation of an independent Palestinian state. Shortly afterwards, the Arab summit that was held in Beirut on 28 March 2002, adopted the Arab Peace Initiative, after which Washington once more became more actively involved in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, leading to the Mitchell recommendations, the Tenet plan, the frequent shuttling back-and-forth of Bush's special envoy Anthony Zinni, not to mention the personal efforts of Secretary of State Colin Powell.
The most important landmark during this period was Bush's unveiling, on 24 June 2002, of the "roadmap" -- a plan, conceived and supported by the Quartet whose ultimate goal was to create "a viable, sovereign, independent and democratic Palestinian state that would live side-by-side with Israel." However, Bush was the first president to make progress on the roadmap conditional upon democratic reform of the PA and the redistribution of powers between the Palestinian president and a newly introduced post of prime minister brought to power through parliamentary elections. He also insisted that the PA take action to halt all acts of violence from the West Bank and Gaza and to dismantle Palestinian militias. On the other hand, Bush never commented on the 14 "reservations" Israel appended to its approval of the roadmap, which is, perhaps, understandable. But then he personally handed Prime Minister Sharon a letter of understanding, dated 16 April 2004, that flies in the face of the text and spirit of the roadmap, which stipulates that no definitive positions should be taken on any of the issues that are presumed to be subject to negotiation between the two sides. Such subjects include borders, Israeli settlements and the Palestinian refugee problem. Perhaps as a last ditch attempt to rescue the peace process from total collapse, Bush called for an international conference in Annapolis on 27 November 2007 in the hope of realising his vision for a two-state solution before leaving the White House at the end of 2008.
ETERMINANTS ON THE NEXT US PRESIDENT: The purpose of the foregoing retrospective was to underscore the generally positive trajectory in the positions of successive US presidents towards the Palestinian cause, in spite of periods of retrogression, decline or wavering. I believe it was necessary to recapitulate and acknowledge this trajectory as a prelude to building realistic Palestinian expectations of the next US president and, perhaps more importantly, to help the Palestinians see a way out from the futile cycle of obfuscation, over-simplification and excessive pessimism.
What, one wonders, has driven the Palestinian political mentality to deliberately overlook the relatively positive developments in the official US stance on the Palestinian cause? Surely this tendency not only fails to do credit to but also undermines the strenuous efforts and enormous sacrifices the Palestinian people themselves have made to propel the US in this direction. Some analysts attribute the phenomenon to ideological entrenchment or to the wariness of a demagogic climate inimical to free and independent expression of opinion. Be that as it may, what concerns us here is the need to identify, as much as possible, the factors that have induced positive developments in the stances of US presidents towards the Palestinian question and the factors that may have hampered such developments.
As a whole, it is possible to point to three chief factors, the first being the American assessment of how Israel fits into US strategy. The historical record of the attitudes of US presidents towards the Palestinian cause testifies to an inverse relationship between Washington's assessment of Israel as a strategic asset and hesitancy to take more positive and sophisticated stances on the Palestinian question and to propel the peace process forward. Conversely, the Palestinians could expect Washington to give them more favourable attention if its assessment of Israel's strategic importance were different, as would be the case if the decisions of the forthcoming president were influenced by the growing trend in the US to regard Washington's absolute support for Israel -- without linking it to progress on the peace process -- as detrimental to America's strategic interests in the Middle East. Indeed, such a view was taken into account in the formulation of US Middle East policy in the wake of the October 1973 war and in the assessments of such influential figures as Anthony Cordesman, George Ball, William Fulbright and Zbigniew Brzezinski.
The second factor is Washington's perception of international rivalry over the Middle East and its stances on existing conflicts and the threat of war in the region. The impact of this factor is clearly visible in the shifts in position of many US presidents. Truman changed his mind about the UN partition resolution following the outbreak of the 1948 war. Similarly, Nixon and Carter adopted a different tack following the 1973 war, as did Reagan after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Bush Sr engineered the Madrid peace conference in the aftermath of the first Gulf War and Bush Jr tried to revive a peace drive following 11 September and the 2003 war on Iraq. Perhaps the Palestinians should give closer consideration to this factor in view of the likelihood of another war in the Middle East, whether against Iran due to the purported threat from its nuclear programme, or against Lebanon or Syria.
The third factor is the efficacy of the Arab role, which by no means should be underestimated or excluded from Palestinian calculations. This role has frequently been put to the test in the course of which it was demonstrated that the closer the Arabs worked together and the more they interacted constructively with other factors propelling towards more favourable US stances the more influential it has been.
