In Focus: Can we end the violence? Across the Arab world the state remains the major party in ongoing conflicts. It stands to reason, then, writes Galal Nassar, that the state must itself be overhauled if conflicts are to be resolved Last week I argued that a rethinking of pan-Arab discourse is a political, social and economic necessity. It is no longer advisable to continue reproducing outmoded ways of thinking in the hope that somehow this will end the crisis in inter-Arab affairs. Today, I will try to show that violence has become the norm in Arab life, both on official and non-official levels. Take the extraordinary popular and official reaction to the Egypt-Algeria football match in Khartoum on 18 November. The repercussions of that match -- even now far from over -- should have been enough to shock us out of our slumber, affording a glimpse into the dark abyss on the edge of which we stand. The excessive sensitivity exhibited by the public matched the parlous state of regional stability, the volatility of latent tensions and frustrations. Even without looking into the causes of the events or assigning blame, Khartoum and its aftermath is evidence of how Arab societies have turned into a powder keg vulnerable to any spark. But there are many types of violence besetting the domestic scenes of Arab countries, making relations among them unpredictable and unstable. One form of violence is directly related to politics. It can take the form of insurgency by political groups or movements, and attempts by the regime to suppress the opposition. Often, opposition leaders find themselves thrown behind bars, with no recourse to due legal processes. The Islamic opposition is most exposed to such treatment, as we saw in Algeria in the 1990s. Similar situations exist today, albeit on a smaller scale, in many Arab countries. Sectarian violence breaks out sporadically, engulfing parts of Arab countries and sometimes an entire state. Lebanon and Iraq are cases in point. And don't forget Yemen, where a fifth civil war is underway between the government and the Al-Huthi clan. Other conflicts relate to ethnic, nationalist or secessionist issues. Many of these are the result of poor conflict management, the intransigence of the political regime, and the desire of voracious ruling elites to hold on to power at any cost. Many countries have fallen into the inferno of such conflicts. Somalia may be an extreme case. But in Iraq, Sudan and Yemen, governments are having a hard time keeping their countries together. To make things worse, jihadist groups are bent on fighting particular states as well as rival groups, Al-Qaeda being the obvious example. Neighbourliness doesn't seem to count for much either. There are many instances of strained relations among Arab countries. Currently, tensions exist between Morocco and Algeria, Libya and Tunisia, Jordan and Palestine, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq. Violence comes in many shapes and forms and attempts to explain it are as varied. Some analysts claim that cultural pluralism -- ethnic and sectarian -- is the way to end all violence. Others argue ruling elites must review their political and ideological orientation. It has been said that pan- Arabism, an ideology that has fanned conflicts just as it promoted a one-sided concept of nationalism, is to blame for the absence of pluralism in this part of the world. It has also been said that there is something hidden in the Arab psyche that keeps the region in turmoil, a latent need to disagree, a penchant for division and dispute. And there are those who argue that the recurrent eruption of violence is due to widespread disenchantment with modern values, a renewed belief in customs and tradition, and a retreat for the safety thought to reside in religious and doctrinal loyalty. Others focus on the failure of political regimes to provide the foundations on which economic and social progress can be built. As development trailed behind expectations, the gap between the rich and poor widened, giving rise to frustration. Finally, there are those who blame pan-Arab patriotism for a tendency to demonise others rather than try to improve one's own lot. All these factors may play a part in igniting the conflicts one sees on the Arab scene. But they do not explain the extreme volatility of the region, leading some analysts to speculate about a culture of violence and argue that its roots are embedded in religious texts that call for jihad, that urge the faithful to wage a perpetual fight for virtue and against sinfulness. There can, however, be no general theory of violence. Violence changes according to the historical, political and social situation. And conflict most often happens because of a multiple of reasons, not just one. The most noticeable thing about the ongoing conflicts in Arab societies is that the state is invariably a party. The state's involvement often exceeds that of any individual group or militia. In other words, the state is involved in the production, export and triggering of violence. Often the state operates at the heart of conflicts, nourishing some and instigating others, making deals and manipulating players just to keep its ruling elite in place. Generally speaking, it is conflict over power that lies at the heart of the violence taking place in various Arab societies. This conflict turns particularly bloody when oppressed parties see a chance to grab power partially, or entirely, from those who have monopolised it. This being the case, how can one think of a way to defuse tensions and keep violence in check? Even if we have neutral intermediaries, and that's a big if, there is no guarantee that the rival parties would accept mediation, not unless they were about to lose their bid for power anyway. Also, there is no guarantee that mediation would succeed in cases where the resource over which the conflict is being waged is indivisible. In Arab societies, to have the state on one's side is to have unlimited access to resources, posts and power. This may explain the hesitance of the Arab League to mediate in Arab conflicts. The Arab League is a governmental club after all. Any intervention by the Arab League is liable to create more grievances than those it resolves. Over the years numerous Islamic and Arab groups have interceded with Arab governments to release intellectuals who have been languishing in their prisons because of their political views. In virtually all cases the pleas fell on deaf ears. Arab countries' structure of power is so totalitarian that any concession on any subject, however small, becomes too much of a threat to the rulers. Many rulers think that the very idea of concession will undermine their hold on power. Ruling elites are fighting tooth and nail to stay in office. They refuse to give up anything or give in. Any challenge to their authority is viewed as an act of war. Meanwhile, the opposition can find itself in dire straits: either it faces a slow and painful death or opts for suicide in a hopeless war. To reduce the danger of such situations recurring, action is needed on two fronts. The first step is to reform the state. We need to rehabilitate the state, nationalise it if you like, turning it into a public institution instead of a tool for factional control. This must be the basis for any reform. We need to instigate a political life in which individuals participate as equal citizens without discrimination. This is the way to bring about a natural rotation of power, to end monopoly and despotism, repression and exclusion. The second step is to defuse inter-Arab grievances that surfaced in the 1950s with the rise of pan-Arabism. Then the Arab world was divided between those labelled progressive and others labelled reactionary. Today's hardliners and moderates are vestiges of that period. We need to normalise inter-Arab relations and end the one-upmanship and posturing that have undermined Arab interests. Arab relations should be placed on a proper foundation, capable of exploring the possibility of cooperation in the economic, social and cultural spheres, for the benefit of their own people. To work on the first front is essential if we are to emerge from the cycle of violence. We need to calm the atmosphere and allow the people to express social and political grievances without fear of retribution from the state. In a nutshell, we have to find options other than violence to sort out our grievances. Grievances are like sparks. They will occur but they don't have to start a conflagration. The reason this region keeps going up in flames is not that it has sparks, but that there is kindling everywhere. It is the kindling that needs to be removed. Unless we do that Arab conflicts, political and national, will increase rather than decrease. And as we fight among ourselves we'll lose the battles that matter to us all. We don't need mediation committees. God knows, we've had enough already. What we need is a panel of wise men to guide our path. We need a council of upright and well-intentioned people with a sense of public responsibility. We need scientists, opinion makers, civil activists, people with a known record of public work, to show our rulers how to behave. And we need them to tell the public a bit about their rights and obligations. Only then will we be able to break free from the cycle of violence.
