The prospects for peace, writes Abdel-Moneim Said following his return from the US capital, are more positive than at any time in recent memory "My name is Barack Hussein Obama and I want to be your friend and work with you in the interest of bringing peace to the Middle East." Such were the words spoken by the American president-elect to the Egyptian president immediately after November's US elections. He reiterated this message to President Hosni Mubarak upon entering the Oval Office in January in the first phone call Obama made to a foreign head of state. Egyptian-US relations thus entered a new phase, one of ever growing closeness, which culminated in Mubarak's visit to Washington last week. Although the visit lasted only two days, it marks the beginning of a train of developments that will leave their imprint on the region for generations. "The revival of the strategic partnership," announced one senior US official. It is a strategic relationship that has formed the backbone of any movement towards peace and regional cooperation achieved since the end of the October 1973 War up to the collapse of Palestinian-Israeli talks at the end of the Clinton presidency. At that point the partnership faced arduous tests as a succession of tragic and disastrous events occurred: the second Palestinian Intifada, the events of 11 September 2001, Israel's war against Hizbullah and its more recent assault on Gaza, and the outbreak of full- scale wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in which the US led a coalition of other countries. On top of these upheavals a growing number of countries in the region entered the swelling ranks of "failed states". The Bush administration's mounting pressures on Egypt during this period placed such heavy strains on the strategic partnership as to effectively jettison the only compass steering the region away from conflict and war. According to one highly-placed Egyptian source I had the opportunity to interview over a leisurely dinner, what undermined the relationship between Cairo and Washington was the Bush administration's determination to "tame" Egypt. They wanted Egypt to become one of those countries that would jump to attention whenever Washington snapped its fingers. When the Bush administration first exhibited signs of this tendency Egyptian officials were inclined to put them down to inexperience and the kind of "toughness" that the neoconservatives felt should characterise their style in public. Unfortunately, it soon became apparent that the White House was dominated by a brand of fanatics who regarded Egypt not as a strategic partner but as a subordinate on the receiving end of a chain of command emanating from Washington. At times it seemed as if the neoconservative administration wanted to engineer a complete break with the past when it came to Egyptian-US relations. At one point US officials conveyed a message that President Mubarak should stop sending his greetings to George Bush senior when talking to George Bush junior! Initial signs of a domineering attitude turned into a torrent of heavy-handedness following 11 September 2001. Washington insisted Cairo must take part in the war in Afghanistan and then in the war in Iraq. It pressed Cairo to intervene in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region in accordance with plans drawn up in Washington. Cairo fully appreciated the magnitude of 11 September, not least because Egypt had faced its own battle against terrorism. But appreciation was one thing, blindly following the US from one military adventure to the next another. To begin with, Egypt was not prepared to commit its forces to operations in which they would be compelled to kill fellow Arabs or Muslims. When Egypt took part in the war to liberate Kuwait, alongside other Arab and Western forces, it was to liberate an occupied Arab country. Cairo's position at the time was very clear: its forces would not take part in operations beyond the Kuwaiti borders. Egypt had another reason for its refusal to take part in the subsequent American-led battles in the region. From a purely military perspective, it is relatively easy for US forces to intervene in an Arab or Islamic country for a few days or even weeks. But should the war drag on for months, or even years, the human and material costs would be enormous, and the strategic situation in the region would become steadily more perilous. The Egyptian prognosis proved accurate, not that Cairo could take any pleasure in being right. At each successive stage in its failing enterprises Washington heaped more of its anger and frustration on Egypt. After invading Afghanistan in order to put an end to terrorism, and then invading Iraq on the spurious grounds of eliminating weapons of mass destruction, the Bush administration suddenly decided that its real aim was to spread "democracy" in the Middle East. Now Egypt had no problem in discussing the question of democracy and considering ways to address the democratic deficit in the region. But Cairo knew perfectly well that democratisation was a façade and Washington's real aim was to force Egypt to become involved in two futile wars, as well as compel it to toe the neoconservative line on the Arab-Israeli conflict and other regional issues. According to my source, the folly and arrogance that was gripping Washington reached its apogee when the US secretary of state delivered a lecture on democracy at the American University in Cairo while Bush, himself, set off to Sharm El-Sheikh to provide Egypt with a few supplementary lessons. Sadly, some Egyptian officials swallowed the bait and began to believe that democracy was heading to Egypt on the barrels of American tanks. This deception was not the only tactic in the campaign