Obviously, building rational Palestinian expectations from the forthcoming US president is contingent upon a reasonable presence of -- and interplay between -- the three factors above within the framework of the determinants of US domestic policy, which usually tend to outweigh external factors. It follows, therefore, that those concerned with building Palestinian expectations should give close attention to such domestic determinants as power balances in Congress and between Congress and the executive; the influence of pressure groups, most notably the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and the Committee on US Interests in the Middle East; and the assessments and attitudes of the Pentagon and State Department. All of these determinants will interact with the dynamism, charisma and other traits of the next incumbent and shape the political environment in which he takes his decisions.
At the same time, we must be on guard against allowing our affirmation of a positive trajectory in attitudes of former US presidents on the Palestinian question to delude us into automatically projecting that trajectory onto the next president. Before rushing to any conclusions it is essential to give close and objective study to the above-mentioned factors that could propel the president in that direction or an opposing one.
HREE TRENDS, THREE EXPECTATIONS: Time after time and from one president to the next the Palestinians build their expectations on the almost knee-jerk premise that US pressure on Israel is the only instrument that can promote progress on the negotiating track. The US pressure theory occupies a prominent place in Palestinian rhetoric across the shades of the political spectrum. As the cornerstone upon which virtually all Palestinian expectations rest, it was almost always guaranteed to yield disappointment in view of US presidents' reluctance to bring the desired pressure to bear. This theory should have been subjected to analytical critique years ago. Nevertheless, there remains an opportunity to avert its trap as we embark on the process of shaping Palestinian expectations with regard to the next US president.
The "all that is needed is for the US to pressure Israel" theory needs to be addressed at three levels. The first is Palestinian persistence in perennially and uncritically recycling it without reaping any returns on this persistence. The second is Palestinian explanations for why US presidents refuse to exert the pressure that Palestinians ask to be wielded against Israel, as just as this request is from their perspective. For the most part, these explanations rarely depart from the framework of the notion of the overwhelming influence of the Zionist lobby on US decision-making, combined with the notion of the function of Israel as a major strategic asset for the US in the Middle East. As important as such explanations are, I believe that a more comprehensive approach, one that embraces, perhaps, ideological and cultural facets, will have the power to produce a more accurate and less mono- dimensional explanation of why US presidents refuse to pressure Israel.
The third level has to do with Palestinian inability to come up with an alternative hypothesis that would be more subtle and more realistic and, hence, more helpful to the process of building expectations of the forthcoming president.
At this juncture, however, it is important to take a closer look at the terms that are being used so frequently in reference to Palestinian expectations, not least of which is this very term. "Palestinian expectations" is heavily laden with generalist and reductionist connotations. There are at least three distinct major Palestinian trends, the differences between which are sometimes such as to make them virtually antithetical. These diverse trends, therefore, logically defy being classed under the same heading as "Palestinian expectations," since each has its own vision, project and approaches. These three trends are: that led and epitomised by PA President Mahmoud Abbas. This body of opinion espouses immediate final status negotiations to be pursued, not in accordance with the three phases called for by the roadmap but rather as quickly as possible so as to be able to reach a settlement within the period left before Bush leaves the White House. If such an agreement can be reached, the leaders of this trend plan to put it to a national referendum so as to settle the matter. They would, therefore, expect the new president to put all his weight behind the implementation of the agreement if, indeed, one can be reached under Bush. If not, they would expect him to sustain the impetus of the negotiating process from the advanced stage it had reached by the end of Bush's term instead of allowing it to revert to square one. As difficult as it is to read Abbas's preferences in view of the delicacy of his official position, one could still make an educated guess as to what will shape his expectations.
In the event that the Republican candidate, John McCain, wins as president, his stance on a settlement will be strongly governed by the position of the ruling Israeli coalition. If public opinion polls in Israel are accurate, then Likud, headed by Netanyahu, will most likely head the next coalition together with the ultranationalist and ultra- religious right. In this case, the Republican president would operate from the premise of not forcing Israel to do anything it does not want to do. If McCain chooses to pursue the negotiating process according to the roadmap, he would also be more inclined to appending Likud's 14 reservations and the substance of Bush's letter to Sharon. But there are other possibilities that should not be ruled out. McCain, if he becomes president, could choose another route to promote a settlement. He could circumvent the roadmap and opt for the so-called "regional solution", which would entail ignoring the de facto situation that Hamas created in Gaza and exerting pressure to link Gaza to Egypt and to link the West Bank to Israel and Jordan in a form of an economic federation. The formula certainly coincides with the Likud outlook.
If, on the other hand, Democratic candidate Obama wins, Abbas's expectations could be founded on the possibility that Obama would revive the Clinton formula and the Clinton style of bringing the two sides together in face-to-face negotiations over final status issues. The US would be more actively involved in sponsoring and brokering these negotiations than ever before, or it could bring into a play a trusted third party. As for the details of the proposal that Clinton presented to the two sides in Camp David and then in Taba, Abbas would naturally hope that Obama would not feel obliged to keep those proposals that the Palestinians regard as too biased in favour of Israel and that may have been inspired by electoral considerations at the time.
