Since 1952, Egyptian foreign policy has been in the hands of lone individuals. This can no longer be the case, writes El-Sayed Amin Shalabi* In the last 60 years, Egypt changed its foreign policy three times, reflecting not just the change in the international situation or domestic circumstances, but changes in leadership. The personality and individual vision of the president seemed to be the ultimate factor defining the country's external politics. In the early 1950s, Egypt's revolutionary regime vowed to end British occupation, modernise the army, and raise the standards of living for the entire population. The British left with relative ease, their forces evacuating the Suez Canal zone in 1954. The regime's next step was to ask the US, and other Western nations, for help with the army modernisation and the building of the High Dam, a project to which the country's new strongman, Gamal Abdel-Nasser, was particularly attached. The Americans were not as forthcoming as Nasser had expected. The negotiations over the High Dam ended when the US withdrew its offer to finance it. And the negotiations concerning the modernisation of the Egyptian army also fell apart. Nasser was too resourceful to give up, and before long he did the unthinkable. His nationalisation of the Suez Canal was a watershed not only for Egypt but also for international politics. The subsequent 1956 war helped boost his fortunes, turning him into a symbol for national liberation and a leader of the non-alignment movement. Then Nasser turned east, asking the Soviets to help with building the High Dam and re-equipping the Egyptian army. There was no question by now about who was formulating the country's foreign policy: Nasser was sole decision maker in matters of war and peace. This was disastrously true in 1967, when Nasser closed the Aqaba Straits and pulled out international forces from Sinai without being really ready for war. Egypt's second president, Anwar El-Sadat, initially promised to maintain the policies of his predecessor, but proceeded to do just the opposite. He expelled Soviet advisers in 1972 and then, still needing them as allies, he signed a friendship agreement with the Russians, a concession that Nasser had refused to even consider. Eventually, Sadat edged closer to America. One of his top aides, Hafez Ismail, started negotiating with Henry Kissinger, but Sadat retained his tight hold on foreign policy in much the same way Nasser did. Everything Sadat did in foreign policy came as a surprise to his aides. His decision to expel the Soviet experts was all too sudden. His decision to go to Jerusalem was so extraordinary that then Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi had to resign. Sadat signed the Camp David Accords against the advice of his own negotiators, thus forcing another foreign minister, Mohamed Ibrahim Kamel, to quit. Just before the 1973 war, Sadat created a new post, that of national security adviser, to help out with foreign policy. On the surface, the president wanted someone to share the responsibility for formulating foreign policy, but the reality was another thing. The national security adviser in Egypt was not expected to make policy, but to do the footwork Sadat needed to make his decisions. Those who filled this post scouted the diplomatic scene, made the trips, conveyed the messages, but didn't make policy, at least not in the way the National Security Council does in the US. The next president was obsessed with maintaining good relations with the US and safeguarding the peace treaty with Israel. In 1991, Mubarak sent Egyptian troops to participate in the US-led international coalition to liberate Kuwait. In 2003, during another US-led war on Iraq, he permitted US military vessels to sail through the Suez Canal. Mubarak also refrained from establishing full relations with Iran, a sworn enemy of Washington. Under Mubarak, Egypt distanced itself from Hizbullah and Hamas, signed the Qualified Industrial Zones agreement with Israel, and supplied Israel with natural gas. Just as his predecessors did, Mubarak kept a tight hold on foreign policy. When he needed help with thorny regional issues, he called not on diplomats but on top intelligence officials. Mubarak claimed that he was acting in the best interests of the country, but under him Egypt's regional role receded, Israel was never called to account, and Egypt appeared to be taking cues from Washington. Six decades have passed with presidents controlling foreign policy to the exclusion of professional institutions. Now that the country has turned a corner, one imagines that foreign policy will become more susceptible to public opinion. But this is not the whole story. Regardless of the nature of Egypt's future regime, it will have to keep in mind not just public opinion, but the need to develop the kind regional and international goodwill needed to keep the economy going. When Arab League chief Nabil El-Arabi was foreign minister, he proposed the creation of a National Security Council in Egypt. Now would be a good time to do that. Egypt can no longer afford that its foreign policy is run as a one man show. * The writer is managing director of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs.