against Egypt and its regime. We began to hear of Egypt's declining regional role, its inability to contribute to reshaping the region, and the depletion of its influence in comparison with that of emerging regional powers. Worse yet, some Egyptian forces, for reasons of their own, chorused the tune being played by neoconservative research centres in the US, and soon it was being echoed across portions of the media. It took six years for the Bush administration to recognise its blunders and by the time it began to reconsider its attitude in 2007 it was too late. There was little Washington could do to regain Egypt's confidence after so much bullying, tension beneath the surface and blows below the belt. President Obama's words to President Mubarak acted as a balm. When asked what the revival of the strategic partnership between Cairo and Washington meant to him, a senior American official related an exchange from the meeting that had taken place earlier that same day between Mubarak and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. In short, he said the Egyptian president's perspective on the Iranian situation added new and unfamiliar dimensions to Washington's commonly held notions on Iran and were much appreciated by his interlocutors. The same applied to the president's analyses of other parties and situations in the region. Perhaps there will come a time when I will relay what was related to me about the perspectives the Egyptian president presented on various issues. What concerns me here, though, is the manner in which the process of rebuilding a strategic understanding between Egypt and the US is being pursued. On the first day of his visit to Washington, President Mubarak met the secretary of state and her team, the director of the National Intelligence Council and Obama's national security advisor. In each of these meetings the Egyptian and American sides presented their assessment of the situation. This was followed by questions, which would continue until each side fully appreciated the other's position. Mubarak was the spokesman for the Egyptian delegation, presenting its positions, offering advice and adding further explanations, although at times he would defer to Ahmed Abul-Gheit and Omar Suleiman to provide details, facts and figures. Not that that was the whole of the first day's business. Two more meetings were scheduled. One was with a group of opinion-makers and others concerned with developments in the Middle East and Egyptian-US relations whose views the president wanted to hear. The second meeting was with a group of Jewish leaders whose outlooks, regardless of how we might differ with them, must be heard and taken into consideration if the peace process is to turn from words to deeds. I also heard that former presidents Clinton and Bush Senior both tried to meet Mubarak in person, but that their schedules could not be made to mesh. Instead, they held lengthy telephone conversations with the Egyptian president, though the substance of these conversations has not been made public. The most crucial day of President Mubarak's visit was 18 August when he met with President Obama in the White House. Naturally, the details of this meeting have not been disclosed, but we can presume that the outcomes of the previous day's meetings were transformed into decisions, programmes and future projections. And during the joint press conference the two presidents held with Egyptian and American journalists it was evident that the Egyptian-US strategic partnership had regained much of its former vitality. It was also clear that the Palestinian question had re-emerged as a top priority and that both sides were determined to press ahead with efforts to realise a settlement that both parties could live with and develop in the future. So what can we expect in the near future? From what I gathered on the meetings between the Egyptians and Americans in Washington circumstances are propelling momentum towards a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The guns are silent on all fronts. The Israelis, as stubborn as they might be, realise that they are facing a historic opportunity. On the Palestinian side moderates have gained ground since the Fatah conference, while Hamas is currently absorbing the lessons of recent events in Gaza and, in any case, will not deviate far from the position of Syria, which also wants to reach a settlement. The regional situation seems to offer hope as well. Both Iran and Hizbullah are taking stock of their positions following recent elections in both Lebanon and Iran. In both cases, whatever the rhetoric, there may well be a desire to finally give peace a chance. In light of these developments we can anticipate a scenario that will pass through three stages. The first is the arrival at a compromise on the question of Israeli settlements whereby Israel agrees to halt settlement construction for a stipulated period during which negotiations can be held. At the same time, a compromise will be struck on normalisation under which a number of Arab states will resume limited levels of representation in Israel. The second stage will be inaugurated by the unveiling of Obama's plan for a settlement. This will consist of a blend of general principles towards realising what everyone knows is the solution, ie a mix of the Clinton proposals, the Taba accord and the Geneva agreement. In the third phase, the principals will be invited to a new peace conference to discuss final status issues. When I asked an American official how long he expected all this to take, he told me between four and six weeks. I put the same question to an Egyptian official who suggested that the process might take a little longer. In either case we won't have long to wait.