Hamas is the second Palestinian trend and the strongest rival to that led by Abbas. The difference between the two trends is not in their ultimate objective, which is the two-state solution, but rather in their conflict over the position that would give them the right to represent the Palestinian people, to negotiate a settlement on their behalf, and to lead them in the establishment of an independent state.
Hamas as a whole is very pragmatic and has exhibited a considerable degree of flexibility when necessary. Not the least testimony to this is that it entered the parliamentary elections of 25 June 2005 and agreed to the necessary conditions, such as accepting a truce, which it had formerly rejected. Contrary to the general impression, Hamas has no objection to forging a systematic official relationship with Washington. Indeed, quite to the contrary, for which reason it is very careful in most of its literature not to criticise the US too strongly. It is also highly significant in this regard that Hamas laid out the red carpet for former President Carter when he visited Gaza and handed him a letter containing an assurance of Hamas's acceptance of the two-state solution. In addition, numerous reports indicate the existence of several back channels of communications with various agencies in the US. Ahmed Youssef, advisor to Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, springs to mind here. On the first anniversary of the capture of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit Youssef appeared in interview aired on Israeli television to tell viewers that he had transmitted a letter from Shalit to his family through American Jewish groups, which suggests that these groups may be one of the channels through which Hamas is in contact with non- official and perhaps official agencies in the US. Youssef is also reported to have said, "We support Obama and hope he wins the elections." Naturally, such a statement was ready fodder for the McCain camp, forcing Obama to respond by levelling harsh accusations against Hamas.
In the event of a McCain victory, Hamas may expect a tougher US stance towards it. The Republican administration would keep Hamas's name on the list of terrorist organisations and up the pressure on this movement to yield to the conditions of the Quartet. As dire as such predictions may seem, Hamas may actually find a McCain victory more suited to its purpose, because any obstruction to or setbacks in the negotiating process will strengthen Hamas's position and influence with respect to Fatah and the Abbas front. If, on the other hand, Obama wins, Hamas could expect not only a less hard-line stance but also, perhaps, willingness on the part of a Democratic administration to talk. At the same time, however, it should anticipate stronger US support for Abbas as a negotiating partner committed to peace that, in turn, could inspire the PA president to appeal for an intensification of US mediating efforts to propel negotiations to a new phase. As one of the conditions of this would be to rein in Hamas, Haaretz of 22 April 2008 was of the opinion that Hamas serves McCain, not Obama. Indeed, that may be exactly what Hamas intended when it declared its support for Obama.
The third Palestinian trend is represented by the government of Salam Fayyad who, in spite of the fact that he has no armed faction or militia to rely on, has been steadily carving out a course of his own between Fatah and Hamas. What Fayyad has in his favour is strong US, European and international support for the model of sensible leadership he is striving to promote in Palestinian society. Fayyad has called for the construction and development of a "state in the making", one that voluntarily conforms to international standards for sound democratic administration, transparent and honest institutionalised government, and a single authority with the sole right to maintain the arms necessary to safeguard security and maintain law and order. Fayyad is convinced that this formula serves the higher Palestinian interest before any other party, as it is the route that will enable Palestinians to climb in international esteem and to generate a greater tide of support for their right to an independent Palestinian state.
Contrary to Abbas, Fayyad has declared on several occasions that he does not entertain the hope that an agreement can be reached with Israel before the end of 2008. On the other hand, his liberal model stands in sharp contrast to Hamas's fundamentalist one in Gaza. In my opinion, regardless of whether the next incumbent in the US is the Republican McCain or the Democrat Obama, the Fayyad trend can expect more support from Washington in the interest of strengthening his position in the face of bids on the part of both Fatah and Hamas to isolate him and topple his government. It could also anticipate more active US intervention to compel Israel to relax its grip on the West Bank by removing barriers, allowing the PA to assert security control there, halting settlement construction and dismantling settlement "outposts", helping develop Palestinian economic resources and gradually restoring the situation in the West Bank to the way it stood before the beginning of the construction of the separation wall in 2002.
HE COST OF DISUNITY: The foregoing was a panorama of possible Palestinian expectations from three perspectives. In view of the autonomous capacities of the Palestinians and their current state of political fragmentation, their ability to influence US decision-making circles cannot possibly hold a candle to Israel's capacities in this regard. Consequently, the three trends will undoubtedly have to modify their expectations in accordance with whatever new foreign policy emerges from Washington under either McCain or Obama. This is not to say that the Palestinians have no other options for positively influencing how the forthcoming US president will think. But that is another question and one that requires considerably more space.